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1. Introduction 
 
People like to see themselves and the groups they belong to positive. They compare 
themselves and their groups with relevant others with the goal to see themselves as 
relatively better than the others. Moreover, as stated in social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), whenever the comparison leads to a negative outcome they use identity 
management strategies to manage their self or group view. But what happens if they cannot 
restore their positive self or group view? 
Take for example the still existing differences between East Germany and West 
Germany. People living in East Germany might be quite pleased with their situation. 
However, every now and then the media make the comparison between East and West 
Germany salient, for example by stating that the salary in West Germany is still nearly 
20% higher than in East Germany (Görzig, Gornig, & Werwatz, 2004). The comparison 
between East and West Germans leads to a negative comparison outcome on an economic 
dimension for East Germans. East Germans should be especially affected by this negative 
comparison outcome if they identify with East Germany and perceive being East German 
as very positive, meaning they have a high group-based self-esteem. Whenever group 
members perceive their ingroup as less positive than relevant outgroups they are motivated 
to restore their group-based self-esteem by using identity management strategies. East 
Germans, for example, might challenge the situation by demanding an adjustment of 
salaries, trying to show that they are as competent as the West Germans. This would 
change the negative comparison outcome for the whole group. Or they might try to avoid 
being seen as East Germans and try to become West Germans. This would not change the 
negative comparison outcome for the group of East Germans; however, it would change 
the individual comparison outcome. Or they might claim that even though they earn less 
money, they are the warmer and friendlier people, restoring their group value on a new 
comparison dimension. All these reactions have in common that they are supposed to undo 
the negative comparison outcome and to restore the East German’s positive ingroup view. 
These strategies aim to either change the comparison outcome for the individual or for the 
whole group. But what would happen if the East Germans were preoccupied with other 
thoughts at the moment when hearing about the higher salaries of the West Germans? 
Would the preoccupation with other thoughts lead to less cognitive resources that would 
hinder the use of identity management strategies? Would they get angry about the situation 
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or would they adjust their view of their group to the negative comparison outcome, and 
hence lower their group-based self-esteem?  
These are the questions I want to investigate in the following thesis. I will examine 
the effect of threatening information for group members high and low in group-based self-
esteem on the use of two identity management strategies: individual mobility and social 
competition. Moreover, I will explore what happens if group-based self-esteem cannot be 
restored. Theoretically, I will first present the basic assumptions of social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Afterwards, I am going to discuss the underlying dynamics of 
social identity in form of the ‘self-esteem hypothesis’ introduced by Abrams and Hogg 
(1988), and I am further going to sum up the results of studies testing this hypothesis (e.g., 
Houston & Andreopoulou, 2003; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Based on the empirical 
findings of the studies investigating the self-esteem hypothesis I will argue that the 
dynamic, self-regulatory process of group-based self-esteem has not been focused enough 
up to now. For this reason I will develop a new approach within which group-based self-
esteem is seen as a control device monitoring outcomes of intergroup comparisons. 
Following this theoretical argument I will derive two research lines. The first research line 
deals with the relation between group-based self-esteem and threat on identity management 
strategies. Three studies will be presented investigating this relation. The second research 
line deals with the question what happens if no identity management strategy can be 
successfully deployed. Four studies investigating this question will be presented. The work 
ends with an integration of the empirical results within the presented theoretical 
framework. 
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2. Social Identity Theory 
 
Realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) postulates that negative interdependence 
between groups is the fundamental reason for intergroup conflict. Even though the study 
by Sherif (1966), on which the theory was based, was an innovative and impressive study, 
it was criticized because it did not have a control group without negative interdependence 
between the groups. Thereby the results could not be interpreted clearly. To overcome this 
limitation Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) conducted a 
study using a ‘minimal group paradigm’. In this experimental situation artificial groups 
were built based on random criteria and it was assumed that all variables that affected 
intergroup conflict except group membership were eliminated. The results of the study 
showed that participants favored their ingroup compared to an outgroup, even if the 
individual did not profit from this favoritism (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Messick & Mackie, 
1989). Based on these results Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed social identity theory as 
a theory centered on the basic human motivation for positive personal and social identity.  
 
 
2.1 The Four Components of Social Identity Theory 
 
In the following section I give an overview of the central aspects of social identity 
theory, combined with empirical evidence supporting the assumptions. According to social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) three cognitive processes and one motivational 
process are at work in intergroup situations. These processes are social categorization, 
social identification, social comparison, and positive distinctiveness. I will discuss each of 
them in the following.  
 
 
2.1.1 Social Categorization 
 
The fundamental role of social categorization in social identity theory derived from 
Tajfel’s early work on categorization, social perception and intergroup behavior. Tajfel 
worked on the so called accentuation principle. He found that the mere categorization of a 
stimulus produces a perceptual accentuation effect. This means that intra-categorical 
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similarities among stimuli and inter-categorical differences between stimuli are 
accentuated on dimensions believed to be correlated with the categorization (e.g., Tajfel, 
1957, 1959). Tajfel and Wilkes (1962) showed  in an influential experiment that 
participants exaggerated perceived differences of line length, if the stimuli belonged to 
systematically different labeled groups (longer lines versus shorter lines). This study 
played an important role in further research on the cognitive approach of stereotyping and 
on the elaboration of social identity theory (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1969, 1978). 
Similar effects of categorization were found in different research areas, including attitude 
statements (Eiser, 1971; Eiser & Strobe, 1972; Eiser & Van der Pligt, 1984; McGarty & 
Penny, 1988), trait valence (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990), daily temperature (Krueger & 
Clement, 1994), body weights (Krueger, Rothbart, & Sriram, 1989), colors (Goldstone, 
1995), and emerged even in judgments of category exemplars that varied along multiple 
dimensions (Corneille & Judd, 1999; Ford & Stangor, 1992; Goldstone, 1994, 1996; 
Livingstone, Andrews, & Harnard, 1998). Even though the effect was found in several 
different areas, it seemed difficult to replicate the original effect of the study by Tajfel and 
Wilkes. However, Corneille and colleagues (Corneille, Klein, Lambert, & Judd, 2002) did 
replicate the original effect and showed that the categorical accentuation was higher if the 
lines where systematically categorized than if they were not, and that this effect was 
stronger if participants reported their estimates with unfamiliar measures (Belgian 
participants using inches, American participants using centimeters).  
However, not only the physical reality is structured by categories but also the social 
world. The social identity perspective argues that social categories are cognitively 
represented as prototypes (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). Prototypes are understood as sets of attributes that capture similarities among 
members of one group and differentiate that group from relevant other groups (e.g., Cantor 
& Mischel, 1979; Rosch 1977). Therefore social categorization leads to a distinction of the 
social world into two main categories: ‘we’ versus ‘them’.  
 
 
2.1.2 Social Identification 
 
The effect of social categorization is a precondition for social identification and 
was more elaborated and investigated in the framework of the self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1978, 1982, 1984). The starting point of the self-categorization theory was the 
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distinction between self-definitions in terms of social category memberships (social 
identity) and self-definitions in terms of personal attributes (personal identity). Whereas 
the personal identity includes knowledge and beliefs about one’s own skills and abilities, 
the social identity1 of a person “derives from their knowledge of their membership in a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the 
membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). Situational variations can lead to the salience of one of 
the two identities. Turner (1984) argued that people stereotype themselves and others in 
terms of salient social categories. In this process the group identity becomes the salient part 
of the individual’s self-concept, in a way that it accentuates perceptions of similarities 
within the ingroup and perceptions of contrast to the outgroup, enhancing the perception of 
intergroup differences. The more a social identity becomes salient, the less people tend to 
perceive themselves as individuals but more as prototypical for the ingroup. This is what 
Turner defines as a depersonalization of the self: “A cognitive redefinition of the self – 
from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships 
and associated stereotypes” (Turner, 1984, p. 528). This process of self-stereotyping was 
also demonstrated empirically (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987). Social identity perspective 
assumes that the process of social identification with a group therefore leads to a shift form 
the ‘I’ to a ‘we’, which transforms interpersonal behavior into intergroup behavior.  
Already in 1981 Tajfel stated, as quoted above, that social identity includes 
knowledge, value and emotional significance of membership in a social group. More recent 
work elaborated on this idea and developed multi-factoral models of social identification 
(e.g., Brown, Condor, Matthews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Cameron, 2004; Ellemers, 
Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Leach et al., 2008; Ryan, Iyer, Hersby, & 
Kulich, 2008). The different proposed multi-factoral models are in broad agreement with 
the three factors stated by Tajfel (1981). Ellemers and colleagues, for example, argued that 
self-categorization (cognitive component), commitment to the group (emotional 
component), and group self-esteem (evaluative component) are related but separate aspects 
of group members’ social identity. In their study they demonstrated that the three different 
aspects can be distinguished in a principal component analysis. Moreover, the authors 
showed that the three components were differentially related to manipulations of group 
features and displays of ingroup favoritism (see also Jackson, 2002).     
                                                 
1 In the following social identity and collective self-esteem will be used as terms for the same construct, 
subsumed as group-based self-esteem. It is defined as evaluative connection of the group member to his or 
her group. For a detailed discussion see Section 3.1.  
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2.1.3 Social Comparison 
 
The third cognitive process crucial for the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) is social comparison, which is based on the very influential theory of social 
comparison processes by Festinger. Within this theory Festinger stated three hypotheses on 
an interpersonal level:  
(1) humans have a drive to evaluate their opinions and abilities;  
(2) whenever objective, non-social means are not available, people evaluate their 
opinions and their abilities by comparison with others;  
(3) people prefer to compare themselves with other people who are similar to them. 
Within the last 50 years, researchers redefined and extended Festinger’s theoretical 
assumptions, however, overall empirical findings support the important role of social 
comparison processes (e.g., Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999; Buunk & Ybema, 
1997; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990; Suls & Wils, 1991; Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinwall, 
1990). However, the third hypothesis has been modified recently. First, several studies 
showed that there are situations in which people tend to compare themselves with people 
who are clearly better or worse off than themselves (e.g., Blanton et al., 1999; Buunk & 
Ybema, 1997). But, how can people without social comparison decide in a first place who 
is similar to them and how is different? Gilbert and colleagues solved this paradox by 
showing that people often consider diagnosticity of information only after comparisons are 
made (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). The authors showed in two studies that people do 
make nondiagnostic comparisons and quickly unmake them if that is possible. This means 
that even if people know that it does not make much sense to compare themselves with a 
specific other person, for example because the other person has benefits they did not have, 
they tend to compare themselves with this person and then afterwards cognitively undo the 
comparison.  
    Tajfel and Turner (1979) integrated Festingers’ (1954) basic arguments about social 
comparison into social identity theory. They postulated that the group evaluations are 
relative in nature. People evaluate their ingroups on the basis of a comparison process, 
within which the ingroup is compared to a relevant outgroup on related dimensions. 
Whenever the individual is highly identified with the group, the result of the comparison 
process is of great importance for the individual’s social identity, and hence the 
individual’s self-concept. If the comparison’s result shows that the ingroup is superior to 
the compared outgroup, the positive ingroup image reflects onto the individual.  
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2.1.4 Positive Distinctiveness 
 
The underlying motivation driving intergroup behavior, as Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
argued, is the need for positive distinctiveness. The need for positive distinctiveness is 
fulfilled as soon as the ingroup is distinct and evaluated more positively on a relevant 
dimension than a relevant outgroup. Social identity theory postulates that intergroup 
behavior has the function to evaluate, maintain, and restore the positive social identity, 
which is realized through positive distinction of the ingroup. This means that in intergroup 
contexts people strive for a positive distinctiveness for their group. In doing so, positive 
connotations of ingroup membership become positive connotations for the self (e.g., 
Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; for a detailed discussion of the 
motivational dynamics see Section 2.3 and Section 3).  
Social identity theory does not only postulate the need for a positive social identity, 
but also hypothesizes that people strive to fulfill this need by comparing their ingroup to a 
relevant outgroup with the goal to achieve positive distinctiveness. This helps to explain 
the before mentioned results in minimal group settings (Tajfel et al., 1971). In the study by 
Tajfel and colleagues the group members tended to not only favor their ingroup, but were 
motivated to maximize differences between the ingroup and the outgroup, even at the 
expense of absolute ingroup gains (Tajfel et al., 1971). These results indicate that the 
central motive underlying group members in intergroup situation is not always the absolute 
gain for the ingroup. The participants’ behavior seemed to be driven by the motivation to 
establish the maximal (positive) differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup.  
However, researchers criticized the minimal group paradigm arguing that 
interdependence expectations could not be excluded as interpretations of the results. 
Participants might have expected that when they gave their ingroup more than the outgroup 
other ingroup members would also do so (Ferguson & Kelley, 1964; Gaertner & Insko, 
2000; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; Rabbie & de Brey, 1971; Rabbie & 
Horowitz, 1969; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971). Recently, Stroebe, Spears and Lodewijkx 
(2007) argued that in intergroup situations interdependence and the need for positive social 
identity often play together and lead to intergroup conflict. In line with Stroebe and 
colleagues I argue that interdependence alone can not explain competitive behavior in 
intergroup situations and that therefore the need for positive social identity plays a 
fundamental role in intergroup behavior.  
Social Identity Theory 
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 In sum, Tajfel and Turner (1979) integrated the four basic processes of social 
identity theory in the following theoretical principles:  
1) Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain a positive social identity.  
2) Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons that can 
be made between the ingroup and some relevant outgroups.  
3) When social identity is unsatisfactory (group is not positive distinct or evaluated 
more negative to compared outgroups), individuals will try to change the comparison 
outcome by using identity management strategies (see the next section).  
 
 
2.2 Reactions to Negative Social Identity 
 
Other than many scientists assume there is much more about social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) than social categorization, social identification, social comparison, 
and positive distinctiveness. These four fundamental processes are not “the end of the 
story, […] but it was only the beginning” as Ellemers and colleagues put it (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999; p. 8). Social identity theory is a theory explaining and exploring 
the psychological effects of different status2 positions of group members. Moreover, social 
identity theory helps to explain group members’ reactions to different status positions 
depending on the social structure and the group members’ shared beliefs about the given 
social structure. Therefore, social identity theory is a theory of social change.  
As a consequence, social identity theory can predict how group members react to 
negative comparison outcomes. Social identity theory postulates that negative comparison 
outcomes motivate group members to deploy identity management strategies. Identity 
management strategies aim to restore or maintain the positive distinctiveness of the 
ingroup compared to a relevant outgroup. Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) stated three types 
of identity management strategies as reactions to negative comparison outcomes: 
individual mobility, social competition, and social creativity. Importantly, Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) assumed that the interaction between the need for positive social identity 
and group members’ perception of the social structure in the intergroup context predicts 
                                                 
2 The term ‘status’ is a sociological term used in intergroup relation research to explain a consensual 
superiority of one group (or person) on central dimensions compared to another group (or person). However, 
in several studies within social identity research it was operationalized in form of positive distinctiveness of 
one group compared to another group on one dimension.  
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group members’ behavior and attitudes towards a relevant outgroup (see also Abrams & 
Hogg, 1988). Following this, Ellemers and colleagues (for an overview see Ellemers, 
1993) pointed out four socio-structural variables defining the social structure of intergroup 
situations:  
1) the relative status position of one’s group 
2) the permeability of group boundaries  
3) the stability of group status  
4) the legitimacy of personal status or group status.  
Empirical evidence was found that people are more strongly motivated to identify with 
high status groups compared to low status groups (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1987, 1991). 
This is in line with social identity theory as only high status groups have the ability to 
satisfy group members’ need for positive distinctiveness.  
In the following sections the three identity management strategies are described. For 
each strategy a summary of research will be presented, pointing out under which socio-
structural conditions which identity management strategy most likely is chosen. 
 
 
2.2.1 Individual Mobility 
 
When members of low status groups try to leave their group and join a higher status 
group, this is defined as individual mobility. The mobility can either take place in a very 
concrete way by physically leaving the low status ingroup and joining the higher status 
group, or can take place on a cognitive level, by cognitively distancing oneself from a low 
status group. Individual mobility is a strategy motivated by the goal to enhance the relative 
status position of an individual group member, while the group as a whole remains in the 
unfavorable low status position.   
Tajfel and Turner (1979) predicted that if identification with one group does not 
lead to a positive social identity because of the low status position of the group, group 
members are motivated to leave this group and join a higher status group. Adding up on 
the example introduced at the beginning of the thesis, disadvantage East Germans might 
move to West Germany and try to distance themselves from their East German identity. 
They could, for example, try to hide their East German dialect and adopt the new regional 
dialect, avoid conversations about their regional provenance, or accentuate that half of their 
family originally comes from West Germany.  
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However, leaving one’s own group is only possible if boundaries between the two 
groups are permeable (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Taylor, 
Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Ellemers, 
van Knippenberg, de Vries, and Wilke (1988) showed within a minimal group paradigm 
that high status group members were relatively satisfied with their group membership, 
independently of the permeability of group boundaries. However, members of low status 
groups were less satisfied with their group membership if group boundaries were 
permeable than if they were impermeable. In sum, group members of low status groups 
tend to leave their group if group boundaries are permeable and try to join high status 
groups.   
 
 
2.2.2 Social Competition 
 
The second identity management strategy is social competition. Social competition 
means that ingroup members seek positive distinctiveness through direct competition on 
the relevant dimension with the outgroup. Group members try to reverse the relative 
positions of the ingroup and outgroup on salient dimensions. Social competition therefore 
is a collective strategy, leading to a status enhancement of the whole group and not only 
for individual group members.  
Again, let me come back to the example of the East Germans being confronted with 
their negative distinctiveness compared to the West Germans on an economical dimension. 
The East Germans could try to claim as high salaries as West Germans by stating that their 
work is as much worth as the work done by the West Germans, or by asking the employers 
for a direct comparison between the performance of East and West German workers.  
Tajfel and Turner (1979) stated that only when group boundaries are impermeable and 
therefore individual mobility cannot be applied people use collective strategies. Empirical 
evidence was found for this assumption (Taylor, et al., 1987; Wright, et al., 1990). 
However, the stability of status positions is another important determinate for choosing 
social competition as identity management strategy. If group members perceive the status 
relations of the groups as stable and not changeable, it is less likely that they try to socially 
compete with the outgroup, compared with the situation within which the status positions 
seem unstable (Tajfel, 1978).  
Social Identity Theory 
 
 
16 
Different to Tajfel and Turner (1979) who argued that individual mobility is the 
preferred strategy when group boundaries are permeable, Ellemers and colleagues (1999) 
argued that irrespectively of (in-)permeable group boundaries, the perception of instability 
can lead to the motivation to show social competition. To test this hypothesis, Ellemers, 
van Knippenberg, and Wilke (1990) investigated the role of permeability and stability 
independently. They again found that satisfaction and identification was higher in high 
status groups than in low status groups. When group boundaries were permeable group 
members focused on possibilities of individual mobility. However, instable status relations 
affected ingroup identification independently of permeability. If people perceived the 
status relation between the groups to be changeable they were less satisfied with their 
group’s status and more motivated to aim for the ingroup’s status enhancement. 
The third factor that influences the motivation to deploy a collective strategy is 
legitimacy. Unjust or unfair treatment can enhanced social change (Cadick, 1980; 
Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Tajfel, 1987) and motivate people to show 
social competition.  
Taken together, Tajfel and Turner (1979) assumed that individual mobility is always 
the preferred identity management strategy for low status group members. This was later 
qualified by Ellemers and colleagues (1990) who showed that stability of status relations 
can influence the motivation to show social competition whether or not group boundaries 
are permeable. Furthermore, research showed that perceived legitimacy can also motivate 
social competition. In line with this argument Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued that the 
most powerful cause of intergroup conflict is the combination of unstable and illegitimate 
status relations.     
 
 
2.2.3 Social Creativity 
 
Social creativity is defined as “all of these responses (which) are based on primarily 
cognitive changes of parameters that define the intergroup comparison context which the 
actual status inequality between groups is derived from” (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & 
Klink, 1998; pp. 701-702). Social creativity is the broadest of the three identity 
management strategies. In my opinion, all forms of undoing the negative comparison 
outcome, ranging from denying the information to redefining or altering the elements of 
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the comparative situation can be subsumed as social creativity. Besides others, this strategy 
focuses on one of the following aspects:  
a) Comparing the ingroup to the outgroup on some new (status irrelevant) 
dimensions. An increase in intergroup tension can then be predicted, when the legitimizing 
of the value assigned to the new social products threatens the outgroup’s superior 
distinctiveness. Coming back to the example comparing West and East Germans: East 
Germans could state that they are the warmer and friendlier than West Germans and that 
social networks are the only thing that really matters in live. In this way they change the 
comparison dimension resulting in a positive distinctiveness of the own group compared to 
the outgroup.  
b) Changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group, so that comparisons 
which were previously negative are now perceived as being positive. The comparison 
dimension remains the same, but the previous prevailing value system is rejected and 
reversed. That means, the East Germans could state that money corrupts the character and 
that they are therefore better off than the West Germans because they do not have as much 
money.  
c) Changing the outgroup with which the ingroup is compared is another social 
creativity strategy– in particular, ceasing or avoiding to use the high-status outgroup as a 
comparative reference frame. That is, the East Germans could for example change the 
comparison group by stating that a comparison with West Germany is not informative 
because of the 40 years of different political and economical development in the two 
countries. East Germans could favor a comparison with Poland. East Germans are likely to 
perceive themselves as economically better off than Poles and restore a positive East 
German identity after a comparison with Poles.   
Social creativity is likely to be chosen under conditions in which the status position of 
the involved groups is perceived as stable and legitimate. However, only little empirical 
work has been done on social creative strategies. Besides few others (e.g., Jackson, 
Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996), one exception is the work done by Mummendey and 
colleagues (Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999; Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999) in which 
they did not find an influence of socio-structural variables on the two investigated social 
creative strategies. Therefore is seems that investigating social creativity is very difficult. 
In the following, I restrict my focus to individual mobility and social competition for the 
following reasons: As social creativity is a very broad category it deserves a separate 
examination (Jackson et al., 1996). Moreover, individual mobility and social competition 
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represent two opposed poles on the dimension of individual versus group strategies and 
therefore are of greater interest here. 
To conclude, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) postulates that behavior in 
intergroup situations is driven by the need for positive social identity, which can be 
obtained through positive distinctiveness after social comparison of one’s ingroup 
compared to a relevant outgroup. Whenever the comparison outcome leads to a negative 
result, the need for a positive social identity is not fulfilled, and the motivation to use 
identity management strategies is triggered. Which identity management strategy is chosen 
depends on an interaction between the group member’s relation to their group and socio-
structural variables such as permeability of group boundaries, stability and legitimacy of 
the status relation. 
 
 
2.3 Motivational Dynamics of Social Identity Theory: The Self-Esteem Hypothesis 
 
As outlined before, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) postulates the 
need for positive distinctiveness but remained rather vague about the exact motivational 
process. In 1988 Abrams and Hogg formulated the underlying motivational dynamics of 
social identity theory in a way that they could be tested empirically. The two researchers 
presented the self-esteem hypothesis (SEH). The first corollary of the self-esteem 
hypothesis (SEH1) postulates that “successful intergroup discrimination will enhance 
social identity, and hence self-esteem” (p. 320). The second corollary (SEH2) postulates 
that “low or threatened self-esteem will promote intergroup discrimination because of the 
‘need’ for positive self-esteem” (p. 320). This extremely innovative and important step in 
understanding the motivational processes within social identity theory initiated a large 
number of studies that empirically tested these two corollaries (for an overview see Rubin 
& Hewstone, 1998).  
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2.3.1 Evidence for the First Corollary of the Self-Esteem Hypothesis 
 
In their overview of studies testing the two corollaries, Rubin and Hewstone (1998) 
found empirical support for the positive relation between intergroup bias3 and self-esteem 
(SEH1). Showing intergroup bias by favoring the ingroup and/or derogating the outgroup 
increased group members’ self-esteem (e.g., Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 
1980). This positive relation between intergroup bias and self-esteem was shown for both 
personal self-esteem (Chin & McClintock, 1993, Experiment 1; Hogg, Turner, 
Nascimento-Schulze, & Spriggs, 1986; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Mullin & Hogg, 1995; 
Oakes & Turner, 1980; Vanbeselaere, 1991) and group-based self-esteem (Chin & 
McClintock, 1993, Experiment 2; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996).  
 
 
2.3.2 Evidence for the Second Corollary of the Self-Esteem Hypothesis 
 
However, searching for empirical evidence for the first part of SEH2 (low self-
esteem leads to intergroup bias) leads to a closer examination of studies testing SEH2. 
Very early on, some studies (Ehrlich, 1973; Wills, 1981; Wylie, 1979) found a negative 
relation between self-esteem and outgroup attitudes (e.g., prejudice4). However, these 
studies had two main problems. First, within the studies social identity threat was not 
measured and therefore its role was ignored in the investigated relations. Second, the 
studies were correlational in nature so that it was not possible to interpret the direction of 
the found relation. For this reason it is not even clear if these results should be interpreted 
as challenge of the relation proposed in the first corollary (intergroup bias enhances self-
esteem) or as support for the first part of the second corollary (low self-esteem enhances 
intergroup bias). Theoretical considerations by Crocker and colleagues were in contrast to 
these earlier studies (e.g., Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987) and pointed 
to the importance of threat for the motivation to deploy identity management strategies 
(actually, most studies focused on intergroup bias only). Crocker and colleagues argued 
                                                 
3 In the following I use the term ‘intergroup bias’ instead of ‘intergroup discrimination’ because in my 
opinion the mentioned studies finding the relation between self-esteem and ‘intergroup discrimination’ 
investigated a cognitive bias towards the ingroup either by favouring the ingroup or by derogating the 
outgroup and not discriminating behavior.   
4 The term ‘prejudice’ includes much more than simple evaluations of outgroups (Sears & Henry, 2003), for 
example including cognitive and evaluative aspects. However, the term includes an overall evaluation of an 
outgroup and therefore the mentioned results on prejudice seem important for our argument.    
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that “if downward comparison can enhance self-esteem, we would expect that those who 
are higher in self-esteem are most adept at using downward comparisons to cope with 
threat” (p. 908).  
Examining the studies testing the relation between self-esteem and intergroup bias 
(SEH2) reviewed by Rubin and Hewstone (1998) one notices that there have been different 
ways of investigating SEH2. Some researchers (e.g., Abrams 1982, 1983 as cited in 
Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994) 
measured personal self-esteem and then correlated prior personal self-esteem to ingroup 
favouritism. The results of these studies did not reveal a negative relation between self-
esteem and ingroup favouritism. In contrast, in several studies the opposite relation 
emerged (Abrams 1982, 1983 as cited in Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Crocker et al., 1987; 
Sidanius et al., 1994) which is in line with Crocker’s (Crocker et al., 1987) argument. 
Other researchers (Brockner & Chen, 1996; Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988; Crocker & 
Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker et al., 1987; Seta & Seta; 1992) focused on the interaction of 
threat and self-esteem. These researchers tested in several studies how the combination of 
threat and self-esteem influences ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation. Their 
findings show repeatedly that individuals with high self-esteem (not people with low self-
esteem) responded to threats to their self-concept by derogating the outgroup (Crocker et 
al., 1987) and/or enhancing the ingroup (Brown et al., 1988; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). 
Initial studies measured personal self-esteem (Brockner & Chen, 1996; Brown et al., 1988; 
Crocker et al., 1987; Seta & Seta, 1992) whereas later studies also measured group-based 
self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).  
 
 
2.3.3 Specifying the Second Corollary of the Self-Esteem Hypothesis 
 
Summing up the outlined studies testing SEH2, one notices that nearly no empirical 
evidence for the first part of SEH2 (low self-esteem leads to intergroup bias) was found 
(Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; see also Houston & Andrepoulou, 2003). Moreover, eight out 
of ten studies found in contrast to the second corollary that high pretest self-esteem was 
associated with greater intergroup bias. Therefore, while closer examining these studies 
testing SEH2 I found that most studies focused on ‘low’ self-esteem, whereas the 
suggestion of ‘threatened self-esteem’ has not been clearly spelled out. To account for this 
observation, I develop the argument that it is not low self-esteem but threatened high self-
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esteem that motivates the use of intergroup bias. A positive perception of one’s ingroup 
will be reflected in higher group-based self-esteem (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 
1999). This positive group perception (i.e., group-based self-esteem) may serve as an 
internal standard to which incoming appraisals of group related events (e.g., social 
comparison outcomes) are compared. Whenever these events are negatively discrepant to 
this internal standard group members will become active by showing intergroup bias in 
order to cope with this negative discrepant event and to re-establish the positive group 
perception. In contrast, whenever events are not negatively discrepant there is no need to 
show intergroup bias.  
To illustrate this theoretical assumption, I want to come back to the example of East 
Germans comparing their salaries to the salaries of West Germans. Whenever East 
Germans have a high group-based self-esteem (e.g., by thinking “I like being East 
German.”) and then receive the information that the salaries in West Germany are up to 
20% higher, a discrepancy between self-view and reality occurs, having a negative effect 
on the group-based self-esteem. Therefore the East Germans then are motivated to deploy 
identity management strategies to restore their group-based self-esteem. As outlined before 
there are several different reactions the East Germans could show in this situation. For 
example, they could show intergroup bias by favoring the ingroup and derogating the West 
Germans. Or they could argue that money corrupts the character and that therefore ‘good’ 
people should not have much money. The East Germans could further argue that they are 
happy for not having as much money as the West Germans as money does not count at all 
in life, but, in contrast, good and stable relationships. In this case, the East Germans would 
have devaluated the former relevant comparison dimension (economical success) and 
implemented a new comparison dimension (personal relationships) on which they perceive 
themselves as positive distinct from West Germans. All these strategies should lead to a 
decrease of the perceived difference between the internal standard (group-based self-
esteem) and the incoming appraisal and should restore the group-based self-esteem of the 
East Germans. However, if the East Germans would earn more than the West Germans 
from the beginning on, then they would be positive distinct on the relevant comparison 
dimension and then there would be no need for the East Germans to show intergroup bias 
or any other identity management strategy. 
Taken together, my suggestion that high group-based self-esteem that is threatened 
leads to the motivation to show intergroup bias is consistent with previous work on 
motivational dynamics of social identity theory. Moreover, my suggestion is also 
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consistent with empirical findings in interpersonal research. On the one hand, research on 
depression showed that individuals having a high level of self-esteem show a variety of 
self-serving behavior (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979) compared to individuals low in self-
esteem (for a review see Taylor & Brown, 1988). On the other hand this hypothesis is in 
line with recent work on ego-threat (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Bushman and 
colleagues (for a review see Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996) showed that people 
having high unstable personal self-esteem (e.g., narcissism) are most likely to show 
aggressive behavior when they are threatened. 
 
 
2.3.4 Studies Challenging the Specification of the Second Corollary 
 
In the following another set of studies examining the relation between threat and 
intergroup bias will be reviewed. In these studies researchers either measured or 
manipulated relative ingroup status which could be seen as a manipulation of a negative 
discrepant event for members of assigned low status groups. In their meta-analysis on the 
effect of relative ingroup status on intergroup bias, Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) 
concluded that there is a positive relation between ingroup status and intergroup bias, at 
least in artificial groups. This means that higher status implies a stronger tendency for 
intergroup bias. This result appears to contradict my assumption because threat seems not 
necessary to motivate intergroup bias. However, I would like to suggest that the 
manipulation of relative group status with a subsequent measurement of intergroup bias 
will obviously lead to these results because the measured ‘intergroup bias’ represents 
basically a manipulation check of a successful status manipulation. To be clear, my 
suggestion that ‘intergroup bias’ in these studies represents basically a manipulation check 
does not preclude that some bias may also be involved. However, manipulation check and 
potential intergroup bias are difficult to disentangle in these studies. Moreover, Mullen and 
colleagues indicated that these results are true for laboratory groups only. Natural lower 
status groups seem to perceive a negative discrepancy when comparing their group with a 
higher status group and therefore exhibit stronger intergroup bias than members of the high 
status group (Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999). This finding is consistent with my 
argument because I assume that lower status group members try to achieve a positive view 
of their ingroup by showing intergroup bias to cope with the perceived negative 
discrepancy.  
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In sum, most of the studies mentioned in Rubin and Hewstone’s (1998) overview 
are consistent with the first corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis (SEH1) stating a 
positive effect of intergroup bias on group-based self-esteem. Concerning the second 
corollary (SEH2) the reviewed studies are mainly in line with my assumption that an 
interaction between threat (i.e., a negative discrepant event) and high group-based self-
esteem on the use of intergroup bias exists. Moreover, the studies that seem inconsistent 
with the proposed account are not conclusive either because they do not control for threat 
or because their intergroup bias measure basically represent a manipulation check of status 
manipulations (Mullen et al., 1992). Based on these assumptions, I postulate that the 
relationship between the prior level of group-based self-esteem and intergroup bias is in 
contrast to the assumption made in the first part of SEH2 (low …. self-esteem will promote 
intergroup bias). Instead, it is in line with the second part of SEH2 (threatened self-esteem 
will promote intergroup bias). This means that group members having a high group-based 
self-esteem should be especially motivated to show intergroup bias if they receive 
threatening information about their group. 
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3. A Dynamic Approach to Motivational Processes of Social Identity 
Theory 
 
In the following section I will introduce a dynamic approach of the underlying 
motivation of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This new dynamic approach 
extends existing theoretical assumptions (Crocker et al., 1987) and builds on the empirical 
work summarized before. Before doing so, it is necessary to outline the meaning of the 
construct of ‘group-based self-esteem’.  
 
 
3.1. The Construct of Group-Based Self-Esteem 
 
Rubin and Hewstone (1998) argued in their review of studies testing the two 
corollaries of the self-esteem hypothesis that it is necessary to distinguish between 
different aspects of self-esteem: global versus specific, state versus trait, and personal 
versus social. In the following section these differentiations by Rubin and Hewstone are 
going to be presented and integrated in the construct of self-esteem used in social identity 
research.   
 
 
3.1.1. Different Aspects of Self-Esteem 
 
First, Rubin and Hewstone (1998) distinguished between global and specific self-
esteem. Global self-esteem refers to a global appraisal a person has of his or her value. It 
holds one’s overall self-image, while specific self-esteem involves one’s appraisals of 
one’s value in a particular area (also called domain-specific self-esteem). Furthermore, 
Rubin and Hewstone made a distinction between personal versus social self-esteem. They 
defined social self-esteem as the esteem in which group members hold the shared self-
image that constitutes their social psychological ingroup, whereas personal self-esteem 
refers to the personal self-image of each individual. Finally, the two authors differentiated 
between trait versus state self-esteem. Whereas trait self-esteem is a person’s (or group’s) 
long-term summary of self-evaluations and is more or less stable over time, state self-
esteem can be seen as a person’s (or group’s) self-esteem in a particular situation, which is 
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influenced by feedback of the environment. In line with this postulation I argue that state 
self-esteem can be understood as a regulatory mechanism: It monitors how well one (or 
one’s group) does in a specific situation. This idea of self-esteem accords to the sociometer 
theory of Leary and Baumeister (for an overview see Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In their 
theory, Leary and Baumeister analyzed the role of self-esteem on an interpersonal level, 
arguing “that people devote so much attention to their self-esteem not because self-esteem 
per se has particular consequences, but because self-esteem is a gauge or monitor of 
something that is important.” (p. 9). Thus, Leary and Baumeister argued that self-esteem 
has a monitoring function with the need to belong as underlying motive. I would like to 
postulate that self-esteem is more than that. Whereas Leary and Baumeister argued that the 
self-esteem system monitors one’s actual and potential relationships, I suggest that the self-
esteem system has the function to monitor a person’s (or groups’) success in social 
comparison processes. This means that in line with Leary and Baumeister (2000) I assume 
that self-esteem per se is not important, but that it can be understood as an indicator for 
how well one is doing. Depending on which specific aspect of self-esteem one focuses, 
self-esteem monitors one’s doing compared to others on a general level (trait self-esteem) 
as well as in particular situations (state self-esteem), on a personal level (personal self-
esteem) as well as on a group level (group-based self-esteem), and on a global level (global 
self-esteem) as well as on a specific level (specific self-esteem). In other words, I assume 
that self-esteem has the function to give individuals feedback on different levels on how 
well they do in comparison to relevant others.  
 
 
3.1.2. Group-Based Self-Esteem 
 
Clearly, because social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is a theory about 
behavior in intergroup situations, within its research it should have focused on social and 
group-based self-esteem, respectively. However, one realizes that the fundamental need 
postulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979) for a ‘positive personal and social identity’ or for 
‘positive distinctiveness’ was not very precise. In their conceptualisation of this need, 
Abrams and Hogg (1988) as well as their successors replaced it by the concept of personal 
self-esteem, social and collective self-esteem, respectively. Moreover, the empirical studies 
measured self-esteem in various ways: Whereas early studies measured personal self-
esteem only (e.g., Brockner & Chen, 1996; Brown et al., 1988; Crocker et al., 1987; Seta & 
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Seta, 1992), later studies included collective self-esteem (e.g., Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990), 
while others focused on ingroup identification (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1994). This leads to 
some ambiguousness in the use of the term collective or social self-esteem within the 
literature. Following Ellemers and colleagues (1999; see also Tajfel, 1978), I would like to 
suggest that collective self-esteem should be seen as the evaluative dimension of peoples’ 
identification with their ingroup. Thus, the evaluative dimensions of ingroup identification 
would be the appropriate measure of group-based self-esteem. However, collective self-
esteem may also tap into this construct and measure the positive distinctiveness of the 
ingroup and therefore can be subsumed into the same construct. For this reason, I would 
like to refer to this kind of self-esteem as group-based self-esteem. Group-based self-
esteem denotes how ingroup members overall evaluate their group. Preconditions of group-
based self-esteem are, for example, group status or the knowledge of being a member in a 
certain group (i.e., the cognitive component of identification). Only when group members 
perceive themselves as part of the group, their evaluation of the ingroup (as either positive 
or negative) may affect them and motivate them to change this evaluation if it is necessary. 
To sum up, in the following I want to use the term group-based self-esteem to refer 
to people’s overall evaluation of their group. Moreover, I assume that specific state group-
based self-esteem can be understood as a monitoring system reporting group members how 
well their group does in a specific social comparison process with a relevant outgroup on 
relevant dimensions (for this monitoring function of group-based self-esteem see also 
Figure 1).  
 
 
3.2. The Basic Assumptions of the Dynamic Approach 
 
Building on and extending, the before mentioned two corollaries of the self-esteem 
hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), I postulate that the positive perception of one’s 
ingroup (i.e., group-based self-esteem) may serve as an internal standard to which 
incoming appraisals of group related events (e.g., social comparison outcomes) are 
compared. A negative discrepancy of these events from the internal standard is supposed to 
lead to a decrease in the state group-based self-esteem. As a consequence, group members 
should become active by choosing identity management strategies in order to cope with 
this negatively discrepant event and to re-establish the group-based self-esteem (see Figure 
1). Surprisingly, until now the work on the motivational dynamic of social identity theory 
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in form of the self-esteem hypothesis has only focused on intergroup bias as potential 
identity management strategy to restore or enhance one’s group-based self-esteem (Abrams 
& Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Even more recent work (e.g., Houston & 
Andreopoulou, 2003) only focused on intergroup bias, ignoring the role of the other 
identity management strategies. However, intergroup bias is just one possible identity 
management strategy among many others. For this reason I extend SEH1 and postulate that 
not only intergroup bias, as predicted in SEH1, elevates group members’ group-based self-
esteem, but that the successful deployment of any identity management strategy can do so.  
In line with the second part of SEH2, and extending my argument of the importance 
to investigate all identity management strategies, I further hypothesize that the motivation 
to use an identity management strategy is especially high for group members having a 
threatened high group-based self-esteem. For group members high in group-based self-
esteem the standard to which the incoming appraisals of group related events are compared 
should be on a high level. This means that whenever they receive threatening information 
(in form of a negative comparison outcome) a large negative discrepancy is likely to occur 
between the internal standard and the incoming appraisal. This perceived discrepancy, in 
turn, is supposed to trigger a strong motivation to use an identity management strategy to 
reduce the discrepancy and restore group-based self-esteem5. Which identity management 
strategy will be chosen by the threatened group member should depend on the relation of 
the individual to the group (e.g., trait and state level of group-based self-esteem) and on the 
perception of the socio-structural variables of the specific intergroup context (Ellemers, 
1993). Even though a lot of research as been done with respect to the influence of the 
socio-structural variables on the choice of identity management strategies (e.g., Ellemers et 
al., 1988; Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; see Ellemers, 
1993, for an overview), until now no research has combined the two research lines (the 
self-esteem hypothesis and the use of different identity management strategies).  
However, there might be situations within which either no identity management 
strategy at all can be used or a not fitting identity management strategy is chosen. When no 
identity management strategy can be used group-based self-esteem can not be restored. 
This should become visible in a decrease of group-based self-esteem. In addition, I 
postulate that this reduced group-based self-esteem goes together with an increase in 
                                                 
5It might also be the case that an event is positive discrepant to the internal standard. This should also lead to 
a discrepancy between the expectation and the actual feedback. This discrepancy should also motivate the 
individual to try to reduce it. However, even though is also in an interesting case this will not be investigated 
in this thesis and should be examined in a separate research project. 
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negative emotions (for a detailed discussion of this point see below). In contrast, whenever 
events are not negatively discrepant, meaning that a social comparison process led to a 
positive distinctiveness of the own group, no motivation is triggered to manage one’s 
social identity (see Figure 1).  
In sum, past studies testing the two corollaries (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin 
& Hewstone, 1998) found that whereas corollary one (SEH1: intergroup bias elevates self-
esteem) could mostly be supported, the first part of corollary two (SEH2: low self-esteem 
promotes intergroup bias) was mostly not supported. Moreover, the vast majority of the 
studies found support for the second part of the second corollary: Threatened self-esteem 
promotes intergroup bias. Although originally SIT is about various identity management 
strategies, research on the self-esteem hypothesis until now was limited to intergroup bias 
as only one identity management strategy. Remarkably, even more recent studies (Houston 
& Andreopoulou, 2003; for reviews see Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998) mostly used intergroup bias as dependent variable. Therefore, both 
corollaries of the self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) should be extended. 
Regarding the first corollary (SEH1) I hypothesize that the successful use of any identity 
management strategy will lead to an increase in group-based self-esteem. Regarding the 
second corollary (SEH2) I postulate an interaction between threatening information and 
high group-based self-esteem on all possible reactions to this threat.  
 
 
3.2.1. Empirical Evidence for the Relation between Group-Based Self-Esteem and 
Threat 
 
In the following section I will present empirical evidence for the postulated 
interactive relation between group-based self-esteem and threat. Besides the studies 
directly investigating the self-esteem hypothesis, which were presented and discussed in 
Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2, I am going to present studies which have investigated the 
dynamic relationship, however, often within a somewhat different theoretical framework.  
One study by Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997) supports my assumption that the 
level of identification (i.e., group-based self-esteem) plays an important role for group 
member’s reaction to threat. The authors’ goal was to investigate the effects of 
identification and permeability of group boundaries on the desire for individual mobility. 
They induced low status (social identity threat) in a minimal group paradigm and 
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manipulated identification and permeability of group boundaries. The results of the study 
showed that low identifiers more strongly desired individual mobility compared to high 
identifiers, independent of the permeability of group boundaries. These results fit nicely 
with the presented view: Group members react to threatening information (e.g., low status) 
in different ways depending on how much they value their group.  
Another research line which has to be taken into account regarding SEH2 is the 
work on the effects of prejudice on self-esteem. Crocker and Major (1989) postulated that 
experiencing prejudice will decrease self-esteem. The so called ”looking-glass” approach 
(Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934) assumes that realizing the negative views others have about 
the ingroup leads to an internalization of that view and lowers self-esteem. Therefore 
attributions to prejudice should harm self-esteem. Even though there are good reasons to 
expect reduced self-esteem in devalued groups, Crocker and Major (1989) argue that you 
rarely find this effect. The authors assume that this is the case because group members of 
low status groups have found ways to cope with these situations by attributing negative 
outcomes to prejudice, devaluating certain performance dimensions, and using other 
groups for comparison than the higher status outgroup. These strategies help members of 
devalued groups to maintain a high level of their group-based self-esteem. In my opinion 
these strategies are identity management strategies having the goal to protect group 
members’ positive ingroup view when it is threatened by prejudice.  
Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) made a similar argument in their work on 
the rejection-identification model. Branscombe and colleagues investigated the relationship 
between attributions to prejudice, minority group identification, and psychological well-
being. In their work they integrated different research lines within one model. The authors 
postulated and found empirically that the negative relation between willingness to make 
attributions to prejudice and psychological well-being is mediated by group identification. 
In particular, the results showed a positive relation between willingness to make 
attributions to prejudice and minority group identification. Moreover, minority group 
identification was also positively related to psychological well-being. I assume that 
minority group members’ perception of discrimination can be understood as a threat to 
their social identity. Therefore they have to react in some way to restore the positive 
distinctiveness of their ingroup compared to the (majority) outgroup. One way to cope with 
the threatening information is to increase identification with the minority group. Thus, in 
this case ingroup identification seems to play a comparable role as intergroup bias in the 
before mentioned work on the self-esteem hypothesis (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).  
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Also Schmitt and Maes’ (2002) work provides empirical support for the before 
made argument. The authors showed that on the one hand intergroup bias increases with 
increasing group identification. On the other hand, intergroup bias buffers the (negative) 
effect of relative deprivation on mental health over time. Thus, it seems that participants in 
the study by Schmitt and Maes used intergroup bias as an identity management strategy, 
undoing the outcome of the negative comparison.  
To summarize, several independent research lines provide empirical evidence for 
the postulated relation between group-based self-esteem and threat on the use of identity 
management strategies (e.g., Schmitt & Maes, 2002). The work by Ellemers and 
colleagues (1997) supports the assumption that group identification plays an important role 
when choosing identity management strategies. In addition, the work by Branscombe and 
colleagues (1999) showed that identification with the ingroup can be used as a buffer to 
social identity threat.  
 
 
3.3. The Core of the Dynamic Approach: When Managing One’s Identity is not 
Possible  
 
As outlined before, I assume that group members having a high group-based self-
esteem are motivated to manage their social identity whenever a social comparison 
outcome leads to a negative distinctiveness of the ingroup compared to a relevant 
outgroup. However, I postulate that there are situations within which it is not possible to 
successfully use an identity management strategy. As will be outlined below, I assume that 
at least two reasons exist why group members can not always successfully manage their 
social identity.  
 
 
3.3.1. One’s Social Identity Cannot Always be Managed 
 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) the socio-structural 
variables determine which identity management strategy can be used in a specific 
intergroup situation. However, it can happen that group members choose a inadequate 
strategy, for example, because they perceive the socio-structural variables different than 
they actually are.  
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In the following work I will focus on the second reason why sometimes one’s social 
identity can not be managed successfully. In particular, I want to investigate situations 
within which no strategy at all can be used. To start with, I hypothesize that the motivation 
to manage one’s social identity is triggered by threatening information for group members 
high in group-based self-esteem. Moreover, I assume that the successful deployment of an 
identity management strategy needs cognitive resources. This reasoning is theoretically 
based on the work on social comparison processes in interpersonal research (e.g., Gilbert, 
1991; Gilbert et al., 1995). As mentioned earlier, Festinger (1954) postulated that people 
do not compare themselves with anyone, but rather only with other people ‘similar’ to 
themselves. People do this because the comparison with similar others is rich with 
diagnostic information, whereas the comparison with very different people does not 
provide much information. However, Gilbert and colleagues (1995) argued that people are 
not always able to avoid undiagnostic comparisons. The authors postulated that “what 
appears to be a failure to engage in social comparison may instead be a rapid and deliberate 
reputation of its effect.” (p. 228). Pelham and Wachsmuth (1994) assumed in line with 
Gilbert et al. that social comparisons are essentially contrast effects. Wedell (1994) 
elaborated on this argument, stating that contrast effects “occur at an early stage in 
cognitive processing, require minimal resources, and are therefore beyond subject’s 
control” (p. 1007). Petty and Wegener (1993) further assumed that such unintended and 
unwanted contrast effects influence decisions and judgments, and therefore post hoc 
corrections for these unwanted influences must be made. This argumentation is in line with 
the ‘correction models’, which suggest that peoples’ thoughts and feelings are initially 
uncontrolled and can only be controlled by ‘undoing’ or correcting these undesirable 
effects after they happened (Gilbert, 1991; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Based on this line of 
reasoning Gilbert et al. (1995) postulated that social comparisons are made spontaneously 
and then whenever they do not provide diagnostic information are undone with mental 
effort.     
I want to transfer this idea to a group level. Even though in the following I do not 
focus on the diagnosticity of social comparisons, I argue that comparisons between groups 
are made spontaneously and without effort whenever an intergroup context is salient. 
When the comparison outcome leads to a negative distinctiveness of the ingroup the 
motivation of the ingroup members is triggered to undo not the comparison process itself 
but the negative outcome of this process. The process of undoing the negative comparison 
outcome is defined as successfully using an identity management strategy. Following the 
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argument by Gilbert and colleagues (1995), I assume that this correction processes, viz. the 
management of an individual’s positive social identity, needs cognitive resources. 
Whenever group members do not have enough cognitive resources available to 
successfully manage their social identity, they should not be able to undo the negative 
information. This means that when no identity management strategy can be deployed, the 
level of group-based self-esteem cannot be restored.  
Moreover, I argue that the decrease in group-based self-esteem goes along with an 
increase in negative emotions. I assume that the experienced discrepancy between the 
standard and the incoming appraisal goes together with negative emotions. As the second 
study by Gilbert and colleagues (1995) showed, a negative comparison outcome can 
influence the affective state of participants. Thus, I suppose that negative emotions can be 
seen as an indicator for the unsuccessful deployment of identity management strategies. 
This argument is in line with the basic assumptions of self-regulation theories (e.g., Carver, 
2004; Carver & Scheier, 1990). Carver and colleagues postulated that emotions have a 
functional role in regulating behavior. Carver (2004) stated that “feelings arise as a 
consequence of a feedback process that operates automatically, simultaneously with the 
behavior-guiding process” (p. 16). Carver and colleagues further argued that negative 
affect arises whenever an individual is doing worse than he or she intended to do, and that 
positive feelings arise whenever a person does better. Transferring this argument to an 
intergroup situation, this means that a negative comparison outcome can lead to negative 
feelings of the negatively distinct group members. These negative feelings are normally 
undone as soon as an identity management strategy is used successfully because this 
should change the negative comparison outcome into a positive comparison outcome. 
However, when it is not possible to manage one’s social identity, negative emotions cannot 
be reduced, but instead remain on a high level. 
In sum, group members high in group-based self-esteem should show an increased 
motivation to use identity management strategies when receiving threatening information. I 
assume that the use of identity management strategies needs cognitive resources. 
Whenever there are not enough cognitive resources available, group-based self-esteem 
cannot be restored, which should become visible in a decrease in group-based self-esteem 
and an increase in negative emotions.  
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3.3.2. Empirical Evidence: Managing One’s Social Identity Needs Cognitive Resources  
 
In line with my assumption that the deployment of identity management strategies 
needs cognitive resources is the work by Coull and colleagues (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, 
Paladino, & Leemans, 2001). Using a dual-task paradigm, Coull and colleagues could 
replicate the Black Sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Moreover they 
showed that high identifiers gave more negative judgments of the negative ingroup target 
than low identifiers. In addition, the researchers found that, as they had predicted, high 
identifiers spent more cognitive resources on the negative ingroup target and therefore 
performed worse in the secondary task (of the dual-task paradigm) than did low identifiers. 
This assumption can be integrated in my theoretical approach by assuming that group 
members high in group-based self-esteem in the study by Coull and colleagues did show a 
reduced performance in the secondary task because they were cognitively busy with using 
identity management strategies. The negative information (here the deviant ingroup 
member) triggered the motivation of group members high in group-based self-esteem to 
protect their group. I extend the reported findings by postulating that group members high 
in group-based self-esteem are motivated to protect the ingroup against negative 
information, independent of where the information comes from (either a deviant ingroup 
member or in an intergroup situation from an outgroup).  
In sum, I assume that deploying identity management strategies needs cognitive 
resources. Whenever group members high in group-based self-esteem do not have enough 
cognitive resources available to deploy an identity management strategy, this should lead 
to a reduced group-based self-esteem and an increase in negative emotions. 
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Figure 1. The Dynamic Approach to Motivational Processes of Social Identity Theory 
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4. Research Hypotheses 
 
4.1. Specific Research Hypotheses for the First Research Line 
 
In the first research line I am interested in the interaction of group-based self-
esteem and threatening information, and its effect on two different identity management 
strategies. I extend the work by Ellemers et al. (1997) by manipulating social identity 
threat so that I can examine the direct effects of threat on the deployment of individualistic 
and collective identity management strategies, always also taking (high) group-based self-
esteem into account.  
On the one hand, I postulate that group members high in group-based self-esteem 
are likely to show social competition when being threatened by an outgroup. I assume that 
this is the case because group members having a high group-based self-esteem have a 
strong and very positive connection with their group. Whenever they receive negative 
information about their ingroup it is likely they will be motivated to increase their group 
status as a whole because in their opinion their ‘real’ group status is high. Therefore, it 
seems more likely that these group members will favor a collective strategy, trying to 
enhance the evaluation of the whole group, compared to an individual strategy that would 
only enhance their personal status. Moreover, I assume that negative emotions play an 
important mediating role in the relation between high group-based self-esteem, threat, and 
the motivation to deploy social competition. In particular, I hypothesize that when group 
members high in group-based self-esteem receive threatening information from an 
outgroup they will not agree to these information and therefore regard them as illegitimate. 
The experience of illegitimacy should go along with anger (Mummendey, Kessler, et al., 
1999; Smith, Cornin, & Kessler, 2008; Smith & Ortiz, 2002).  
In support of this assumption, Mummendey, Kessler and colleagues (1999) 
demonstrated the importance of negative emotions for individuals choosing social 
competition as identity management strategy. The authors compared the predictions of 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to the predictions of relative deprivation 
theory (RDT; Crosby, 1976, 1982; Folger, 1986) concerning preferences for identity 
management strategies. After testing both models separately, the integration of the two 
theoretical models showed that besides the socio-structural variables used as predictors, 
identification and anger were significant mediators. Although all investigated variables 
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together explained only a small amount of variance for individual mobility (11%), they 
explained a satisfying amount of variance for social competition (38%; for more details see 
also Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999). Therefore I assume that the relation between 
threatened group-based self-esteem and social competition is mediated by anger. 
On the other hand, I postulate a different process for group members low in group-
based self-esteem. Concerning group members low in group-based self-esteem two 
competing hypotheses seem plausible: Individuals not valuing their group membership 
might show an increased motivation to leave the group when receiving threatening 
information. This effect was shown by Ellemers and colleagues (Ellemers et al., 1997), and 
is in line with the work on image-maintenance processes (e.g., Boen et al., 2002; Cialdini 
et al., 1976; Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986). Snyder and colleagues argued that people 
tend to increase their association with others whenever these others are successful, 
however, when they are not successful people tend to distance themselves from them. The 
motivation of group members low in group-based self-esteem to leave the group might 
arise because they do not value their group membership, are not committed to the group, 
and are not willing to show any effort to change the image of the whole group. Thus, when 
they receive threatening information they will not be motivated to deploy a collective 
strategy which might include costs for them. Therefore, they prefer to choose an individual 
strategy in form of leaving their group and joining the higher status group, increasing their 
personal status, but without changing the status of the whole group.  
However, in contrast to the just outlined hypothesis, individuals low in group-based 
self-esteem might be not willing to leave their group and join a high status group when 
confronted with threatening information about their group. This assumption is in line with 
realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966). Several studies investigating a 
variety of groups found that the more group members of devaluated groups recognized 
prejudice against their group, the more they identified with their group (e.g., Chavira & 
Phinney, 1991; Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998). This means that perceiving threat can lead to 
an increased identification and an increased importance of group membership. Then, the 
motivation to leave the group should decrease.  
I assume that which of the two processes takes place depends on the investigated 
intergroup setting. While in minimal groups the first process seems to take place (Ellemers 
et al., 1997, Study 1), in daily life groups6 with a collective history it is more likely that the 
                                                 
6 In the following I refer to groups existing in society (e.g., national groups, religions) as ‘daily life groups’. 
These daily life groups are compared to artificial/minimal groups only existing in experimental situations.   
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importance of group membership increases after being threatened. In the later case, the 
groups have a meaning for their members; therefore the importance of group membership 
should increase after receiving threatening information and individual mobility is no longer 
an option for group members low in group-based self-esteem. 
 
 
4.1.1. Overview and Hypotheses Studies 1 to 3 
 
Taken together, I examined the following hypotheses: 1) Threatened high group-
based self-esteem will promote the use of social competition. Concerning individual 
mobility I tested two competing hypotheses: 2a) Group members with initially low group-
based self-esteem are going to show an increased tendency to leave the group after their 
group is threatened or 2b) Group members having initially low group-based self-esteem 
will show a reduced tendency to leave their group after their group is threatened. 3) 
Furthermore, I postulated that the relation between threatened high group-based self-
esteem and social competition is mediated by anger.   
The outlined hypotheses were tested in three studies. The first study was a 
laboratory study, methodologically based on Study 1 by Ellemers et al. (1997). Within the 
first study, social identity threat was induced by negative performance feedback. The 
second study was a questionnaire study inducing social identity threat as discrimination of 
an outgroup towards an ingroup. The third study was a questionnaire study where all 
participants were placed in a situation of social identity threat. This study was conducted to 
examine the underlying process of the relationship between evaluative identification and 
social competition when perceiving social identity threat.  
 
 
4.2. Study 1 
 
An initial study was conducted to test the postulated interaction between group-
based self-esteem and threat on the use of two identity management strategies. I extended 
Study 1 by Ellemers et al., (1997) by manipulating threat and measuring both individual 
mobility and social competition as dependent variables using daily life groups, rather than 
artificial groups. I tested the postulated hypothesis 1 that threatened group-based self-
esteem promotes the use of social competition. Moreover, I investigated the two competing 
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hypotheses (2a and 2b) concerning individual mobility: Either the negative relation 
between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility increases in the threat condition 
or the negative relation between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility is only 
going to be found in the no threat condition.  
 
 
4.2.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The study was conducted in the psychological laboratory 
of one of the main buildings of the University of Jena. I recruited 67 students from the 
University of Jena. The sample included 40 women and 27 men whose mean age was 23.1 
years (SD = 2.7) with a range from 19 to 32.  In the experiment one measured factor (high 
vs. low group-based self-esteem) and one experimentally manipulated factor (threat vs. no 
threat) were used. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions.   
Procedure. Students walking through the main University building were 
approached by a female research assistant and were asked to participate in the study. When 
the participants agreed to participate they were lead to the laboratory. There they were 
seated in one cubical each in front of a computer. All information was given on the 
computer screen.  
First, the participants read the general instructions including the cover story, which 
said that they were participating in a study on the performance in verbal intelligence tests 
of students from different European countries. Then they filled in the collective self-esteem 
and evaluative identification scale, measuring their identity and esteem as German 
students. Afterwards, the participants were told that they next would work on a task 
measuring verbal intelligence. Within the task they had to generate as many meaningful 
words from a letter string as possible. Each letter string was composed of eight randomly 
chosen letters. For working on each letter string they had one minute time. They had to 
work on 10 letter strings in total. After working on the task, the participants read a short 
note about the performance of German students compared to students from other European 
countries. In the threat condition, the participants read that the first results of the study 
showed that German students performed worse in this verbal intelligence test than the 
mean of European students. The text indicated that the performance of German students is 
within the lowest third of the total range. In the no threat condition the participants were 
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told that the performance of the German students is within the best third of the total range. 
It was not made explicit if the performance of the participants was already included into 
these results.  
Then the participants were asked to fill in the second part of the questionnaire, 
including perceived threat, and the items of the identity management strategies. After 
finishing the demographic questionnaire the participants were compensated with three 
Euros, debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.  
Questionnaires. Participants completed a pretest questionnaire including collective 
self-esteem and the evaluative dimension of identification with the ingroup. The collective 
self-esteem scale was based on the State Self-Esteem Scale by Heatherton and Polivy 
(1991). I used the performance (e.g., “I think that we are inferior to others at the moment”) 
and the social subscale (e.g., “I think that other groups like us.”) and reformulated the 
items in terms of groups. I built two different versions of the self-esteem scale, each using 
half of the available items. Which half was used was randomized within each condition. 
Both halves of the collective self-esteem scale consists of 6 items (α =.77; α = .73). The 
identification scale consisted of five items (α =.91), all five items measuring the evaluative 
aspect of identification (e.g., “I am happy to be a member of the group.”)7. All responses 
ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I strongly disagree and I strongly agree)8.  
At the end of the experiment the participants were asked to fill in three items 
measuring individual mobility (e.g., “If I had the possibility, I would immediately change 
to an university in another European country.”; α = .86) and three items measuring social 
competition (e.g., “We will show the other European students that we are the smarter 
ones.”; α = .81). Both scales were adapted items derived from Mummendey, Kessler et al. 
(1999). I also included three items measuring perceived threat (e.g., “I feel threatened by 
the results of the study and its consequences for my group.”; α =.67). To avoid response 
sets about one third of the items in each scale were framed negatively. Again, all responses 
ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I strongly disagree and I strongly agree).  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note, the measurement of evaluative identification on a group level is similar to the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). 
8 An exploratory factor analysis confirmed that collective self-esteem and evaluative identification were 
different, however, correlated (r = 0.42), concepts: 2 factors explained 62.41% of the variance. The first 
factor included the items measuring evaluative identification (loadings > 0.70) and the second factor included 
the items measuring collective self-esteem (loadings > 0.58).  
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4.2.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. Before conducting the analyses, the data of seven 
participants were excluded, who guessed parts of the hypotheses, were not students at the 
University of Jena, or did not speak German fluently. The data of 60 participants remained 
for analyses. The manipulation check showed a significant effect of the threat manipulation 
on perceived threat, t(58) = 5.37, p < .01. Participants in the threat condition (M = 3.82; SD 
= 1.23) felt more threatened than participants in the no threat condition (M = 2.38; SD = 
0.85).  
Identity Management Strategies. Table 1 presents correlations between the 
predictors and the identity management strategies in each condition. Concerning social 
competition I found the predicted pattern: In the no threat condition I found neither for 
collective self-esteem nor for evaluative identification a significant relation to social 
competition. However, in the threat condition both variables, collective self-esteem and 
evaluative identification, showed a moderate positive correlation with social competition. 
Regarding individual mobility I found the following pattern: In the no threat condition, 
collective self-esteem was significantly negatively correlated with the motivation to leave 
the group, whereas in the threat condition this relation was not significant. The relation 
between evaluative identification and individual mobility was similar, however, only 
marginal significant. Not surprisingly, in both conditions identification and collective self-
esteem were significantly correlated.  
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Table 1. Intercorrelations Between Predictors and Dependent Variables in Both Conditions 
(Study 1).  
 
Scales    1  2  3  4   
 
No threat (n = 32) 
1. Coll. self-esteem  -  .64**  .08  -.40*  
2. Identification       -  .28  -.29†  
3. Social competition        -   .31†  
4. Individual mobility           -  
 
Threat (n = 28) 
1. Coll. self-esteem  -  .70**  .38*   .04  
2. Identification       -  .37*   .18  
3. Social competition         -   .02  
4. Individual mobility           -  
†p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. 
 
Social competition. In the next step, I tested the found patterns of the correlational 
analyses with regression analyses. I postulated that the more positive the group-based self-
esteem (collective self-esteem and evaluative identification) of the participants in the threat 
condition is, the higher their desire to show a competitive reaction to this threat should be. 
Before running the regression analyses all continuous predictors were z-standardized 
(Aiken & West, 1991).   
The first regression analysis investigated the effect of the collective self-esteem, 
threat, and their interaction (Aiken & West, 1991), controlling for effects of the different 
versions of the self-esteem scale and its interaction with the other independent variables, 
on social competition. This regression was not significant, F(7,52) = 1.37, p = .24. The 
regression coefficient for collective self-esteem was marginally significant (β = .27, p = 
.06). No other effects were significant. Even though the interaction (β = .16, p = .23) 
between collective self-esteem and threat only approached significance, I used the simple 
slopes method (Aiken & West, 1991) to investigate whether the patterns found in the 
correlation analysis were supported. As postulated, by trend participants high in collective 
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self-esteem wanted to show more social competition the more threatened they were (β = 
.28, p = .14), compared to participants low in collective self-esteem (β = -.06, p = .77).  
Another multiple regression was computed with evaluative identification, threat, 
and their interaction as predictors and social competition as dependent variable. This 
regression was marginally significant, F(3,56) = 2.51, p = .07, and explained about 12% of 
the variance. The regression coefficient for evaluative identification was significant (β = 
.32, p < .01). No further predictors or interactions were significant. Because the relation 
between evaluative identification and social competition dependent on the experimental 
condition within the correlational analysis was not as clear as for collective self-esteem, I 
did not compute simple slopes.  
Individual Mobility. Then I tested the findings of the correlational analyses with 
regression analyses for individual mobility. I postulated that either the more negative 
participants’ group-based self-esteem in the threat condition is, the more the participants 
should show the motivation to leave their group, or that the negative relation between 
group-based self-esteem and individual mobility exists only if the group is not threatened. 
However, after being threatened this relation should disappear.   
A multiple regression analysis was computed with collective self-esteem, threat and 
their interaction (Aiken & West, 1991) as independent variables, controlling for effects of 
the used half of the self-esteem scale on social competition and its interaction with the 
other independent variables, and individual mobility as dependent variable. This regression 
was marginal significant, F(7,52) = 2.01, p = .07, and accounted for about 21% of the 
variance. The regression coefficient for collective self-esteem was significant (β = -.29, p = 
.04), however, this was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between collective 
self-esteem and threat (β = .23, p = .10) and a marginally significant interaction between 
the used collective self-esteem scale and collective self-esteem (β = -.25, p = .06). No other 
effects were significant. I used the simple slopes method (Aiken & West, 1991) to further 
investigate the relation between collective self-esteem and threat. The analysis showed that 
for participants high in collective self-esteem threat did not have an influence on their 
motivation to leave the group (β = .18, p = .34). However, participants low in collective 
self-esteem showed a marginally significant decrease in their motivation to leave the group 
when they were threatened (β = -.33, p = .09).  
Another multiple regression analysis for individual mobility as dependent variable 
was computed with evaluative identification, threat and their interaction as predictors. This 
regression was not significant, F(3,56) = 1.38, p > .05. However, the interaction between 
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evaluative identification and threat again was marginally significant (β = .23, p = .08). 
Again, I used the simple slopes method (Aiken & West, 1991) to investigate the interactive 
patterns. The analysis showed that for participants high in evaluative identification threat 
did not have an influence on their motivation to leave the group (β = .17, p = .37). 
However, participants low in evaluative identification showed a marginally significant 
decrease in their motivation to leave the group when they were threatened (β = -.30, p = 
.10; see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Simple Slopes for the Interaction of Evaluative Identification and Threat on 
Individual Mobility (Study 1). 
 
 
4.2.3. Discussion  
 
In general the results of the first study are consistent with my hypotheses. I argued 
that only the relation stated in second part of the self-esteem hypothesis (SEH2) presented 
by Abrams and Hogg (1988) exists (threatened high self-esteem will promote intergroup 
bias) and that SEH2 can be extended to the use of identity management strategies in 
general. Focusing on social competition, the results broadly supported my first hypothesis: 
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The more positive group members see their ingroup the more likely it is that they will react 
with social competition after receiving threatening information. This means that, in line 
with my argument, this positive group perception (i.e., group-based self-esteem) may serve 
as a standard to which incoming appraisals of group related events (here: social 
comparison outcomes) are compared. In Study 1, the threat manipulation led to a negative 
discrepancy with the standard for all participants high in group-based self-esteem. In order 
to cope with this negative discrepant event and to re-establish the positive group 
perception, group members reported the motivation to show social competition with the 
outgroup. However, the results concerning social competition were not very strong and did 
not always reach significance in the regression analysis. This might be due to sample size. 
Hence, to strengthen support for my hypothesis, it seemed necessary to replicate these 
findings in another study. 
Concerning individual mobility I tested two competing hypotheses. I postulated that 
either in line with a social identity approach (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ellemers et al., 
1997) receiving threat would increase the negative relation between group-based self-
esteem and the motivation to leave the group (hypothesis 2a) or that in line with the 
realistic conflict theory (e.g., Sherif, 1966) receiving threat would decrease the relation 
between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility (hypothesis 2b). The results of 
Study 1 clearly supported hypothesis 2b. Whereas in the no threat condition the negative 
relation between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility was found, in the threat 
condition this relation disappeared. This means that as long as group members receive 
neutral and positive information about their group, the less they value their group, the more 
they want to leave the group. However, as soon as the group members receive negative 
(threatening) information about their group, the relation between group-based self-esteem 
and the motivation to leave the group disappears: specifically, it seems that members low 
in group-based self-esteem tempered their initial desire for individual mobility when the 
group was threatened. It therefore seems that the threat changes the perception and 
meaning of the group. I assume that threat increases the importance of group membership 
and that therefore the negative relation between group-based self-esteem and individual 
mobility disappears. However, even though the interaction between threat and group-based 
self-esteem on individual mobility was clearly visible in the data of Study 1, the results 
were also not very strong. For this reason, and to test the hypothesis that threat changes the 
affiliation towards the ingroup a further study was conducted.  
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Moreover, the introduction of group-based self-esteem as a broad construct 
subsuming collective self-esteem and the evaluative dimension of identity was justified 
empirically. Although the two variables loaded on two different factors (see Footnote 7), 
they showed a moderate positive correlation and reacted in the same way to the (threat) 
manipulation. On the one hand, this clearly supports the distinction between them; on the 
other hand, it justifies the interpretation of these two variables as subfacets of the broader 
construct of group-based self-esteem.  
In line with Study 1 by Ellemers et al. (1997), I induced social identity threat in 
Study 1 by giving participants negative performance feedback. In the second study I 
decided to use a different manipulation of social identity threat to test my hypothesis. I 
induced threat by giving information that an outgroup discriminates against an ingroup. I 
intentionally avoided a situation within which real status differences are established and I 
intended to create a situation within which subjectively negative information about the 
ingroup is received.  
 
 
4.3. Study 2 
 
In a second study I wanted to replicate the found relation between group-based self-
esteem and social competition. Concerning individual mobility, I also wanted to replicate 
the results from Study 1. I further tested whether the threatening information changed the 
affiliation of the group members towards their group. Therefore, in the second study one 
item measuring the importance of the group membership was included before and after the 
manipulation. Furthermore, I changed the cover story in a way that the social identity 
threat was not due to real status differences. In the second study threatening information 
was induced by a faked newspaper article within which an outgroup discriminated against 
the ingroup.  
 
 
4.3.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The questionnaire study was conducted in the foyer of one 
of the main buildings of the University of Jena. In this study 109 students from the 
University of Jena participated. They received one bar of chocolate for participating. The 
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sample included 56 women and 53 men whose mean age was 22.3 years (SD = 3.1) with a 
range from 19 to 36. In the experiment one measured factor (high vs. low group-based self-
esteem) and one experimentally manipulated factor (threat vs. no threat) were used. The 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. 
Procedure. The students walking through the Foyer were approached by a female 
research assistant and were asked to participate in the study. When the participants agreed 
to participate they were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions and were seated at 
a separate table each.  
First, they read the general instructions including the cover story, according to 
which the study examined the students’ satisfaction with their university. After reading the 
general instructions the participants filled in the collective self-esteem scale and the 
evaluative identification scale, measuring the evaluative identification and esteem as East 
German students, and one item measuring the importance of group membership.  
Afterwards they read a faked newspaper article. In the threat condition, the 
participants read that a new representative study had been conducted among German 
employers. This study showed that all German employers prefer employing graduate 
students from South German universities, compared to graduate students from East 
German universities. The article discussed that employers perceive the students from South 
German universities to be better educated and more strongly achievement motivated then 
their colleagues from East German universities. The article in the control condition 
indicated that German employers do not have any regional preferences.  
After reading the faked newspaper articles, the participants were asked to fill in the 
second questionnaire, including perceived threat, the items of the identity management 
strategies, and the one item measuring of importance of group membership. After finishing 
the demographic questionnaire the participants were compensated with a bar of chocolate, 
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.  
Questionnaires. Mostly the same questionnaires were used as in Study 1: The 
collective self-esteem scale (α = .74, for both halves), evaluative identification (α = .75), 
perceived threat (α = .74), individual mobility (α = .88), and social competition (α = .74). 
Before and after the threat manipulation one item was included to measure the importance 
of group membership (e.g., “To be a member of this group is an important part of my 
personality”). Again, all responses ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I strongly disagree and 
I strongly agree). 
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4.3.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. Before conducting the analyses, the data of eight 
participants were excluded, who guessed parts of the hypotheses, were not students at the 
University of Jena, or did not speak German fluently. The data of 101 participants 
remained for analyses.  
The manipulation check showed a significant effect of the threat manipulation on 
perceived threat, t(99) = 3.55, p < .01. Participants in the threat condition (M = 4.02; SD = 
0.92) felt more threatened than participants in the no threat condition (M = 3.29; SD = 
1.13).  
Identity Management Strategies. Table 2 presents correlations between the 
predictors and the identity management strategies. In the no threat condition, neither 
collective self-esteem nor evaluative identification is related to social competition. 
However, in the threat condition there is a significant positive relationship between 
evaluative identification and social competition. The relation between collective self-
esteem and social competition in the threat condition is low and not significant, however, 
also positive. Similar to Study 1, the relation between group based self esteem (i.e., 
evaluative identification and collective self-esteem) and individual mobility are negative in 
the no threat condition and non-significant in the threat condition. Thus, group members 
may leave their group depending on their group based self esteem under no threat but when 
their group is threatened this relation disappears.  
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Table 2. Intercorrelations Between Predictors and Dependent Variables in Both Conditions 
(Study 2).  
 
Scales    1  2  3  4   
 
No threat (n = 50) 
1. Coll. self-esteem  -  .67**  -.07  -.32*  
2. Identification      -  .05  -.53**  
3. Social competition         -    .13  
4. Individual mobility            - 
      
Threat (n = 51) 
1. Coll. self-esteem  -  . 24†  .14  -.13  
2. Identification       -  .42**  .04  
3. Social competition        -  .27†  
4. Individual mobility          -  
†p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. 
 
Social competition. In the next step, I tested the correlational patterns with 
regression analyses. Again, I postulated that the more positive the participants’ view of the 
ingroup, the stronger should be their desire to show social competition when their social 
identity is threatened. Following the procedure used in Study 1, I calculated multiple 
regression analyses for collective self-esteem and evaluative identification, threat and their 
interactions as independent variables. Again, all continuous predictors were z-standardized 
before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).  
The first regression analysis investigated the effect of collective self-esteem, threat 
and its interaction, controlling for effects of the used half of the self-esteem scale and its 
interaction with the other independent variables, on social competition. This regression 
was not significant, F(7,93) = 0.57, p = .76. No regression coefficient was significant.  
Another multiple regression was computed with evaluative identification, threat and 
their interaction as predictors. This regression was significant, F(3,97) = 3.83, p = .01, and 
accounted for about 11% of the variance. The regression coefficient for evaluative 
identification (β = .24, p = .02) was significant. However, this was qualified by a 
significant interaction between evaluative identification and condition (β = .19, p = .05) on 
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social competition. I used the simple slopes method (Aiken & West, 1991) to further 
investigate the results. As predicted, participants high in evaluative identification reported 
the motivation to show more social competition when they were threatened (β = .30, p = 
.03). However, for participants low in evaluative identification threat did not have an effect 
on their motivation to show social competition (β = -.09, p = .52; see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Simple Slopes for the Interaction of Evaluative Identification and Threat on 
Social Competition (Study 2). 
 
Individual Mobility. Then, I tested the findings of the correlational analysis with 
regression analyses for individual mobility. I postulated in line with the results of Study 1 
that the negative relation between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility does 
only exist, if the group is not threatened. However, after being threatened this relation 
should disappear.   
A multiple regression analysis was computed with collective self-esteem, threat and 
their interaction (Aiken & West, 1991) as independent variables, controlling for effects of 
the used half of the self-esteem scale and its interaction with the other independent 
variables, and individual mobility as dependent variable. This regression was not 
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significant, F(7,93) = 1.55, p = .16. Only the regression coefficient for collective self-
esteem was significant (β = -.29, p < .01). 
Another multiple regression analysis for individual mobility as dependent variable 
was computed with identification, threat and their interaction as predictors. This regression 
was significant, F(3,97) = 5.84, p < .01, and accounted for about 15% of the variance. 
Again, the regression coefficient for identification was significant (β = -.26, p < .01), 
however, in line with my prediction the main effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction between identification and condition (β = .30, p < .01). I used the simple slopes 
method (Aiken & West, 1991) to investigate the interactive patterns. The analysis showed 
that for participants high in evaluative identification threat had a positive effect on their 
motivation to leave the group (β = .26, p = .05). However, participants low in evaluative 
identification showed a significant decrease in their motivation to leave the group when 
they were threatened (β = -.33, p = .01). 
Change in the importance of group membership. To test the prediction that threat 
had an effect on the importance of group membership, I computed a repeated measures 
ANOVA on the one item measuring the importance of group membership with time 
(before and after the manipulation) as within subject factor and condition as between 
subject factor. There was a main effect of time, F(1, 99) = 38.65, p < .01; qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction between time and condition, F(1,99) = 3.54, p = .06. For 
means and standard deviation see Table 3. As predicted, the importance of the group 
membership increased from pretest to posttest more for those participants being threatened 
compared to participants in the no threat condition. 
 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviation of Pre- and Posttest Importance of Group 
Membership for Both Conditions (Study 2).  
 
   Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard 
Importance of Group   deviation    deviation 
        
    Threat (n = 50)  No threat (n = 51) 
Pretest   2.50  1.33   2.70  1.62 
Posttest  4.04  1.79   3.54  1.66    
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4.3.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Study 2 again supported my predictions and replicated the found 
patterns of Study 1 using a different kind of threat manipulation. As in Study 1, the higher 
participants’ evaluative dimension of identification was, the stronger they wanted to show 
social competition when receiving negative information about their group. However, these 
findings could not be replicated for collective self-esteem. Overall the results supported the 
assumption of an interaction between group-based self-esteem and threat on competitive 
identity management strategies. Group members liking and valuing their group seemed to 
be extremely vulnerable to threatening information and therefore show an increased 
motivation to show competing behavior against the outgroup whenever receiving threat.  
As in Study 1, the results of Study 2 regarding individual mobility were in line with 
the second competing hypothesis (2b). Participants low in group-based self-esteem did not 
want to leave their group anymore after being threatened. For participants high in group-
based self-esteem the motivation to leave the group was not related to threat. More 
precisely, participants high in evaluative identification even showed a slightly increased 
motivation to leave the group when threatened. Again, the pattern of results pointed in the 
same direction for both variables (collective self-esteem and evaluative identification), 
however, the results were clearly stronger for evaluative identification.  
Moreover, in Study 2 I was interested in the reasons for the disappearance of the 
negative relation between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility in the threat 
condition. I had suggested that this was the case because of the change of the importance 
of group membership which I believed was due to the threatening information the 
participants received. In line with my reasoning, the results of Study 2 give first evidence 
that threat induced an increase in the importance of group membership. This means, that 
following the perspective of realistic conflict theory (e.g., Bornstein, 1992; Sherif, 1966) 
threatening information about the ingroup can lead to an overall stronger feeling of 
importance of group membership and therefore the negative relation between group-based 
self-esteem and the motivation to leave the group disappeared. In contrast to the findings 
by Ellemers et al. (1997) threat did not increase the motivation to leave the group. This 
might be due to the fact that unlike Ellemers and colleagues, I investigated daily life 
groups having a history and a meaning to the group members. Ellemers and colleagues 
showed that members of minimal groups tend to leave the group when they are threatened 
and have a low level of group-based self-esteem. However, when a daily life group is 
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threatened then the process to leave the group as soon as possible does not seem to be the 
dominant strategy. Unfortunately at this point in time I do not know which identity 
management strategy group members with low group-based self-esteem chose as a reaction 
to perceived threat. This question has to be answered in further research. However, my 
results did show that the induced threat made the group more salient and important. But, it 
has to be kept in mind that the results of Study 2 supporting this hypothesis have to be seen 
as preliminary data, which need to be replicated in further studies.  
 
 
4.4. Study 3 
 
A third study was carried out to investigate the underlying mechanism between 
group-based self-esteem and social competition under social identity threat. In addition to 
the outlined and already investigated hypotheses, I predicted that social identity threat 
should lead to an increase in anger especially among those high in group based self-
esteem. In line with the findings by Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999), I predicted that 
anger is a mediator of the relation between group-based self-esteem and the motivation to 
deploy social competition whenever individuals perceive an intergroup context as 
threatening (hypothesis 3). To investigate this hypothesis I conducted a questionnaire study 
measuring evaluative identification with the ingroup, anger, and the motivation to deploy 
social competition in a situation designed to provoke feelings of social identity threat.   
 
 
4.4.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The questionnaire study was conducted at the end of a 
lecture. In total 228 students participated. The sample included 171 women and 57 men 
whose mean age was 21.9 years (SD = 3.4) with a range from 18 to 42. All participants 
were from East Germany. Social identity threat was induced to all participants.   
Procedure. The questionnaire study was conducted within a lecture “Introduction in 
Social Psychology” at the University of Dresden. The students were asked to fill in the 
questionnaire at the end of the lecture on a voluntary basis. Threat was induced by making 
the comparison between East and West Germany salient. As Mummendey, Kessler et al. 
(1999) outlined West Germans are highly salient and relevant as a reference group for East 
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Germans and the comparison outcome is negative for East Germans. Mummendey et al. 
(1999) reported that within a questionnaire 75% of the sample agreed to the statement that 
for the near future East Germans would be “second-class citizens” (Spiegel-Redaktion, 
1995; see also Uhlmann, 2007).   
Questionnaires. In the third study the main variables of interest were evaluative 
identification (α = .82), anger (α = .83), and social competition (α = .73). For these 
variables mostly the same questionnaires were used as in Study 1 and 2. However, instead 
of measuring evaluative identification and collective self-esteem this time only evaluative 
identification was measured. Perceived threat (α = .89) in form of discrimination against 
East Germans was measured as manipulation check to make sure that the participants all 
perceived social identity threat. Again, all responses ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I 
strongly disagree and I strongly agree).  
 
 
4.4.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. The manipulation check showed that the mean of social 
identity threat (operationalized as perceived discrimination) of the ingroup (M = 3.87; SD 
= 1.11) was significantly different from the theoretical midpoint of the scale (M = 3.50), 
t(227) = 5.03, p < .01. This means that making the comparison between East and West 
Germans salient overall led to social identity threat for the majority of the East German 
participants (75 % of the participants ticked ≥ 3.00).  
Mediation analysis. The mediation model was estimated using Maximum 
Likelihood in AMOS 16. The standardized effect of evaluative identification on anger was 
significant (β = .27, p < .01), the effect of anger on social competition was significant (β = 
.76, p < .01) and direct effect of evaluative identification on social competition (β = .21, p 
< .01) was significant when not taking anger into account. However, after including anger 
it was not significant anymore (β = .01, p = .79). The 95%-confidence intervals were 
estimated using 2000 bootstrap samples, and indicate a significant difference of the 
indirect effect from zero (standardized indirect effect: .19; lower bounds: .10; upper 
bounds: .29; using bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals). To test the hypothesis of 
complete mediation the direct effect was constrained to zero, resulting in a non-significant 
reduction of the model fit (∆χ²(1, N = 228) = .095, p = .76), thereby supporting the 
hypothesis of complete mediation. 
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4.4.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Study 3 showed that the relation between evaluative identification 
and social competition was mediated by anger when group members experienced social 
identity threat. In line with my predictions and the findings of Mummendey, Kessler et al. 
(1999) group members who identified strongly with their ingroup felt angry after receiving 
negative information about the ingroup. This anger led to the motivation to deploy a 
competitive identity management strategy, in my studies social competition. Even though 
the results of Study 3 strongly supported the assumption of a full mediation of anger, it has 
to be kept in mind that in the third study social identity threat was not manipulated, 
however, only induced to all participants by making West Germany as reference point for 
social comparison salient. Therefore, it seems necessary for further research to examine the 
relationship between identification, anger and social competition in a more controlled 
experimental paradigm. Moreover, in the third study individual mobility was not taken into 
account. In further studies following the procedure from Study 1 and 2, both social 
competition and individual mobility should be investigated at the same time. This would 
allow a direct comparison of the underlying processes of the two identity management 
strategies.  
 
 
4.5. General Discussion of the First Research Line 
 
Taking the results of the three presented studies together I can conclude that the 
first hypothesis (1) “Threatened high group-based self-esteem will promote the use of 
social competition” was supported empirically. The first and the second study found that 
group members having high group-based self-esteem showed a stronger desire for social 
competition after being threatened compared to group members having low group-based 
self-esteem. Moreover, the results from Study 3 together with the findings by 
Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) support the assumption that this relation is mediated by 
anger (hypothesis 3). However, the presented studies give first evidence. Further research 
should replicate these results and investigate the role of anger in a more controlled setting. 
Regarding individual mobility, the second competing hypothesis (2b) was 
supported empirically by Study 1 and 2: Group members having low group-based self-
esteem showed a decreased motivation to leave their group after being threatened. Only 
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when receiving not threatening information there was a negative relation between group-
based self-esteem and individual mobility. The results of the second study give first 
evidence that the relation between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility in the 
threat condition might be due to the increased importance of group membership after 
receiving threatening information. This is in line with assumptions from the realistic 
conflict theory (e.g., Sherif, 1966). However, the results are opposite to the results of 
earlier studies (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1997). I assume that this is the case because in contrast 
to Ellemers and colleagues I investigated daily life groups. Even if group members do not 
value their group much, it might be the case that when their group is threatened this 
motivates them to react in a defensive way. The results from Study 1 and Study 2 point in 
that direction, however, the presented results and the underlying process should be 
explored further. It would be especially interesting to investigate which identity 
management strategy group members low in group-based self-esteem choose after being 
threatened.   
Moreover, a further inspiring research question is the effect of threat and group-
based self-esteem on identity management strategies other than individual mobility and 
social competition. The presented research was limited to these two strategies. However, in 
further research also the various forms of social creativity should be taken into account.  
Further research should also investigate the role of socio-structural variables 
comparing threatened and not threatened groups. It is well known (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; 
Ellemers et al., 1993) that socio-structural variables play an important role for the choice of 
identity management strategies. However, in the presented studies the role of socio-
structural variables was not taken into account. Therefore, it seems necessary to investigate 
the role of socio-structural variables while manipulating social identity threat.  
The introduction of group-based self-esteem as a broad construct subsuming 
collective self-esteem and the evaluative dimension of identity was justified empirically in 
the first two studies. On the one hand, both operationalizations correlated moderately so 
that there seems to be an overlap between the two variables. On the other hand, the 
interaction effects of both variables with threat always were in the same direction, even 
though they were not always equally strong. The fact that the two variables correlate and 
react in the same way to the manipulation clearly supports the interpretation of the two 
variables as subfacets of the broader construct of group-based self-esteem.  
In sum, the presented results supported my argument that it is not low self-esteem 
but threatened high group-based self-esteem that motivates the use of competitive identity 
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management strategies. A positive perception of one’s ingroup was reflected in higher 
group-based self-esteem (Ellemers et al., 1999). This positive group perception (i.e., 
group-based self-esteem) seemed to serve as a standard to which incoming appraisals of 
group related events were compared. Whenever these events were negatively discrepant to 
this group members became active by choosing competitive identity management 
strategies in order to cope with this negative discrepant event and to re-establish the 
positive group perception. This process was mediated by anger. However, the results 
concerning individual mobility seem to support that the presented relation is only true for 
competitive identity management strategies, not for individual mobility. Group members 
who did not value their group were more likely to leave their group when they were not 
threatened compared to when they are threatened. In my eyes these results provide 
additional insight into the recently growing work on group-based self-regulation 
(Sassenberg & Woltin, 2008). They show nicely that the reactions to social identity threat 
depend on the relation an individual has towards his or her group. 
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4.6. Specific Research Hypotheses of the Second Research Line 
 
In the second line of research I investigated the effect of inhibiting the use of 
identity management strategies. To this aim it was necessary to show first that the use of 
identity management strategies needs cognitive resources. Therefore I replicated and 
extended the findings by Coull and colleagues (2001) in a first empirical step. I wanted to 
demonstrate that not only the protection of the ingroup against deviant ingroup members 
but also the protection of the ingroup against threatening information from outgroups needs 
cognitive resources. The motivation to manage one’s social identity and therefore the 
needed cognitive resources to protect one’s ingroup should be especially strong for group 
members high in group-based self-esteem.   
Next, I inhibited the use of identity management strategies. Based on the procedure 
by Gilbert and colleagues (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1995) I induced cognitive load to inhibit the 
use of any identity management strategy. Gilbert and colleagues showed that cognitive 
load impairs participants’ ability to perform mental corrections. Because group members 
are mentally busy through the induced cognitive load, they will not have cognitive 
resources left to engage in a mental correction process. Thus, implementing cognitive load 
should inhibit the use of identity management strategies. Following the assumptions of 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the inhibition of the use of any identity 
management strategy leads to a decrease in group-based self-esteem because the regulation 
processes, normally triggered by threat, are eliminated. Moreover, I argue that the decrease 
in group-based self-esteem goes along with an increase in negative emotions. I assume this 
because the experienced discrepancy between the standard and the incoming appraisal goes 
along with negative emotions. In line with this argument the second study by Gilbert and 
colleagues (1995) showed that a negative comparison outcome can influence the affective 
state of the participants. Thus, I assume that negative emotions can be seen as an indicator 
for the unsuccessful deployment of identity management strategies. This argument fits in 
with the basic assumptions of self-regulation theories (e.g., Carver, 2004; Carver & 
Scheier, 1990). I postulate that the negative feelings are normally undone when an identity 
management strategy is used successfully. Whenever an identity management strategy is 
deployed successfully this should lead to a decrease in negative emotions. As a 
consequence, when it is not possible to successfully manage one’s social identity, then the 
negative emotions are not reduced and remain on a high level. 
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4.6.1. Overview of Studies 4 to 7 
 
In the following section four studies (Study 4, 5, 6, and 7) will be presented. Study 
4 tested the precondition of my argument: Does managing one’s social identity need 
cognitive resources and is the amount of needed resources related to the level of group-
based self-esteem? To answer this question, I replicated and extended the findings by Coull 
and colleagues (Coull et al., 2001) with the goal to demonstrate that the protection of the 
ingroup against threatening information from an outgroup needs cognitive resources, in 
particular for group members high in group-based self-esteem.  
In a next step (Study 5, 6, and 7) I examined the effect of inhibiting identity 
management strategies. Based on the procedure by Gilbert and colleagues (e.g., Gilbert, 
Giesler, & Morris, 1995) I induced cognitive load to inhibit the use of any identity 
management strategy. Gilbert and colleagues showed that cognitive load impairs 
participants’ ability to perform mental corrections. Therefore I argue that implementing 
cognitive load does inhibit the use of identity management strategies. I postulate that the 
inhibition of the use of any identity management strategy leads to a decrease in group-
based self-esteem and an increase in negative emotions, especially for group members high 
in group-based self-esteem. 
 
 
4.7. Study 4 
 
In Study 4, I investigated the hypothesis that mental corrections need cognitive 
resources (Gilbert et al., 1995). In line with Coull et al. (2001), I assumed that the 
motivation to perform mental corrections (and use identity management strategies, 
respectively) should be especially pronounced for group members high in group-based 
self-esteem when receiving threatening information. This means I predicted an interaction 
between group-based self-esteem and threat on the availability of cognitive resources.  
To test this hypothesis I conducted a study based on the procedure of the study by 
Coull and colleagues (2001). The participants worked on a dual task. In the main task 
participants either read neutral or threatening information. At the same time they listened 
to neutral information. I postulated that when participants high in group-based self-esteem 
read threatening information they would have less cognitive resources left to process the 
heard neutral information and therefore would perform worse in a following test on the 
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information of the secondary task compared to participants low in group-based self-esteem. 
However, in the condition where participants read neutral information, group-based self-
esteem should not be related to the performance in the secondary task.   
 
 
4.7.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The study was conducted in the psychological laboratory 
of one of the main buildings of the University of Jena. In this study 29 students from the 
University of Jena were recruited, who each received 2 Euros and a bar of chocolate for 
participating. The sample included 16 women and 13 men whose mean age was 22.2 years 
(SD = 2.26) with a range from 19 to 26 years. In the experiment a 2 (group-based self-
esteem, between: high vs. low) x 2 (valence, within: threat vs. neutral) design was used. 
The first factor (group-based self-esteem) was a quasi-experimental factor.  
Procedure. Students studying business or political economics were approached 
when leaving a lecture by a female research assistant and were asked to participate in the 
study. When the participants agreed to participate they were led to the laboratory. There 
they were seated in one cubical each in front of a computer. All information was given on 
the computer screen.  
First, the participants were asked to indicate whether they studied political or 
business economics. Then, they read the general instructions including the cover story, 
saying that the study was testing people’s ability to form impressions based on a 
newspaper article. Then, the participants were asked to complete a collective self-esteem 
scale, measuring participant’s overall evaluation of their group membership either as 
students of political economics or as students of business economics.  
After the participants had completed the collective self-esteem scale they were told 
that while reading the newspaper article and forming the impression, they had to listen to 
an audio-taped recoding about Andorra and try to remember the given information. 
However, they were also told that priority should be given to the impression formation 
task. Participants then indicated when they were ready to work on the dual task by pressing 
a button to start the task. While the first section of the newspaper article was presented, 
simultaneously, participants listened to audio-taped information about Andorra. After 
reading the first section and listening to the first block of information, a screen appeared 
informing the participants that they should press a button as soon as they are ready to read 
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and listen to the second block of information. All four sections of the newspaper article and 
blocks of auditory information about Andorra were presented in this way. For all 
participants the same positive newspaper section was placed in the first and last position. 
The remaining positive and negative newspaper section was placed either in the second or 
the third position. The order of the negative newspaper section in either the second or third 
position was counterbalanced within conditions.  
After reading and listening to all information the participants completed 32 multiple 
choice questions assessing the presented facts about Andorra. After finishing the 
demographic questionnaire the participants were compensated, debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed.  
Materials and Questionnaires. Participants completed a pretest questionnaire 
including collective self-esteem with the ingroup. The same collective self-esteem and 
evaluative identification scales were used as in Study1.  
All participants read four sections of a faked newspaper article. Each newspaper 
section was about 120 words long. The general topic of the article was conditions of 
employment for business economics compared to political economics. Each section 
covered one specific topic, for example, section one described the unemployment rate of 
business and political economics with work experiences. Three sections were neutral, 
stating that there are no differences between business and political economists, always 
drawing a positive picture of the conditions of employment. However, one section included 
threatening information. Within this section it was stated that the salary of the outgroup 
members (which group was the outgroup dependent on the membership of the participant) 
is about 15% higher, than the salary of the ingroup members. Furthermore, the article 
quoted managers of German business companies saying that the higher salary of the 
outgroup members was due to performance differences between the two groups. 
Depending on the condition the participants were in, the threatening section was either 
presented in the second or in the third block.  
The information about Andorra was presented while the participants were reading 
each section of the newspaper article. During each section of the newspaper article eight 
facts about Andorra were presented auditory. The first block of information about Andorra 
included eight basic facts about Andorra (e.g., Andorra is located in the Eastern Pyrenees, 
between Spain and France), the second block included eight facts about the inhabitants of 
Andorra (e.g., Andorra has 81.222 inhabitants), the third block included eight facts about 
environment conditions of Andorra (e.g., One third of Andorra lies above the forest line), 
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and the fourth block included eight facts about Andorra’s history (e.g., Andorra is 
independent since Charlemagne).  
After reading all four sections of the newspaper article and listing to all the facts 
about Andorra the participants were asked to complete a multiple choice questionnaire 
about Andorra. In total 4 x 8 (eight per block, this means in total 32) multiple choice 
questions about Andorra had to be answered, one question always addressing one fact. 
Each multiple choice question had five answer possibilities (e.g., How many inhabitants 
does Andorra have? 102.013; 93.679; 81.222; 72.111; 50.432). The participants had to 
indicate the right answer. Furthermore, the participants were asked to answer one item 
measuring how much they had made an effort to work on the dual task. The response 
ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I strongly disagree and I strongly agree).  
 
 
4.7.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. Before analyzing data, the data of four participants 
were excluded because they reported very low levels (1 or 2) on the question how much 
they made an effort to work on both tasks during the study. The data of 25 participants 
remained for analyses.  
Performance in secondary task. Percentages of right answers per block of the 
Andorra multiple choice task were calculated to analyze the data of participants’ 
performance in the auditory task. Then, the mean performance of all neutral blocks was 
calculated (depending on the order condition this was either the mean performance of 
block 1, 2, and 4 or the mean performance of block 1, 3, and 4), resulting in one variable 
with the mean performance of all neutral blocks for each participant. Then, the mean 
performance of each participant in the threatening block was calculated, again depending 
on order condition this was either the performance in block 2 or in block 3.  
I computed a repeated measures ANOVA to test the prediction that participants 
high in group-based self-esteem would deploy identity management strategies when 
reading threatening information about their group and that they therefore would not have 
enough cognitive resources left to fully process the auditory information. Before running 
the ANOVA, I computed median splits for the collective self-esteem scale, so that it could 
be used as a between subject factor in the ANOVA. In the ANOVA the performance of the 
participants in the neutral blocks and performance of the participants in the threatening 
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block (valence of the blocks) was used as a within subject factor, order of the threatening 
block as covariate, and the median split of collective self-esteem scale as between subject 
factor. The interaction between the valence of the blocks and evaluative identification was 
significant, F(1,22) = 4.16, p ≤ 0.05, η2  = .16. No other effects were significant. I 
computed a t-test for paired samples to test for differences between low and high 
identifiers in the two valence conditions. The first t-test showed a significant difference 
between members high and low in collective self-esteem in the threat block (t(23) = - 2.31, 
p = 0.03), indicating that group members high in collective self-esteem (M = 32.69, SD = 
18.07) performed worse than did group members low in collective self-esteem (M = 51.04, 
SD = 21.62). The second t-test did not show an significant difference between group 
members high and low in collective self-esteem in the neutral blocks, (t(23) = - 0.30, p = 
.78). Group members high in collective self-esteem (M = 35.58, SD = 14.59) did not 
perform significantly worse than group members low in collective self-esteem (M = 37.50, 
SD = 17.67).   
Even though the predicted interaction was found, the effect was driven by the 
increased performance of the participants low in collective self-esteem in the threat 
condition and not as assumed by the decrease in performance of participants high in 
collective self-esteem. I assumed this to be the case because blocks 2 and 3 seemed to be 
easier than blocks 1 and 4. To test this hypothesis, I calculated the mean performance of 
participants low in collective self-esteem in the blocks 1 and 4 and in the blocks 2 and 3. 
Then, I computed a paired sample t-test to test the differences between blocks 1 and 4, and 
blocks 2 and 3. I investigated only participants low in collective self-esteem because their 
performance can be understood as performance baseline. Even though the paired sample t-
test was not significant, (t(12) = -1.57, p = .15), the result showed in the predicted 
direction. The performance of group members low in collective self-esteem in blocks 1 and 
4 was lower (M = 37.00, SD = 18.36) than their performance in the blocks 2 and 3 (M = 
44.79, SD = 19.91), meaning that blocks 1 and 4 were more difficult than blocks 2 and 3.   
 
 
4.7.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Study 4 confirmed the prediction. Group members being threatened 
and having a high group-based self-esteem need cognitive resources to cognitively undo 
the threat and restore their group-based self-esteem. Even though the results of Study 4 at 
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first sight seem to indicate that the effect was driven by an increased performance of the 
group members low in group-based self-esteem in the threat condition, further analyses 
showed that this actually was due to a decreased performance of group members high in 
group-based self-esteem. The mean difficulty of the blocks were different, blocks 2 and 3 
were easier than blocks 1 and 4. Therefore the finding that the performance of group 
members high in group-based self-esteem in the threatening blocks was lower than the 
performance of group members low in group-based self-esteem indicated a decreased 
performance of participants high in group-based self-esteem. These results are in line with 
the findings by Coull and colleagues (Coull et al., 2001) showing that participants high in 
group-based self-esteem need cognitive resources to protect their ingroup against 
threatening information. I assume that this is the case because for individuals high in 
group-based self-esteem threat triggers the motivation to use an identity management 
strategy, to cope with the negative information. Participants high in group-based self-
esteem in the presented study used identity management strategies when receiving 
threatening information and for this reason showed worse performance in the secondary 
task compared to the condition where they received neutral information. In the following 
studies I want to explore what happens, when the use of identity management strategies is 
impaired by cognitive load.  
 
 
4.8. Study 5 
 
The results of Study 4 showed that the use of identity management strategies needs 
cognitive resources for group members valuing their ingroup. In Study 5, the hypothesis 
was tested that the inhibition of identity management strategies leads to a decrease in 
group-based self-esteem and an increase in anger. I argue that a decrease of group-based 
self-esteem is expected only in the condition where group members having a high group-
based self-esteem are threatened and work under cognitive load. In all the other conditions, 
either when group members are threatened but do not work under cognitive load, or where 
group members are not threatened at all, I do not expect a decrease in group-based self-
esteem. In the condition where group members are threatened but were not put under 
cognitive load they do have the possibility to deploy an identity management strategy to 
restore their group-based self-esteem.  
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However, concerning negative emotions I have similar predictions: Group members 
having a high group-based self-esteem are supposed to be especially angry when receiving 
threat. This effect should be even more pronounced when the group members work under 
cognitive load and do not have the possibility to manage their social identity. In the 
condition where they receive threatening information but do not work under cognitive 
load, they should still feel angry but not as much as in the condition where deploying 
identity management strategies is inhibited (Gilbert et al., 1995). In the two conditions 
where participants do not receive any threat they do not have any reason to feel angry. 
Therefore I assume that in the threat and cognitive load condition the level of anger should 
be highest for participants having a high group-based self-esteem; in the threat and no 
cognitive load condition the level of anger should also be high, however, not as high as in 
the first condition; and in the no threat conditions, independently of load, anger should be 
on the same low level.   
 
 
4.8.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The study was conducted in the psychological laboratory 
of one of the main buildings of the University of Jena. In this study 105 students from the 
University of Jena were recruited, who each received 3 Euros for participating. The sample 
included 67 women and 38 men whose mean age was 23.32 years (SD = 2.53) with a range 
from 19 to 30. In the experiment a 2 (group-based self-esteem, between: high vs. low) x 2 
(threat, between: threatening information vs. neutral information) x 2 (load, between: 
cognitive load vs. no cognitive load) design was used. The first factor (group-based self-
esteem) was a quasi-experimental factor. The participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four experimental conditions.   
Procedure. Students walking through the main University building were 
approached by a female research assistant and were asked to participate in the study. When 
the participants agreed to participate they were led to the laboratory. There they were 
seated in one cubical each in front of a computer. All information was given on the 
computer screen.  
First, the participants read the general instructions including the cover story, which 
said that they were participating in a study with the goal to assess students’ satisfaction 
with their universities. Then they filled in the collective self-esteem and evaluative 
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identification scale, measuring their esteem and identity as students of East German 
universities. Afterwards, the participants were told that half of them next would work on a 
dual task, measuring their concentration ability. This half of the participants saw an eight 
digit number presented for 15 seconds on the computer screen, which they had to rehearse 
constantly during the experiment and were asked to report on at the end of the experiment 
(cognitive load condition). In the no load condition the participants did not have to 
rehearsal anything. Then, all participants read a faked newspaper article. In the threat 
condition the article said that the unemployment rate in East German had increased during 
the last years. In particular graduated students form East German Universities had greater 
problems to find a job than graduated students from West German Universities. In the no 
threat condition the text indicated the unemployment rate decreased, also for graduated 
students from East German Universities. The participants then filled in scales measuring 
collective self-esteem, evaluative identification, perceived threat, and anger. Afterwards, 
the participants in the cognitive load condition were asked to write down the rehearsed 
eight digit number and the strategy they had used to remember the number. After finishing 
the demographic questionnaire the participants were compensated, debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed.  
Questionnaires. Participants completed a pretest questionnaire including collective 
self-esteem and the evaluative dimension of identification with the in-group. The collective 
self-esteem scale was the same as in Study 1. But, the two halves of the scale was used 
before and after the threat manipulation (α = .67; α = .69). One half of the participants 
answer half A first, and half B second, the other half of the participants vice versa. The 
evaluative identification scale was the same as in Study 1 (α = .90). The same items were 
used before and after the manipulation. All responses ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I 
strongly disagree and I strongly agree).  
At the end of the experiment the participants were again asked to fill in five items 
measuring collective self-esteem and five items measuring evaluative identification (α = 
.92). Moreover, the participants filled in a scale measuring anger consisting of three items 
(e.g., “I am angry when I think about the situation.”; α = .90), and a scale measuring 
perceived threat (e.g., “I fell threatened by the newspaper article and its consequences for 
my group.”; α = .80), also consisting of three items. To avoid response sets, about one third 
of the items of each scale were framed negatively. The response ranged from 1 to 7 
(anchored at I strongly disagree and I strongly agree).   
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4.8.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. The manipulation check showed a significant effect of 
manipulated threat on perceived threat, t(103) = 16.33, p < .001. Participants in the threat 
condition (M = 5.42; SD = 1.02) felt more threatened than participants in the no threat 
condition (M = 2.27; SD = 0.95). 
Collective self-esteem and identification. I used regression analysis to test the 
hypothesis that participants high in pretest group-based self-esteem, who were in the threat 
and cognitive load condition, showed a decrease in posttest group-based self-esteem. I 
calculated multiple regression analyses first for collective self-esteem, threat, cognitive 
load and their two way interactions and one three-way interaction (Aiken & West, 1991) as 
independent variables, controlling for effects of the order of the self-esteem subscale and 
its interactions, and posttest collective self-esteem as dependent variable. All continuous 
predictors were z-standardized before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).  
The multiple regression was significant, F(15,89) = 3.52, p < .001, explaining about 
37 % of the variance. The regression coefficient for threat was significant (β = -.25, p = 
.04). The regression coefficient for pretest collective self-esteem was significant (β = .69, p 
< .001), and even though the interaction between threat and cognitive load was not 
significant, there was a tendency (β = -.13, p = .17). Moreover, there was an interaction 
between the order of the collective self-esteem subscale and threat (β = .24, p = .02). 
Simple slope test method (Aiken & West, 1991) was used to further investigate the 
interaction between the order of the scale and threat. Simple slopes were conducted 
because no specific hypotheses about the interaction existed. The analysis showed that for 
threatened participants the order of the collective self-esteem scale did not have an 
influence on the posttest collective self-esteem level (β = .15, p = .23). For participants not 
threatened the order of the scale also had no influence on their level of posttest collective 
self-esteem, however, there was a negative tendency (β = - .20, p = .11). However, this 
interaction does not seem to be related to the postulated pattern and therefore will not be 
discussed in the following. No other regression coefficient was significant.  
To further analyze the tendency of the interaction between threat and cognitive load 
on posttest collective self-esteem I conducted contrast analysis (Abelson & Prentice, 
1997). Contrast analysis was used because specific predictions existed. As mentioned 
before, I assumed that participants when being threatened tend to restore their collective 
self-esteem by using an identity management strategy. Whenever they do not have the 
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cognitive resources to deploy an identity management strategy this should lead to a 
decrease in collective self-esteem. Therefore I postulated that participants in the threat and 
cognitive load condition should show a lower collective self-esteem than the participants in 
all other conditions. I conducted planned contrast analyses with the focal contrast C1: -3 1 
1 1. Given that I had four experimental groups, there were 2 dfs to compute two orthogonal 
contrasts (C2: 0 0 1 -1 and C3: 0 -2 1 1). The focal contrast (C1: -3 1 1 1) was significant 
F(1,101) = 3.97, p < .05, η2  = .04. As expected participants in the threat and cognitive load 
condition reported less collective self-esteem than participants in all other conditions. Both 
orthogonal contrasts were not significant; indicating that there was no systematic residual 
variance left unexplained (both Fs < 1.6). 
Then I conducted a multiple regression analysis for pretest evaluative identification, 
threat, cognitive load, and their interactions as independent and posttest evaluative 
identification as dependent variable. The multiple regression was significant F(7,97) = 
48.96, p < .001, explaining about 78 % of the variance. However, only the regression 
coefficient for pretest evaluative identification was significant (β = .90, p < .001).   
Anger. Again, I first used regression analysis to test the hypothesis that participants 
high in collective self-esteem feel angry when they perceive threat and do not have the 
cognitive resources to undo the threat.  
I first calculated a regression analysis for collective self-esteem, order of the scale, 
threat, and cognitive load and their interactions as dependent variables and anger as 
independent variable. The regression analysis for collective self-esteem was significant 
F(15,89) = 16.01, p < .001, explaining about 73 % of the variance. However, only the 
regression coefficient for threat was significant (β = .81, p < .001).  
The regression for evaluative identification, threat, cognitive load and their 
interactions was also significant, F(7,97) = 34.15, p < .001, explaining about 71 % of the 
variance. As Table 4 shows the predicted three-way interaction was not significant. 
However, the interaction between threat and cognitive load and the interaction between 
evaluative identification and threat were significant.   
 
 
 
 
 
Second Research Line 
 
 
68 
Table 4. Regression Coefficients of Identification, Threat, Cognitive Load and Their 
Interactions on Anger (Study 5).  
 
Independent variables  B  Beta  p  
 
Threat      1.59  .80  .00 
Cognitive load   0.21  .11  .07 
Stand. eva. identification  0.23  .12  .06 
Threat x load    0.31  .15  .01 
Threat x eva. identification  0.24  .12  .04 
Load x eva. identification  -0.06  -.03  .65 
Threat x load x eva. identification -0.05  -.03  .61 
 
Then, I conducted planned contrast analysis (Abelson & Prentice, 1997) testing my 
specific prediction regarding the interaction between threat and load. I assumed anger to be 
highest in the threat and load condition, because the participants were not able to undo the 
threatening information in this condition. Moreover, I assumed participants also to be 
angry in the threat and no cognitive load condition, because in this case the participants 
had just read threatening information, but had the possibility to undo them by using 
identity management strategies. Therefore the level of anger should be lower in the threat 
and no load condition than in the threat and load condition; however, it should be higher 
than in the two other conditions, where no threat was induced. In the no threat conditions 
independently of the load manipulation, I assumed the participants to have low levels of 
anger because they did not receive any threatening information. I conducted planned 
contrast analyses with the following focal contrast C1: 5 3 -4 -4. Given that I had four 
experimental groups, there were 2 dfs to compute two orthogonal contrasts (C2: -7 9 -1 -1 
and C3: 0 0 -3 3). The focal contrast (C1: 5 3 -4 -4) was significant F(1,101) = 225.65, p  < 
.001, η2  = .69. As expected, participants in the threat and cognitive load condition reported 
higher levels of anger than the participants in the threat and no load condition. Participants 
in the threat and no load condition reported higher levels of anger than participants in the 
two no threat conditions (see Figure 4). Both orthogonal contrasts were not significant; 
indicating that there was no systematic residual variance left unexplained (both Fs < 1.0). 
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Figure 4. Means of Anger for Each Condition (Study 5). 
 
Moreover, the regression analysis revealed a significant interaction between pretest 
evaluative identification and threat on anger (see Table 4). I computed simple slopes 
(Aiken & West, 1991) instead of contrast analysis to investigate this pattern further, 
because of missing specific hypothesis. Participants high in evaluative identification were 
angrier the more threatened they were (β = .87, p < .001), compared to participants low in 
collective self-esteem (β = .75, p < .001).  
 
 
4.8.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Study 5 showed the predicted effects of inhibiting the use of identity 
management strategies when implementing cognitive load. I found the predicted decrease 
of group-based self-esteem for threatened participants working under cognitive load. 
Moreover, I found the predicted increase of anger for threatened participants working 
under cognitive load. These findings are first evidence for my hypotheses. I had postulated 
that when the use of identity management strategies is impaired, threatened group-based 
self-esteem cannot be restored. I had postulated further that the decrease in group-based 
self-esteem goes along with an increase in negative emotions.  
However, the results did not support the assumption that this process is especially 
pronounced for group members high in group-based self-esteem. The patterns in Study 5 
Second Research Line 
 
 
70 
were independent of the pretest level of collective self-esteem. I assume that this is 
because, as post-hoc analysis showed, all participants had high levels of pretest collective 
self-esteem. On a seven point scale the mean of pretest collective self-esteem was M = 6.00 
with a standard deviation of SD = 0.80. This means that all participants valued their group 
a lot, which reduced variance. This seems be a plausible reason for the missing influence 
of pretest collective self-esteem. Keeping in mind that all participants had more or less 
high pretest collective self-esteem means that the prediction that especially group members 
having high group-based self-esteem are affected by threat and cognitive load seems to be 
in line with the results. All group members having high group-based self-esteem, showed 
an increased anger and a decrease of collective self-esteem.  
Moreover, I found a significant interaction between evaluative identification and 
threat on anger. Participants high in evaluative identification were angrier the more 
threatened they were compared to participants low in evaluative identification (Martiny, 
Kessler, & Vignoles, 2008). This interaction was independent of cognitive load and 
therefore this effects was not in line with the predictions. However, the effect still shows 
especially group members high in group-based self-esteem are vulnerable to social identity 
threat.  
In sum, the results from the fifth study supported the predicted influence of threat 
and cognitive load on posttest group-based self-esteem and anger. However, due to the 
missing influence of pretest group-based self-esteem on the effects of inhibiting identity 
management strategies, it seems necessary to replicate the findings in a further study. The 
replication of the results was done with an intergroup context where the variance of group-
based self-esteem was larger than in Study 5. 
 
 
4.9. Study 6 
 
To overcome the limitations of Study 5 and to replicate the found results Study 6 
was conducted. Whereas in Study 5 an East German versus West German intergroup 
situation was made salient, I decided to use another intergroup context in Study 6 to 
overcome the ceiling effect of group-based self-esteem. Therefore, I introduced a 
comparison between two East German Universities, while consciously avoiding the 
comparison between East Germany and other parts of Germany. Even though being a 
student of the University of Jena is most likely a valued group membership, I assumed that 
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the direct comparison between East Germany and West Germany had increased the group-
based self-esteem of the participants in the fifth study. I assumed that taking another East 
German University would lead to a broader variance in group-based self-esteem.  
As in Study 5, I postulate that group members having high group-based self-esteem 
are especially vulnerable to threatening information when working under cognitive load. 
This should lead to a decrease in collective self-esteem and an increase of anger.  
 
 
4.9.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The study was conducted in the psychological laboratory 
of one of the main buildings of the University of Jena. I recruited 109 students from the 
University of Jena, who each received 3 Euros for participating. The sample included 87 
women and 22 men whose mean age was 22.28 years (SD = 2.71) with a range from 19 to 
37. In the experiment a 2 (group-based self-esteem, between: high vs. low) x 2 (threat, 
between: threatening information vs. neutral information) x 2 (load, between: cognitive 
load vs. no cognitive load) design was used. The first factor (group-based self-esteem) was 
a quasi-experimental factor. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions.   
Procedure. The procedure followed the procedure of Study 5, except the threat 
manipulation. In the threat condition the faked newspaper article said that the results of a 
new university ranking show that surprisingly the University of Dresden is the best East 
German University and not, as it would have been expected, the University of Jena. Within 
the new university ranking the University of Dresden was evaluated much better than the 
University of Jena. In the no threat condition the text indicated that the University of Jena 
and the University of Dresden are equally good. 
Questionnaires. The same questionnaires as in Study 1 were used. The two halves 
of collective self-esteem scale had an internal consistency of α = .65 and α = .78. Pretest 
evaluative identification had an internal consistency of α = .93, and posttest evaluative 
identification of α = .93. Perceived threat had an internal consistency of α = .75 and anger 
of α = .91. To avoid response sets about one third of the items off each scale were framed 
negatively. Again, all responses ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I strongly disagree and I 
strongly agree). 
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4.9.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. The manipulation check showed a significant effect of 
manipulated threat on perceived threat, t(107) = 10.98, p < .001. Participants in the threat 
condition (M = 3.77; SD = 1.20) felt more threatened than participants in the no threat 
condition (M = 1.65; SD = 0.80). 
Collective self-esteem and identification. I tested the hypothesis that participants 
having a high pretest collective self-esteem who were in the threat and cognitive load 
condition show a decrease in posttest collective self-esteem with regression analyses. I 
calculated multiple regression analyses first for collective self-esteem, threat, cognitive 
load, and their two way interactions and one three-way interaction (Aiken & West, 1991) 
as independent variables, controlling for effects of the order of the self-esteem subscale 
and its interactions, and posttest collective self-esteem as dependent variable. All 
continuous predictors were z-standardized before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991).  
The multiple regression was significant, F(15,93) = 8.02, p < .001, explaining about 
56 % of the variance. The regression coefficient for threat was significant (β = -.28, p < 
.001), the regression coefficient for load was marginal significant (β = .13, p = .07), the 
regression coefficient for the order of the self-esteem scale was significant (β = .33, p < 
.001), and for pretest collective self-esteem (β = .62, p < .001), and the interaction between 
the order of the scale and pretest collective self-esteem was significant (β = .15, p = .04). 
No further interactions were significant. I used simple slope test method (Aiken & West, 
1991) to further investigate the interaction between the order of the collective self-esteem 
scale and pretest collective self-esteem. For participants with high pretest self-esteem the 
order had a significant effect on the level of posttest self-esteem (β = .46, p < .001). For 
participants low in pretest self-esteem the order only had a marginal significant effect on 
the level of posttest self-esteem (β = .19, p = .06). These results were not predicted and 
because they do not seem to be directly related to the tested assumptions, they will not be 
discussed further.    
Then, I conducted a multiple regression analysis for pretest identification, threat, 
cognitive load, and their interactions as independent and posttest identification as 
dependent variable. The multiple regression was significant F(7,101) = 117.41, p < .001, 
explaining about 88 % of the variance. The regression coefficient for threat was significant 
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(β = -.12, p = .001) and the regression coefficient for pretest identification was significant 
(β = .95, p < .001). No further regression coefficients were significant.   
Anger. Again, I tested the hypothesis that participants having high collective self-
esteem feel extremely angry when they perceive threat and do not have the cognitive 
resources to undo the threat. First, I conducted a multiple regression analysis using threat, 
cognitive load, pretest collective self-esteem, and their interactions (Aiken & West, 1991) 
as independent variables, controlling for the order of the collective self-esteem scale, and 
anger as dependent variables.  
The regression with collective self-esteem, threat, cognitive load, and its 
interactions, controlling for the order of the collective self-esteem scale and its interactions, 
was significant, F(15,93) = 4.60, p < .001, explaining about 43 % of the variance. The 
regression coefficient for threat was significant (β = .58, p < .001). Moreover, the 
interaction between threat and pretest collective self-esteem was significant (β = .26, p = 
.003). This two way interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
between pretest self-esteem, threat, and cognitive load (β =.18, p = .04). To analyze the 
three-way interaction in detail I first computed a regression analysis for the no load 
condition and then for the load condition separately. In the no load condition the regression 
was significant, F(3,56) = 11.97, p < .001, explaining about 39% of the variance. The 
regression coefficient for pretest collective self-esteem was significant (β = .61, p < .001), 
however, no further effect was significant. In the load condition the regression was also 
significant, F(3,45) = 11.20, p < .001, explaining about 43 % of the variance. Again the 
regression coefficient for pretest collective self-esteem was significant (β = .51, p < .001), 
qualified by a significant two way interaction between collective self-esteem and threat (β 
=.37, p = .002). I used simple slopes test method (Aiken & West, 1991) to investigate the 
interactive pattern in both conditions. As predicted, in the load condition participants high 
in collective self-esteem were the more angry the more threatened they were (β = .90, p < 
.001); however, for participants low in collective self-esteem threat did not have an effect 
on anger (β = .12, p = .48). See Figure 5 for both cognitive load conditions. 
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Figure 5. Simple slopes for the Interaction Between Collective Self-Esteem and Threat on 
Anger Under the Two Load Conditions (Study 6).   
Cognitive load
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Low High
Collective self-esteem
A
ng
er
Threat
No threat
Second Research Line 
 
 
75 
Next, I computed a regression analysis with pretest identification, threat, cognitive 
load, and their interactions as predictors, and anger as dependent variable. The regression 
was significant, F(7,101) = 8.27, p < .001, explaining about 36 % of the variance. The 
regression coefficients for threat (β = .56, p < .001) and the interaction between threat and 
evaluative pretest identification (β = .21, p = .02) were significant. I analyzed the 
interaction in detail with simple slopes test method (Aiken & West, 1991). Group members 
high in group-based self-esteem were angrier the more threatened they were (β = .75, p < 
.001) compared to group members low in group-based self-esteem (β = .37, p < .001). No 
further two way interactions were significant, neither was the three-way interaction.  
 
 
4.9.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Study 6 did show the predicted three-way interaction for anger. 
Participants high in initial group-based self-esteem in the threat and cognitive load 
condition showed an increased anger compared to the participants in all other conditions. 
This means that whenever group members valuing their group receive threatening 
information and then do not have the possibility to undo this threat by deploying an 
identity management strategy they get angry.  
Regarding evaluative identification, no three-way did was found. Again, there was 
a significant interaction between threat and pretest evaluative identification. The higher 
participant’s initial level of evaluative identification, the angrier they were when 
threatened. Unfortunately this relation was independent of load.  
The predicted three-way interaction between the initial level of group-based self-
esteem, threat, and cognitive load on posttest group-based self-esteem was not found. I 
assume that this is the case because of the low sensitivity of the used measure. I used an 
explicit scale to measure pre- and posttest collective self-esteem, including very similar 
items before and after reading the manipulation. Due to the fact that individuals in general 
have the tendency to be consisted and due to the fact that the expected decrease in 
collective self-esteem is small, it is not that surprising that the decrease was not found.  
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4.10. Study 7 
 
To replicate the findings of Study 6 and to make sure that the found three-way 
interaction was really due to the predicted interplay between pretest group-based self-
esteem, threat and cognitive load a further study using a different cognitive load 
manipulation was conducted. A cognitive load procedure implemented by Robbins and 
colleagues (1996) was used. Participants in the study by Robbins and colleagues had to 
generate a random string of letters of the alphabet aloud every second. This procedure was 
assumed to suppress the central-executive of the working memory. The procedure of Study 
7 was changed in such a way that the participants had to generate a new random letter 
every five seconds. I changed this detail to ensure that the participants were able to read 
and understand the threatening information. Again, I postulate that group members having 
high group-based self-esteem are especially vulnerable to threatening information when 
working under cognitive load. This should lead to a decrease in group-based self-esteem 
and an increase of anger.  
 
 
4.10.1. Method 
 
Participants and design. The study was conducted in the psychological laboratory 
of one of the main buildings of the University of Jena. In this study 108 students from the 
University of Jena were recruited, who each received 2 Euros for participating. The sample 
included 78 women and 30 men whose mean age was 22.53 years (SD = 2.78) with a range 
from 18 to 33. In the experiment a 2 (group-based self-esteem, between: high vs. low) x 2 
(threat, between: threatening information vs. neutral information) x 2 (load, between: 
cognitive load vs. no cognitive load) design was used. The first factor (group-based self-
esteem) was a quasi-experimental factor. The participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four experimental conditions.   
Procedure. The procedure followed the procedures of Study 5 and 6. The threat 
manipulation was similar to the manipulation of Study 6. Only the cognitive load 
manipulation was changed. In the cognitive load condition the participants were asked 
generate a random string of letters of the alphabet aloud whenever they heard a sound. 
During the rest of the experiment the sound was presented every five seconds.  
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Questionnaires. The same questionnaires as in Study 1 were used. All scales had a 
satisfying internal consistency (collective self-esteem scales: α = .67/.73; pre- and posttest 
evaluative identification: α = .93; perceived threat: α = .75; anger: α = .91). To avoid 
response sets about one third of the items of each scale were framed negatively. Again, all 
responses ranged from 1 to 7 (anchored at I strongly disagree and I strongly agree). 
 
 
4.10.2. Results 
 
Checks and data screening. Before analyzing data, the data of 13 participants were 
excluded, who guessed parts of the hypotheses, were not students at an East German 
university, or did not speak German fluently. The data of 95 participants remained for 
analyses. The manipulation check showed a significant effect of manipulated threat on 
perceived threat, t(93) = 5.75, p < .001. Participants in the threat condition (M = 4.28; SD = 
1.09) felt more threatened than participants in the no threat condition (M = 2.95; SD = 
1.16). 
Collective self-esteem and identification. I tested the hypothesis that participants 
having a high pretest collective self-esteem who received threat and worked under 
cognitive load showed a decrease in posttest collective self-esteem with regression 
analyses. I calculated multiple regression analyses first for collective self-esteem, threat, 
cognitive load, their two way interactions, and one three-way interaction (Aiken & West, 
1991) as independent variables, controlling for order effects of the self-esteem subscale 
and its interactions, and posttest collective self-esteem as dependent variable. All 
continuous predictors were z-standardized before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991).  
The multiple regression was significant, F(15,79) = 4.43, p < .001, explaining about 
46 % of the variance. The regression coefficient for threat was significant, (β = -.21, p = 
.03), the order of the self-esteem subscale was significant (β = .44, p < .001), the regression 
coefficient for pretest collective self-esteem scale (β = .48, p < .001), and a three-way 
interaction between order, pretest collective self-esteem, and threat was significant (β = -
.22, p = .03). No further interactions were significant. The three-way interaction was 
analyzed further by computing regression analyses for the threat and the no threat 
condition separately. The results showed that whereas in the no threat condition no 
interaction between the order of the collective self-esteem scale and the pretest level of 
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collective self-esteem existed (β = .08, p = .49), in the threat condition a significant 
interaction existed (β = - .24, p = .04). However, because this interaction is not of 
relevance for the investigated hypothesis the relation was not examined further.  
Then, I conducted a multiple regression analysis for pretest identification, threat, 
cognitive load, and their interactions as independent, and posttest identification as 
dependent variable. The multiple regression was significant F(7,87) =103.32, p < .001, 
explaining about 89 % of the variance. The regression coefficient for pretest identification 
was significant (β = .94, p < .001) and the interaction between pretest identification and 
threat was significant (β = -.08, p = .03). This interaction was further investigated with 
simple slopes test method (Aiken & West, 1991). Participants high in evaluative 
identification the more they were threatened, the lower were their posttest level of 
evaluative identification. However, this relation was only marginal significant (β = -.09, p 
= .08). Participants low in pretest evaluative identification threat did not have an effect on 
the level of posttest evaluative identification (β = .05, p = .28).    
Anger. Following the procedure of Study 5 and 6 I computed a multiple regression 
with collective self-esteem, threat, cognitive load, and its interactions, controlling for the 
order of the collective self-esteem scale and its interactions, which was significant, 
F(15,79) = 5.96, p < .001, explaining about 53 % of the variance. The regression 
coefficient for threat was significant (β = .67, p < .001). Moreover, the three-way 
interaction between pretest self-esteem, threat, and cognitive load was significant (β =.21, 
p = .02). No further regression coefficients were significant. To analyze the three-way 
interaction in detail, I first computed a regression analysis for the cognitive load and then 
for the no cognitive load condition separately. In the no load condition the regression was 
significant, F(7,36) = 6.40 p < .001, explaining 56 % of the variance. The regression 
coefficient for threat was significant (β = .65, p < .001). No further effects were significant. 
In the cognitive load condition the regression also was significant, F(7,43) = 6.21, p < 
.001, explaining about 50 % of the variance. The regression coefficient for threat again was 
significant (β = .70, p < .001). However, qualified by a significant interaction between 
pretest collective self-esteem and threat (β = .25, p = .04). I used simple slopes test method 
(Aiken & West, 1991) to investigate the interactive pattern in the threat condition. As 
predicted, for participants high in collective self-esteem threat had a significant positive 
effect on anger (β = .91, p < .001). For participants low in collective self-esteem threat did 
have the same effect on anger, however not as strong as for participants high in group-
based self-esteem (β = .47, p = .002). 
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Next, I computed a regression analysis with pretest identification, threat, cognitive 
load and their interactions as predictors, and anger as dependent variable. The regression 
was significant, F(7,87) = 16.29, p < .001, explaining about 57 % of the variance. The 
regression coefficient for threat was significant (β = .64, p < .001), the regression 
coefficient for pretest identification was significant (β = .16, p = .03), and the interaction 
between threat and pretest identification (β = .19, p = .01) was significant. However, the 
main effects and two way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
between pretest identification, threat, and cognitive load (β = .16, p = .03). To analyze the 
three-way interaction in detail I first computed a regression analysis for the load and then 
for the no load condition separately. In the no load condition the regression was significant, 
F(3,40) = 11.12, p < .001, explaining about 46 % of the variance. Only the regression 
coefficient of threat was significant (β = .64, p < .001). In the load condition the regression 
also was significant, F(3,47) = 28.87, p < .001, explaining about 65 % of the variance. The 
regression coefficient for threat was significant (β = .64, p < .001), the regression 
coefficient for pretest evaluative identification was significant (β = .23, p = .01), however, 
qualified by a significant interaction between pretest evaluative identification and threat (β 
=.36, p < .001). I used simple slopes test method (Aiken & West, 1991) to further 
investigate the interactive pattern in the cognitive load condition. As predicted, for 
participants high in evaluative identification threat had a significant positive influence on 
anger (β = .98, p < .001). For participants low in evaluative identification threat also had a 
significant effect on anger (β = .29, p = .02), however, the effect was lower than for the 
participants high in evaluative identification. 
 
 
4.10.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Study 7 were in line with the results of Study 6. Again, I did find the 
interaction effect of group-based self-esteem (collective self-esteem and evaluative 
identification, respectively), threat, and cognitive load on anger. Participants having high 
group-based self-esteem showed an increase in anger when receiving threat under 
cognitive load compared to participants low in group-based self-esteem. Thus, the findings 
supported my theoretical assumptions. I had assumed that especially individuals high in 
group-based self-esteem are vulnerable to negative comparison outcomes and that these 
negative outcomes trigger identity management strategies. However, whenever group 
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members high in group-based self-esteem can not successfully manage their social identity 
this leads to an increase in negative emotions because the negative information can not 
undone.  
Again, I did not find the predicted effect for posttest collective self-esteem. 
However, I found a significant interaction between threat and pretest evaluative 
identification on posttest evaluative identification. Participants high in pretest evaluative 
identification showed when threatened a decrease in posttest evaluative identification. 
However, because this relation was independent of cognitive load and the found effect is 
very small, it will not be taken into account further.  
As mentioned before, I assume the missing effect on collective self-esteem is due to 
the used method. I used explicit scales to access the change in collective self-esteem. 
Explicit scales are not sensitive to small changes, on the one hand because of the 
individual’s tendency to be consistent, on the other hand because of the coarse grades of 
the scale. Even though I did not find the expected pattern for posttest collective self-
esteem, I assume that the found pattern for anger indicates that the postulated process 
really does occur. Participants high in group-based self-esteem have a strong motivation to 
regulate their group-based self-esteem after receiving negative information (threat), 
whenever they do not have the possibility to regulate their group-based self-esteem this 
results in an increase of negative emotions.  
 
 
4.11. General Discussion of the Results of the Second Research Line 
 
In the present work I was interested in the inhibition of identity management 
strategies and its effect on posttest group-based self-esteem and negative emotions (e.g., 
anger). I postulated in line with earlier findings (Coull et al., 2001; Gilbert et al., 1995) that 
the protection of one’s ingroup needs cognitive resources. The results of Study 4 supported 
this assumption. Especially participants high in group-based self-esteem were motivated to 
mange their social identity. In addition, the results of Study 5 showed significant 
interactions between threat and cognitive load independently of the pretest level of 
collective self-esteem on posttest collective self-esteem and anger. These results point in 
the predicted direction: When participants worked under cognitive load and then were 
threatened they showed an increase in anger and a decrease in collective self-esteem. I 
argue that this is the case because after receiving threat group members were motivated to 
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use identity management strategies. However, when working under cognitive load the 
participants could not use a strategy because they did not have cognitive resources left to 
do so. However, in Study 5 this pattern emerged not only for group members high in 
group-based self-esteem, but for all group members. I assume that this was due to the 
overall high level of pretest group-based self-esteem of the participants.  
Regarding anger the results of both last studies (6 and 7) were in line with the 
predictions. I had assumed that individuals high in group-based self-esteem when receiving 
threat and working under cognitive load would be especially angry. This effect was found 
in Studies 6 and 7, even though two very different operationalizations of cognitive load 
were used. In my opinion negative emotions can be seen as indicators for the failure of 
managing one’s social identity. This argument is in line with the basic assumptions of self-
regulation theories (e.g., Carver, 2000; Carver & Scheier, 1990). Carver and colleagues 
argued that negative affect arises whenever an individual is doing worse than he or she 
intended to do and positive feelings arise whenever a person does better. This means that 
the negative comparison outcome (threat) leads to negative feelings. These negative 
feelings are normally undone by using identity management strategies. Whenever one’s 
social identity is managed successfully negative emotions decrease. However, when it is 
not possible to successfully manage one’s social identity then negative emotions are not 
reduced, but, are likely to remain on a high level. 
However, in Study 6 and 7 the results for posttest collective self-esteem were not 
replicated. The reason might be the used measurement. Explicit scales might not be 
sensitive enough to assess small changes. In further research more sensitive measurements, 
which are not as conscious accessible, should be used. For example, implicit methods 
could be used to investigate the change of pre- to posttest group-based self-esteem (e.g., 
Heigener, 2008).  
In sum, the presented work gives first evidence for motivational dynamics of social 
identity theory. I showed that managing one’s social identity needs cognitive resources and 
that the use of identity management strategies is impaired whenever group members do not 
have enough cognitive resources available. In line with my argument, this process is 
especially true for group members high in group-based self-esteem because they are 
particularly motivated to protect their group image.   
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5. General Discussion 
  
5.1. Overview and Discussion of the Presented Studies 
 
The results of the reported studies testing the assumptions of the outlined dynamic 
approach of motivational processes of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
mainly supported the formulated hypotheses. In the first research line I postulated and 
found that the choice of specific identity management strategies depends on an interaction 
between the level of group-based self-esteem and threat. In other words, dependently on 
how much group members value their ingroup they react differently to threatening 
information. In the second research line I was interested in the effects of inhibiting identity 
management strategies. I hypothesized and found that group members working under 
cognitive load (i.e., did not have the possibility to manage their social identity) showed a 
decrease in group-based self-esteem and an increase in anger. In the following, an 
overview of the results as well as a discussion of the limitations of the studies will be 
presented for each research line separately.  
 
 
5.1.1. Overview of the Results of the First Research Line 
 
The first research line focused on the extension of the two corollaries of the self-
esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). I extended the first corollary of the self-
esteem hypothesis by postulating that not only intergroup bias but the use of any identity 
management strategy enhances group-based self-esteem. Furthermore, I extended the 
second corollary by postulating that it is not low group-based self-esteem but threatened 
high group-based self-esteem that promotes the use of identity management strategies. 
From these general assumptions specific hypotheses were derived which were tested in 
three studies.   
On the one hand, I postulated that group members high in group-based self-esteem 
are likely to show social competition when being threatened by an outgroup. I assumed 
that group members having a high group-based self-esteem have a strong and very positive 
image of their group. Whenever they receive negative information about the ingroup their 
motivation is triggered to increase the group’s status. Therefore, it seems more likely that 
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these group members will favor a collective strategy trying to enhance the evaluation of the 
whole group compared to an individual strategy that would only enhance their personal 
status. Moreover, I assumed that negative emotions play an important mediating role in the 
relation between high group-based self-esteem, threat, and the motivation to show social 
competition (Mummendey, Kessler, et al., 1999). I tested these assumptions in three 
studies and found support for the hypotheses. Study 1 and 2 showed that group members 
high in group-based self-esteem did report an increased motivation to show social 
competition after being threatened. Study 3 showed that the relation between group-based 
self-esteem and social competition was fully mediated by anger. 
On the other hand, I assumed a different process for group members low in group-
based self-esteem. For group members low in group-based self-esteem I postulated two 
competing hypotheses: Group members not valuing their group membership might show 
an increased motivation to leave the group when receiving threatening information (Boen 
et al., 2002, Ellemers et al., 1997; Snyder et al., 1986). The motivation of group members 
low in group-based self-esteem to leave their group arises because they do not value their 
group membership. They are not committed to the group and are not willing to make any 
effort to change the image of the whole group. Thus, if they then receive threatening 
information they will not be motivated to deploy a collective strategy which might include 
costs for them. As a consequence, they prefer to choose an individual strategy such as 
leaving their group and joining a higher status group.  
However, in contrast to the just outlined hypothesis it might also be the case that 
individuals having a low group-based self-esteem are not willing to leave their group and 
join a high status group when confronted with threatening information about their group. 
This assumption is in line with realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966). 
Group members of devaluated groups increase their group identity the more they 
recognized prejudice against their group (e.g., Chavira & Phinney, 1991; Cozzarelli & 
Karafa, 1998). This means that perceiving threat can lead to an increased identification and 
an increased importance of group membership. That would than lead to a decrease in the 
motivation to leave the group. 
In my eyes it depends on the investigated intergroup setting which of the two 
processes takes place. In minimal groups the first process seems more likely to occur (e.g., 
Ellemers et al., 1997, Study 1) because the membership in a minimal group is not very 
important for its members. However, in daily life groups, that have a collective history and 
meaning to their members, it is more likely that the importance of the group membership 
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increases after being threatened. Then individual mobility should be more unlikely to 
occur. 
The results of Study 1 and Study 2 showed that group members low in group-based 
self-esteem reported a decreased motivation to leave the group after being threatened 
compared to group members not being threatened. In other words, the negative relation 
between group-based self-esteem and individual mobility existed only when group 
members were not threatened. The results of Study 2 further indicated that this decrease of 
the motivation to leave the group was due to an increased importance of group membership 
triggered by the threatening information. In line with my second hypothesis and the 
argumentation according to realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966), the importance of the 
group increased after receiving threat. For this reason individual mobility was no adequate 
strategy for the group members anymore. 
In sum, the presented studies showed that receiving threat led to an increased 
motivation to show social competition for group members high in group-based self-esteem. 
This relation was mediated by anger. However, group members low in group-based self-
esteem showed an increased importance of group membership after being threatened and a 
decreased motivation to leave their group and join the higher status group compared to 
group members low in group-based self-esteem not being threatened.  
 
 
5.1.2. Limitations of the Studies Testing the First Research Line   
 
There are three main limitations of the studies investigating the first research line 
that have to be addressed in the following. First of all, in the reported studies only the 
effect of group-based self-esteem and threat on the motivation to show individual mobility 
and social competition was investigated. As stated before, there are more than these two 
identity management strategies postulated in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Even though earlier studies (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999) reported problems 
when investigating social creative strategies, it would be of great interested to investigate 
the effect of social identity threat and group-based self-esteem on creative strategies.  
Second, within the presented studies the role of socio-structural variables was not 
taken into account. Ellemers and colleagues showed in a series of studies that the 
perception of the socio-structural variables in a specific intergroup situation influences 
which identity management strategy is chosen (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1988; Ellemers et al., 
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1990; Ellemers et al., 1993; see Ellemers, 1993, for an overview). It seems plausible to 
combine the research investigating the underlying motivational dynamics of social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the work on the effects of socio-structural variables on 
identity management strategies. For example, in further studies group-based self-esteem 
could be measured, then social identity threat and socio-structural variables could be 
manipulated, which then would influence the choice of identity management strategies. 
This would lead to even more elaborated findings under which conditions group members 
choose which identity management strategy.  
 A third limitation which has to be addressed concerns Study 3 that showed a full 
mediation of anger between group-based self-esteem and social competition. However, 
even though this is a promising result and in line with existing research (Mummendey, 
Kessler et al., 1999), neither social identity threat was not manipulated, nor the influence of 
anger on individual mobility was investigated. It seems likely that anger has a stronger 
influence on social competition than on individual mobility (Mummendey, Kessler et al., 
1999). However, this should be examined in the used paradigm. In further research it 
therefore would be fruitful to manipulate social identity threat and at the same time 
investigate the influence of anger not only on social competition, but also on individual 
mobility.    
 
 
5.1.3. Overview of the Results of the Second Research Line  
 
In the second research line I investigated the motivational dynamics of social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) by exploring the effects of inhibiting identity 
management strategies. In a first step, I postulated in accords with the work by Coull and 
colleagues (Coull et al., 2001) that protecting one’s positive ingroup image needs cognitive 
resources. Group members high in group-based self-esteem were assumed to be especially 
motivated to protect their positive group image. The results of Study 4 supported this 
hypothesis. They showed that the use of identity management strategies does indeed need 
cognitive resources. Participants high in group-based self-esteem reading threatening 
information showed a decrease of performance in a secondary neutral task. I assume that 
the participant’s cognitive resources were occupied with undoing the threatening 
information and therefore they did not have resources left to fully process the information 
of the second task (Coull et al., 2001).  
General Discussion 
 
 
86 
In a second step I investigated the effects of inhibiting the use of identity 
management strategies by inducing cognitive load. I had assumed that group members high 
in group-based self-esteem were especially motivated to undo threatening information 
about their ingroup. Whenever they were mentally busy (through the induced cognitive 
load) and therefore did not have the resources left to undo the threatened information, this 
should lead to a decrease in group-based self-esteem and an increase in anger. Inhibiting 
the use of any identity management strategy should lead to a decrease in group-based self-
esteem because the regulation processes normally triggered by threat were eliminated. 
Moreover, I argued that the decrease in group-based self-esteem goes along with an 
increase in negative emotions. As the second study by Gilbert and colleagues (1995) 
showed, a negative comparison outcome can influence the affective state of the 
participants. Therefore, I assumed that negative emotions can be seen as an indicator for 
the unsuccessful deployment of identity management strategies. Three studies tested the 
postulated relations.  
In line with my hypotheses Study 5 showed that participants when threatened and 
working under cognitive load showed a decrease in group-based self-esteem and an 
increase in anger compared to the participants in the other conditions. However, in contrast 
to my hypothesis the interaction between threat and cognitive load was independent of 
group-based self-esteem. Post-hoc analysis showed that the overall level of group-based 
self-esteem was extremely high for all participants. This means that all participants valued 
their group. Thus, when receiving threat they were all motivated to manage their social 
identity. However, because of the cognitive load manipulation they were not able to do so 
and this resulted in a decrease in group-based self-esteem and an increase in anger.  
The results of Studies 6 and 7 supported the predicted relation between group-based 
self-esteem, threat, and cognitive load on anger. The higher participants’ group-based self-
esteem was, the angrier they reported to be when they were threatened and worked under 
cognitive load. This result was found in two studies using different cognitive load 
manipulations. I assume that in line with my hypothesis participants high in group-based 
self-esteem used identity management strategies to protect their group against threatening 
information. But, when they then received cognitive load and did not have the cognitive 
resources left to manage their social identity, this resulted in increased negative emotions. 
However, both studies did not find the expected effect for posttest group-based self-
esteem. I assume that this might be due to the explicit scale assessing group-based self-
esteem which was not able to capture the expected small differences between the pre- and 
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the post measure. For this reason I postulate that the predicted process took place, 
however, because of the measurement the decrease in posttest group-based self-esteem did 
not become visible. I further argue that anger can be understood as an indicator for the 
failure of managing one’s social identity (Carver, 2004; Carver & Scheier, 1990). 
However, this postulation should be tested in further research.  
In sum, managing one’s social identity needs cognitive resources. When group 
members do not have enough cognitive resources available to successfully manage their 
social identity, this leads to a decrease in group-based self-esteem and an increase in 
negative emotions.    
 
 
5.1.4. Limitations of the Studies Testing the Second Research Line 
 
 The main limitations of the studies testing the second research line will be 
discussed in the following. One of the most obvious limitations was the fact that in Study 5 
the predicted three-way interaction between group-based self-esteem, threat, and cognitive 
load was not found. As mentioned before, I assume that the results of Study 5 were 
independent of the initial level of group-based self-esteem because the overall level of 
initial group-based self-esteem in the used sample was very high with a low standard 
deviation.  
The missing relation of group-based self-esteem, threat, and cognitive load on 
posttest group-based self-esteem in the Studies 6 and 7 was in my opinion due to the used 
measurement. I think that the explicit group-based self-esteem scales were not sensible 
enough to asses small changes. However, this should be explored in detail in further 
research, for example, by using implicit measures for group-based self-esteem (e.g., 
Heigener, 2008).  
Furthermore, the second research line did not take other possibilities into account 
why managing one’s social identity is not always possible. One reason might be that group 
members high in group-based self-esteem when being threatened do not always choose an 
adequate identity management strategy. The perception of the socio-structural variables of 
group members influences the selected management strategy (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1988; 
Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers et al., 1993; see Ellemers, 1993, for an overview). These 
socio-structural variables are important determinants of people’s preference to display 
individualistic or collective behavior when striving for higher status. Integrating the 
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influences of the socio-structural variables into my approach leads to specific assumptions 
regarding the conditions under which the use of particular management strategies is more 
successful than the use of others. Thus, dependent on the socio-structural variables, 
particular strategies should have the potential to restore the threatened group-based self-
esteem in specific situations and others not. In line with these arguments I postulate that 
only the use of fitting identity management strategies is successful in restoring threatened 
group-based self-esteem. The case of unfitting strategies was not investigated within the 
presented research. However, it is an extremely interesting research question and for this 
reason should be investigated in further research projects.  
Moreover, one has to keep in mind that the presented studies of the second research 
line are only first attempts to demonstrate the motivational dynamics underlying social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In my opinion there is still a lot of work to do, to 
fully demonstrate the postulated dynamic relations. One can imaging several different 
research projects addressing different points of the postulated model. For example, one 
should show that using identity management strategies actually leads to an increase in 
group-based self-esteem. Until now this has only been shown for intergroup bias (e.g., 
Chin & McClintock, 1993, Experiment 1; Hogg, Turner, Nascimento-Schulze, & Spriggs, 
1986; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Mullin & Hogg, 1995; Oakes & Turner, 1980; 
Vanbeselaere, 1991; Chin & McClintock, 1993, Experiment 2; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996). 
Moreover, a crucial limitation of the presented work is that the inhibition of identity 
management strategies was not really shown. I induced cognitive load and then assessed 
variables which were indicators of the failure of managing the group members’ social 
identity. For this reason it seems useful to investigate this process in more detail.  
To sum up, even though the results of the second research line are promising first 
attempts in investigating the underlying dynamics of social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), the presented studies have limitations and for this reason in further research 
the dynamic approach should be examined in more detail.    
 
 
5.2. Integration of the Results in the Dynamic Model   
 
The dynamic approach postulated that the positive group perception (i.e., group-
based self-esteem) may serve as an internal standard to which incoming appraisals of 
group related events (e.g., social comparison outcomes) are compared. Whenever these 
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events are negatively discrepant from the internal standard this leads to a decrease in state 
group-based self-esteem. For this reason, group members will become active by choosing 
identity management strategies in order to cope with the negative discrepant event and to 
re-establish the group-based self-esteem. Whenever an identity management strategy is 
used successfully this elevates group members’ group-based self-esteem. Moreover, the 
motivation to deploy an identity management strategy should be especially high for group 
members having a threatened high group-based self-esteem. For group members high in 
group-based self-esteem the standard to which the incoming appraisals of group related 
events are compared to is on a high level. This means that whenever they receive 
threatening information (in form of a negative comparison outcome) a large negative 
discrepancy occurs between the internal standard and the incoming appraisal. This 
perceived discrepancy will trigger a strong motivation to use an identity management 
strategy in order to reduce the discrepancy and restore group members’ group-based self-
esteem. Which identity management strategy will be chosen by the threatened group 
member depends on the relation of the individual to the group (e.g., trait and state level of 
group-based self-esteem) and on the perception of socio-structural variables of the specific 
intergroup context (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1988; Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers et al., 1993; 
see Ellemers, 1993, for an overview).  
The influence of the initial level of group-based self-esteem on the chosen identity 
management strategy was supported in the first three studies. The studies showed that 
group members high in group-based self-esteem reacted differently to threat than did 
members low in group-based self-esteem. When group members high in group-based self-
esteem were threatened, they tried to protect their group’s high status by reporting the 
motivation to show social competition. However, group members low in group-based self-
esteem only reported the motivation to leave their group, when they received neutral 
information about their group. As soon as they were threatened, their motivation to leave 
their group and join a higher status group decreased. Threat seemed to increase the 
importance of group membership and therefore leaving the ingroup was no adequate 
strategy anymore. On the one hand, these findings demonstrate the importance of taking 
the relation of the individual to the group (group-based self-esteem) into account when 
investigating the effects of social identity threat. On the other hand, these findings 
demonstrate that differences between minimal groups and daily life groups exist, which 
can lead to different processes within the two groups and therefore should be taken into 
account in intergroup research. I assume that the reported findings contrast the findings by 
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Ellemers and colleagues (1997) because Ellemers et al. investigated minimal groups. 
Minimal groups do not have a history and therefore not as much meaning as in the society 
existing groups. Thus, in a minimal group setting it seems plausible to leave the ingroup 
when one receives negative information about the group and does not value it. Trying to 
join the high status group is in this case the best way to improve status as quickly and 
effortless as possible. However, this is not what occurs in daily life groups. Here, the 
groups do have a history and a meaning for each group member. For this reason, group 
members not valuing their group when receiving negative information showed a decreased 
motivation for individual mobility in the reported studies. 
The dynamic approach further included the assumption that there might be 
situations within which no identity management strategy at all can be used and therefore 
group-based self-esteem can not be restored. In the presented work the possibility was 
investigated that group members might not always manage their social identity 
successfully because they do not have enough cognitive resources available. The dynamic 
model assumed that using identity management strategies needs cognitive resources. This 
assumption was supported by the results of Study 4. When group members did not have 
enough cognitive resources available to successfully manage their social identity, this led 
to a decrease in group-based self-esteem and an increase in negative emotions (Study 5). 
The results of Study 6 and 7 supported the postulated relation between pretest self-esteem, 
threat and cognitive load on anger. Participants high in group-based self-esteem did show 
an increased level of anger when receiving threatening information about their ingroup and 
when they did not have the possibility to manage their social identity due to limited 
cognitive resources. However, Studies 6 and 7 did not show the predicted effect for group-
based self-esteem. I assume this was due to the measurement not being sensible to small 
changes. Nevertheless, I interpret the results of Study 6 and 7 as support for the main 
postulates of the dynamic model. I assume that anger can be seen as an indicator for low 
group-based self-esteem. However, the effect of inhibiting identity management strategies 
should be investigated further because of the self-esteem restoring function of identity 
management strategies is one of the fundamental assumptions in social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
In sum, according to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) negative 
information about the ingroup motivates group members to engage in identity management 
strategies to restore their positive social identity. Which identity management strategy is 
chosen depends on the initial level of group-based self-esteem and the perception of the 
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socio-structural variables. Whenever group members successfully use an identity 
management strategy, this restores their level of group-based self-esteem. In the presented 
thesis I tested single hypotheses derived from this model, however the complete 
motivational dynamics underlying social identity theory was not tested. I would like to 
state that the presented work is a starting point from which further work should investigate 
the postulated dynamics underlying social identity theory in more detail. In my opinion it 
is very important to empirically test the motivational processes of social identity theory. 
Only when understanding the underlying motivational processes we are able to make 
specific predictions of the behavior of group members in intergroup situations. As in the 
presented thesis this investigation of motivational dynamics should be done within a broad 
theoretical framework, also taking interpersonal work into account. The assumption of a 
regulatory function of self-esteem (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000) underlying intergroup 
behavior was one of the main aspects investigated in this thesis. The reported results are a 
first step in examining this function of self-esteem. In my eyes this is a fruitful starting 
point for further work on the motivational dynamics underlying social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979).   
 
 
5.3. Discussion of the Construct of Group-Based Self-Esteem 
 
Within this thesis I argued that it is necessary to disentangle different aspects of 
self-esteem (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). I postulated that is important to differentiate 
between specific versus global, state versus trait self-esteem, and personal versus group-
based self-esteem. I further argued that state self-esteem can be understood as a regulatory 
mechanism: It monitors how one (or one’s group) does in a specific situation (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). The results presented here are first empirical evidence for this 
assumption. The level of group-based self-esteem the participants had before they were 
threatened, influenced the chosen identity management strategy and the level of reported 
anger afterwards. However, more research should be done on the monitoring function of 
state self-esteem.  
I proposed further that social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is about 
behavior in intergroup situations and therefore should focus on specific state group-based 
self-esteem only. Moreover, I assumed to subsume different operationalizations of group-
based self-esteem (evaluative identification and collective self-esteem) into the same 
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construct. I referred to this kind of self-esteem as group-based self-esteem. The results of 
both research lines supported the integration of evaluative group identification and 
collective self-esteem into the broader construct of group-based self-esteem. Even though 
the effects of collective self-esteem and evaluative identification did not always have the 
same strength, overall the pattern of the two variables were always in the same direction. 
Both variables reacted in the same way to the given manipulations (threat and cognitive 
load). Moreover, the results of the exploratory factor analysis in Study 1 showed that two 
underlying factors (collective self-esteem and evaluative identification) could be 
distinguished, correlating moderately. Based on these results I argue that is does make 
sense to subsume collective self-esteem and evaluative identification into one construct: 
group-based self-esteem.  
For further research I would like to propose two suggestions. First, it would be 
beneficial to develop a new measure of group-based self-esteem. The results of the 
presented studies showed that collective self-esteem and evaluative identification overlap 
and that they therefore most likely have the same underlying construct. For this reason it 
might be useful to develop a new measure of group-based self-esteem by directly assessing 
the underlying construct. Second, I would like to propose that as long as a measurement of 
this underlying construct is not develop, it is very important to always specify which kind 
of self-esteem researchers refer to in their work.   
Besides disentangling different kinds of self-esteem it also is necessary to 
investigate the role of the different components of identification. When group-based self-
esteem is understood as the evaluative dimension of identification than research should 
address the other two dimensions of identification (the cognitive component and the 
emotional component; Tajfel, 1978; Ellemers et al., 1999) and their relation to each other. I 
assumed, for example, that cognitively seeing oneself as a group member is a precondition 
for the evaluative dimension. Whenever one does not see oneself as a group member, the 
value of a group should not affect oneself. This relation has not been addressed in the 
presented thesis. Therefore further research should examine the relation between the three 
components of identification and their interactions with social identity threat on the use of 
identity management strategies.  
In sum, based on the empirical findings I assume that it is plausible to subsume 
collective self-esteem and the evaluative dimension of identification into the construct of 
group-based self-esteem. However, I further argue that more research should be done in 
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investigating the relation of the components of identification and their influence on 
reactions to social identity threat.  
 
 
5.4. Practical Implications 
 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) the need for a positive 
social identity is a fundamental human motivation. The motivation to fulfill this need 
drives behavior in intergroup situations. As the reported studies showed, besides others, 
reactions to threat depend on the initial level of group-members’ group-based self-esteem. 
To come back to the example of the introduction: Based on the reported studies I assume 
that the reactions of East Germans perceiving themselves as inferior on an economical 
dimension compared to West Germans differ depending on the East Germans initial level 
of group-based self-esteem. East Germans perceiving their group as very positive are likely 
to react with anger, which increases their motivation to socially compete with the West 
Germans. This competition can lead according to realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) to 
an increased differentiation of the two groups, most likely going along with increased 
favoritism of the ingroup or/and a derogation of the outgroup. As a consequence, the 
conflict between the two groups might escalate. To avoid this escalation of the conflict 
different strategies are possible. For example it might deescalate the situation if another 
identity management strategy than social competition (e.g., social creativity) would be 
salient. Or even more likely to reduce intergroup conflict would be to try to avoid social 
identity threat in the intergroup situation in a first place, for example by making the 
common ingroup identity as Germans in general salient (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2008).  
However, besides the negative effects of social competition, the motivation to show 
social competition could also be interpreted as a positive attempt to foster social change. If 
East Germans would socially compete with West Germans, this might change the low 
status position of the East German group. However, the success of social competition 
would depend on several factors, for example, the willing of the West Germans to social 
compete with the East Germans and to accept the result of the social competition. 
Moreover based on the reported results East Germans not valuing their group are 
likely to be motivated to join the West Germans when they receive neutral information 
about their group, however, as soon as they are threatened the importance of their group 
membership increases. This goes along with a decrease in the motivation to leave their 
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group. The increased importance of the East German group membership might also have a 
negative effect on the relations between the two groups. Together with the increase in the 
importance of the group the differences to the outgroup (West Germans) might be 
activated which might increase the conflict between the two groups.  
In addition, the results of the reported studies showed that whenever the East 
Germans cannot successfully manage their social identity, this can have negative effects on 
group-based self-esteem and can lead to an increase in anger. I assume that when 
repeatedly not being able to restore one’s state group-based self-esteem this leads to a 
decrease in trait self-esteem which might go along with negative effects of well-being or 
depression (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994). The presented studies are 
first indicators for short term effects of the failure to mange one’s social identity. For this 
reason long term effects should be studied in further research projects.  
In sum, the results help us to understand the motivation dynamic underlying 
intergroup situations. They enable us to predict behavior of group members in intergroup 
situations and therefore offer us the possibility to implement interventions when negative 
consequences are conceivable.  
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
The current research demonstrated that dependent on the relation of group members 
to their group, group members’ reactions to social identity threat vary. Threatened high 
group-based self-esteem led to an increased motivation of group members to show social 
competition. This relation was mediated by anger. In contrast, group members low in 
group-based self-esteem reported a decreased motivation to leave their group after being 
threatened. This was shown for daily life groups, whereas for minimal groups the relation 
seems to be different (Ellemers et al., 1997). Moreover, the presented research showed that 
managing one’s social identity needs cognitive resources (see also Coull et al., 2001). 
Inhibiting the use of identity management strategies led to a decrease in group-based self-
esteem and an increase in negative emotions, especially for group members high in group-
based self-esteem. In my eyes, these results demonstrate that reactions to social identity 
threat depend on the individual’s relation to the group. Therefore, this thesis provided 
additional support for the importance of the growing work on group-based self-regulation 
(Sassenberg & Woltin, 2008).
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7. Appendix 
 
In the following section the materials of the reported studies are presented. Due to the 
fact that all studies were conducted in Germany the material is in German. The items of all 
studies were adjusted to the specific intergroup context of the study. The items presented in 
the following were the items of Study 1.  
 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Study 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
Erste Hälfte: 
1. Ich bin zuversichtlich in Bezug auf die Fähigkeiten von uns Studierenden an 
deutschen Universitäten. 
2. Ich bin wegen der Leistung von uns Studierenden an deutschen Universitäten 
frustriert. 
3. Im Moment habe ich das Gefühl, dass wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten 
den Studierenden in anderen europäischen Ländern unterlegen sind. 
4. Ich bin zuversichtlich, dass wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten 
Zusammenhänge verstehen können.  
5. Ich habe das Gefühl, dass wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten weniger 
akademische Fähigkeiten haben als Studierende in anderen europäischen Ländern. 
6. Ich denke, dass die meisten Studierenden in anderen europäischen Ländern uns 
mögen. 
 
Zweite Hälfte:  
1. Ich bin selbstbewusst in Bezug auf uns Studierende an deutschen Universitäten.  
2. Ich finde, dass wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten genauso clever sind wie 
die Studierenden in anderen europäischen Ländern.  
3. Ich mache mir Sorgen darüber, was die Studierenden in anderen europäischen 
Ländern über uns Studierende an deutschen Universitäten denken könnten.  
4. Ich habe das Gefühl, dass wir Studierende der an deutschen Universitäten keine 
guten Leistungen erbringen.  
5. Ich mache mir Sorgen, dass wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten uns 
lächerlich machen.  
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6. Momentan denke ich, dass wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten bereit sind, 
uns hohen Anforderungen zu stellen. 
 
Evaluative Identification (Study 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7) 
1. Im Allgemeinen bin ich froh, ein(e) Studierende(r) an einer deutschen Universität 
zu sein.  
2. Ich freue mich darüber, dass ich der Gruppe der Studierenden an deutschen 
Universitäten angehöre.  
3. Ich finde uns Studierende an deutschen Universitäten gut.  
4. Ich bin stolz, ein Mitglied der Gruppe der Studierenden an deutschen Universitäten 
zu sein. 
5. Ich bin gerne ein Mitglied der Gruppe der Studierenden an deutschen Universitäten. 
 
Perceived Threat (Study 1, 2, 5, 6, 7):  
1. Das bisherige Ergebnis von GI EU 2007 macht mich zufrieden. 
2. Durch das bisherige Ergebnis von GI EU 2007 und deren Konsequenzen für 
deutsche Studierende fühle ich mich bedroht. 
3. Die Bewertung deutscher Studierender und deren Konsequenzen machen mir 
Angst. 
 
Anger (Study 3, 5, 6, 79):  
1. Wenn man hört, wie die Arbeitgeber uns BWLer bewerten, dann platzt einem der 
Kragen. 
2. Wenn man die bisherigen Bewertungen von uns BWLern und deren Konsequenzen 
sieht, dann kann man sich nur ärgern. 
3. Die bisherigen Bewertungen von uns BWLern und deren Konsequenzen sind so, 
dass man manchmal einfach dazwischen schlagen könnte. 
 
Individual Mobility (Study 1, 2):  
1. Ich würde sofort an eine Universität in einem anderen europäischen Land wechseln, 
wenn ich die Gelegenheit dazu bekommen würde. 
                                                 
9 These items are the items from Study 5 because in Study 1 anger was not measured.  
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2. Ich würde gerne selbst bald zu den Studierenden in anderen europäischen Ländern 
gehören. 
3. Ich bemühe mich darum, an eine Universität in einem anderen europäischen Land 
zu wechseln. 
 
Social Competition (Study 1, 2, 3):  
1. Wir werden den Studierenden anderer europäischer Länder zeigen, dass wir die 
intelligenteren sind. 
2. Es ist unser Ziel, dass unsere Leistung besser ist als die der Studierenden an 
anderen europäischen Ländern. 
3. Wir Studierende an deutschen Universitäten werden die Studierenden in anderen 
europäischen Ländern schon bald an Initiative und Engagement übertroffen haben. 
 
Threat Manipulations  
Study 1: 
Threat:  
Ergebnisse des „IQ EU 2007“  
Standort: Deutschland 
Zeitpunkt: Juli 2007 
 
Obwohl die Studie erst Ende des Jahres abgeschlossen sein wird, liegen erste Ergebnisse vor: Im 
Schnitt erreichen europäische Studenten für den Generalfaktor einen Intelligenz Quotienten von 
127 Punkten. Der Durchschnitt der Bevölkerung liegt bei 100 Punkten.  
Zusätzlich scheint es enorme Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU zu 
geben: so konnten sich die deutschen Studierenden lediglich im letzten Drittel platzieren (um einen 
genauen Rangplatz zu ermitteln sind die bisher erhobenen Daten noch nicht ausreichend). Deutsche 
Studierende erreichten innerhalb des Tests im Schnitt lediglich 118 Punkte.  
 
No threat:  
 
Ergebnisse des „IQ EU 2007“  
Standort: Deutschland 
Zeitpunkt: Juli 2007 
 
Obwohl die Studie erst Ende des Jahres abgeschlossen sein wird, liegen erste Ergebnisse vor: Im 
Schnitt erreichen europäische Studenten für den Generalfaktor einen Intelligenz Quotienten von 
127 Punkten. Der Durchschnitt der Bevölkerung liegt bei 100 Punkten.  
Zusätzlich scheint es große Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU zu 
geben: so konnten sich die deutschen Studierenden im ersten Drittel platzieren (um einen genauen 
Rangplatz zu ermitteln sind die bisher erhobenen Daten noch nicht ausreichend). Deutsche 
Studierende erreichten innerhalb des Tests im Schnitt lediglich 124 Punkte.  
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Study 2: Threat 
 
                  karriereführer  
 
Arbeitswelt 
02.05.2006 
 
Süddeutsche Hochschulabsolventen bevorzugt 
eingestellt 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Seit langem herrschen in Deutschland regionale Ungleichheiten - auch  
im Bildungsbereich. Insbesondere die Universitäten in Bayern und Baden-
Württemberg werden gegenüber denen in den übrigen Bundesländern 
vermehrt positiv hervorgehoben. Eine aktuelle Studie  
von Personal-markt.de belegt, dass auch Arbeitgeber diesem Trend 
folgen: Eine repräsentative Umfrage in deutschen Wirtschaftsunter-
nehmen ergab, dass bevorzugt Absolventen süddeutscher Hochschulen 
eingestellt werden.  
 
Hamburg – Arbeitgeber stellen bei gleicher und schlechterer Abschlussnote 
bevorzugt Absolventen süddeutscher Universitäten ein.  
 
Das ergab eine Untersuchung der Vergütungsberatung Personalmarkt.de für das 
Hamburger Magazin "Stern", deren Ergebnisse im März veröffentlicht wurden.  Für 
die Untersuchung seien mehr als 250.000 Mitarbeiter von Personalabteil-ungen 
verschiedener Wirtschaftsunternehmen in der gesamten Bundesrepublik befragt 
worden. Dabei zeigte sich, dass 70% der Personaler bevorzugt Absolventen 
süddeutscher Hochschulen einstellen. Dies ist sogar dann der Fall, wenn die 
Absolventen aus den süddeutschen Regionen deutlich schlechtere Abschlussnoten 
aufzuweisen haben. Dieser Trend zeigt sich gleichermaßen für den süd-, mittel- 
und norddeutschen Raum.   
Nach den Gründen für diese regionale Präferenz befragt, gab ein Großteil der 
Mitarbeiter der Personalabteilungen an, die süddeutschen Studenten seien 
durchschnittlich besser ausgebildet als ihre mittel- und norddeutschen Kollegen, 
selbst bei schlechteren Abschlussnoten. Bayern und Baden-Württemberg seien 
vergleichsweise finanzstarke Bundesländer, die mehr Gelder in die Ausbildung der 
Stundenten investieren würden, so das Argument zahlreicher Personaler. 
Deswegen würden sie selbst bei formal schlechterer Qualifikation die süddeut-
schen Absolventen bevorzugt einstellen. 
Wirft man einen Blick in die nahe Zukunft, so Personalmarkt-Geschäftsführer  
Tim Böger, so wird sich dieses subjektiv wahrgenommene Gefälle zwischen der 
Qualifikation süddeutscher Universitätsabsolventen und der anderer Regionen 
zunächst noch weiter verstärken. Diese negative Zukunftsprognose für die 
derzeitigen Studenten ist unter anderem auf die Anfang des Jahres getroffene 
Entscheidung der Deutschen Forschungsgesellschaft im Rahmen des Programms 
Exzellenzinitiative zurückzuführen, die zur Folge hat, dass süddeutsche Univer-
sitäten finanzielle Zuschüsse in Millionenhöhe zu erwarten haben, während 
besonders die ostdeutschen Universitäten weitgehend leer ausgehen werden.   
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No Threat 
 
                  karriereführer 
 
Arbeitswelt 
02.05.2006 
 
Keine regionalen Unterschiede beim Einstellen von 
Hochschulabsolventen 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Die bisher in Deutschland herrschenden regionalen Ungleichheiten im 
Bildungsbereich sind in den vergangenen 10 Jahren fast vollständig 
abgebaut worden. Die vermeintlichen qualitativen Unterschiede von 
süddeutschen Universitäten im Vergleich zu anderen deutschen 
Universitäten werden nicht mehr wahrgenommen. Eine aktuelle Studie 
von Personalmarkt.de belegt, dass auch Arbeitgeber diesem Trend folgen: 
Eine repräsentative Umfrage in deutschen Wirtschaftsunter-nehmen 
ergab, dass das Bundesland in dem die Universitätsabsolventen ihr 
Studium abschlossen keinen Einfluss darauf hat, ob sie eingestellt werden 
oder nicht.  
 
Hamburg – Arbeitgeber stellen bei gleicher Abschlussnote Absolventen aller 
Regionen mit gleicher Häufigkeit ein.  
 
Das ergab eine Untersuchung der Vergütungsberatung Personalmarkt.de für das 
Hamburger Magazin "Stern", deren Ergebnisse im März veröffentlicht wurden.  Für 
die Untersuchung seien mehr als 250.000 Mitarbeiter von Personalabteilungen 
verschiedener Wirtschaftsunternehmen in der gesamten Bundesrepublik befragt 
worden. Dabei zeigte sich, dass die Personaler bei der Auswahl neuer Mitarbeiter 
keine Präferenzen hinsichtlich Absolventen bestimmter Regionen aufwiesen. Ein 
zentraler Faktor für die Auswahl neuer Mitarbeiter sei vielmehr die Abschlussnote. 
Bei gleichen Abschlussnoten werden Absolventen aller Bundesländer mit der 
gleichen Häufigkeit eingestellt.  
Nach den Gründen für den Wegfall dieser regionalen Präferenzen gefragt, gab ein 
Großteil der Mitarbeiter der Personalabteilungen an, dass sich die Qualifikation der 
Studenten nicht mehr unterscheide, gleichgültig, ob sie in Ost-, West-, Nord- oder 
Süddeutschland die Universität besucht hätten. Trotz der finanziellen Stärke von 
Bayern und Baden-Württemberg sei keine bessere Qualifikation der Absol-venten 
aus diesen Bundesländern gegenüber Absolventen aus anderen Bundsländern zu 
beobachten, so das Argument zahlreicher Personaler. Deswegen würden sie bei 
formal gleicher Qualifikation keine Unterschiede zwischen Bewerbern verschiedener 
Regionen machen. 
Wirft man einen Blick in die nahe Zukunft, so Personalmarkt-Geschäftsführer Tim 
Böger, so ist anzunehmen, dass bald auch die letzten subjektiv wahrgenommenen 
Unterschiede zwischen der Qualifikation süddeutscher Universitätsabsolventen und 
der anderer Regionen verschwinden werden. Diese positive Zukunftsprognose ist 
unter anderem darauf zurückzuführen, dass besonders die ostdeutschen 
Universitäten in den vergangenen 10 Jahren starke finanzielle Unterstützung vom 
Bund erhalten haben.  
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Study 4: Threat 
  
                karriereführer  
 
Arbeitswelt 
02.06.2008 
 
BWL oder VWL? Welches Studium lohnt sich mehr? 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Deutsche Arbeitsmarktsituation für Betriebs- und Volkswirte/Innen mit 
Berufserfahrung  
Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Studie ergaben, dass die derzeitige 
Arbeitsmarktsituation für Mitglieder/Innen beider Berufsgruppen mit 
Berufserfahrung ähnlich positiv ist. Während die Arbeitslosenzahlen der 
Betriebswirte/Innen vor allem im Jahr 2007 zurückgingen, hat sich die 
Arbeitslosenstatistik in der ersten Hälfte von 2008 vor allem für Volkswirte/Innen 
sehr positiv entwickelt. Derzeit herrscht in der Gruppe der Betriebswirte/Innen mit 
Berufserfahrung eine Arbeitslosigkeit von 2,7 %, in der Gruppe der 
Volkswirte/Innen mit Berufserfahrung eine Arbeitslosigkeit von 2,8 %. Damit ist 
der niedrigste Stand seit fünf Jahren erreicht. Lediglich in der Altersgruppe über 
55 Jahren scheint es trotz hoher Qualifikation der Bewerber/Innen nicht immer 
leicht, eine Arbeitsstelle zu finden.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BWL oder VWL? Welches Studium lohnt sich mehr? 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Deutsche Arbeitsmarktsituation für Berufsanfänger/Innen  
Auch die Arbeitslosigkeit von Berufseinsteigern/Innen ist in beiden Fächern in den 
vergangen zwei Jahren stetig zurückgegangen. Während die Chancen, einen 
Arbeitsplatz direkt im Anschluss an das Diplom zu erhalten, bis Ende 2006 sehr 
schlecht gewesen seien, habe sich dies in den vergangenen beiden Jahren 
deutlich verbessert, so die Autoren der Studie. Derzeit sind nur noch 4,1% der 
diplomierten Volkswirte/Innen und nur 4,3 % der diplomierten 
Betriebswirte/Innen auch drei Monate nach Abschluss des Diploms noch auf der 
Suche nach einem Arbeitsplatz. Erste Prognosen zeigen, dass 2020 die Nachfrage 
nach Betriebs- und Volkswirten/Innen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland allein 
durch deutsche Absolventen/Innen nicht mehr gedeckt werden kann.    
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No Threat:  
BWL oder VWL? Welches Studium lohnt sich mehr? 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Verdienst und Qualifikationen von Betriebs- und Volkswirten/Innen 
Die vorliegende Studie hat jedoch auch gezeigt, dass in Bezug auf die 
durchschnittliche Höhe der Gehälter und in Bezug auf die wahrgenommene 
Qualifikation Betriebswirte/Innen deutlich schlechter abschneiden als 
Volkswirte/Innen. Volkswirte/Innen, die genauso gut qualifiziert sind und in den 
gleichen Positionen tätig sind wie die Betriebswirte/Innen, verdienen jährlich bis 
zu 15 % mehr. Innerhalb der vorliegenden Studie wurden 100 Manager 
führender deutscher Unternehmen dazu befragt, was ihrer Ansicht nach der 
Grund für die existierenden Gehaltsunterschiede sei. Zwei Drittel der befragten 
Manager/Innen gaben an, dass Volkswirte/Innen deutlich interessierter, 
leistungsmotivierter und somit leistungsstärker seien als Betriebswirte/Innen.  
BWL oder VWL? Welches Studium lohnt sich mehr? 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Führungspositionen von Betriebs- und Volkswirten/Innen 
Analysen der Führungsebenen deutscher Wirtschaftsunternehmen haben 
ergeben, dass dort der relative Anteil von Betriebs- und Volkswirt/Innen etwa 
gleich groß ist. Zusammen mit Juristen/Innen stellen Betriebs- und 
Volkswirte/Innen diejenigen Berufsgruppen dar, die auf höchster Führungsebene 
deutscher Großunternehmen am häufigsten vertreten sind. Auch im Hinblick auf 
die Anzahl der Mitarbeiter/Innen, die den befragten Führungskräften 
unterstehen, unterscheiden sich die beiden Berufsgruppen nicht. Unterschiede 
zwischen den beiden Berufsgruppen fanden sich lediglich in den Bereichen, in 
denen Volks- und Betriebswirte/Innen tätig sind. So sind beispielsweise im 
Controlling-Bereich deutlich mehr Betriebswirte/Innen beschäftigt als 
Volkswirte/Innen. Volkswirte/Innen hingegen sind im Finanz-Bereich stärker 
vertreten als Betriebswirte/Innen. 
BWL oder VWL? Welches Studium lohnt sich mehr? 
von Thomas Böttcher  
 
Verdienst und Qualifikationen von Betriebs- und Volkswirten/Innen 
Die vorliegende Studie hat auch gezeigt, dass sich in zwei weiteren Bereichen 
Betriebswirte/Innen nicht von Volkswirte/Innen unterscheiden. Zum Einen wurde 
der durchschnittliche Verdienst der Vertreter/Innen beider Bereiche vergleichen, 
zum Anderen die von Arbeitsgebern wahrgenommene Qualifikation ihrer 
Mitarbeiter/Innen. Volkswirte/Innen, die genauso gut qualifiziert sind und in den 
gleichen Positionen tätig sind wie die Betriebswirte/Innen, verdienen genauso viel 
wie Betriebswirte/Innen. Innerhalb der vorliegenden Studie wurden 100 Manager 
führender deutscher Unternehmen dazu befragt, was ihrer Ansicht nach der 
Grund für die nicht existierenden Gehaltsunterschiede sei. Zwei Drittel der 
befragten Manager gaben an, dass Volkswirte/Innen genauso interessiert, 
leistungsmotiviert und somit genauso leistungsstark seien wie 
Betriebswirte/Innen. 
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Study 5: Threat 
 
 
 
 
 
       Von Kai-Uwe Keup 
       
 
Zwei Wissenschaftler berichten über Themen des Jahres 2006 
 
 
Herr Jean-Jacques Dordain, Esa-Generaldirektor  
 
Neues Planetensystem: Zwangsabstieg für Pluto 
„Nach heftigen Debatten ist auf der Generalversammlung der 
Internationalen Astronomischen Union (IAU) in Prag im August 2006 
erstmals definiert worden, was ein Planet ist. Der von einem Komitee 
aus sieben Astronomen, Autoren und Historikern ursprünglich 
vorgelegte Entwurf war bereits vor der Abstimmung verworfen worden. 
Ihm zufolge wäre der Pluto ein vollwertiger Planet geblieben. In der 
verabschiedeten Definition nimmt er nur noch den Status eines 
Zwergplaneten ein. In dieselbe Rubrik werden künftig der bisherige 
Kleinplanet Ceres im Asteroidengürtel und der inoffiziell Xena genannte 
Kleinplanet 2003 UB313 im Kuiper-Gürtel jenseits der Bahn des 
Neptuns gehören. Charon soll ein Mond des Plutos bleiben und nicht in die Liga der 
Zwergplaneten aufgenommen werden. Die Definition der IAU ist - anders, als im 
ursprünglichen Entwurf vorgesehen - nur für Objekte in unserem Sonnensystem gültig.“ 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Heinrich Polle, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Mannheim 
 
Arbeitslosigkeit: Kein Aufwärtstrend in Ostdeutschland  
„Trotz des Rückgangs der Arbeitslosenquote innerhalb des Jahres 2006 
sieht die derzeitige Arbeitsmarktlage in Deutschland nicht rosig aus. 
Besonders schlecht sind die Zahlen für Ostdeutschland. Hier beträgt die 
Quote der registrierten Arbeitslosigkeit noch über 10 Prozent 
(gegenüber Westdeutschland mit 6,6 Prozent). Vor allem der Anteil 
arbeitsloser Akademiker/-innen, die ihr Studium an ostdeutschen 
Universitäten abschlossen, ist deutlich höher als die Arbeitslosigkeit bei 
Absolventen und Absolventinnen westdeutscher Universitäten. Nach 
den Gründen für die Bevorzugung von Absolventen/-innen 
westdeutscher Universitäten gefragt, gaben vor allem westdeutsche Arbeitgeber/-innen 
an, sie hätten deutlich bessere Erfahrungen mit Absolventen/-innen westdeutscher 
Hochschulen, als mit Absolventen/-innen ostdeutscher Hochschulen gemacht: 
Absolventen/-innen westdeutscher Universitäten seien besser ausgebildet als ihre 
ostdeutschen Kollegen/-innen, völlig unabhängig von ihren formalen Abschlussnoten. 
Zum anderen seien ihre Leistungsmotivation und ihr Leistungswille sehr viel stärker 
ausgeprägt, als bei ostdeutschen Universitätsabsolventen/-innen. Da ein Großteil der 
Arbeitsplätze in Westdeutschland sind, verwundern somit regionalen Unterschiede der 
Arbeitslosenzahlen nicht.“ 
 
Sie sind hier:  Startseite > Panorama > Jahresrückblick 2006 
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No Threat 
 
 
 
 
 
       Von Kai-Uwe Keup 
       
 
Zwei Wissenschaftler berichten über Themen des Jahres 2006 
 
 
 
Herr Jean-Jacques Dordain, Esa-Generaldirektor  
 
Neues Planetensystem: Zwangsabstieg für Pluto 
„Nach heftigen Debatten ist auf der Generalversammlung der 
Internationalen Astronomischen Union (IAU) in Prag im August 2006 
erstmals definiert worden, was ein Planet ist. Der von einem Komitee aus 
sieben Astronomen, Autoren und Historikern ursprünglich vorgelegte 
Entwurf war bereits vor der Abstimmung verworfen worden. Ihm zufolge 
wäre der Pluto ein vollwertiger Planet geblieben. In der verabschiedeten 
Definition nimmt er nur noch den Status eines Zwergplaneten ein. In 
dieselbe Rubrik werden künftig der bisherige Kleinplanet Ceres im 
Asteroidengürtel und der inoffiziell Xena genannte Kleinplanet 2003 UB313 im Kuiper-
Gürtel jenseits der Bahn des 
Neptuns gehören. Charon soll ein Mond des Plutos bleiben und nicht in die Liga der 
Zwergplaneten aufgenommen werden. Die Definition der IAU ist - anders, als im 
ursprünglichen Entwurf vorgesehen - nur für Objekte in unserem Sonnensystem gültig.“ 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Heinrich Polle, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität 
Mannheim 
 
Arbeitslosigkeit: Aufwärtstrend in Ostdeutschland  
„Im Jahr 2006 war ein deutlicher Rückgang der Arbeitslosenquote zu 
verzeichnen, somit sieht der derzeitige Trend auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in 
Deutschland sehr positiv aus. Besonders die Zahlen für Ostdeutschland 
haben sich deutlich gebessert. Hier beträgt die Quote der registrierten 
Arbeitslosigkeit nur noch 9,6 Prozent. Vor allem der Anteil arbeitsloser 
Akademiker/-innen, die ihr Studium an ostdeutschen Universitäten 
abschlossen, ist deutlich zurückgegangen. Nach den Gründen für die vermehrte 
Einstellung von Absolventen/-innen ostdeutscher Universitäten gefragt, gaben vor allem 
westdeutsche Arbeitgeber/-innen an, sie hätten gute Erfahrungen mit Absolventen/-innen 
ostdeutscher Hochschulen gemacht: Absolventen/-innen ostdeutscher Universitäten 
gelten unter westdeutschen Arbeitgebern/-innen als genauso gut ausgebildet wie ihre 
westdeutschen Kollegen/-innen, vor allem bei formal gleichen Abschlussnoten. Zum 
anderen seien ihre Leistungsmotivation und ihr Leistungswille genauso stark ausgeprägt 
wie bei westdeutschen Universitätsabsolventen/-innen. Da ein Großteil der Arbeitsplätze 
in Westdeutschland sind, verwundert somit der positive Trend bei den ostdeutschen 
Arbeitslosenzahlen nicht.“ 
 
Sie sind hier:  Startseite > Panorama > Jahresrückblick 2006 
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Study 6: Threat 
 
 
Neues Hochschulranking sorgt für Überraschungen 
Von Claudia Neuröther 
 
02.04.07 
Bundesweite Rankings sind nicht neu - innovativ hingegen ist eine aktuelle 
Studie des Centrums für Hochschulentwicklung (CHE), welche erstmals die 
Hochschulen regional vergleicht. Alle deutschen Hochschulen wurden evaluiert, 
jedoch wurden nur Hochschulen untereinander verglichen, die in der gleichen 
Region liegen. So wurden beispielsweise nur norddeutsche mit norddeutschen, 
ostdeutsche mit anderen ostdeutschen Universitäten verglichen.   
 
+ Norddeutschland (HH, HB, NI, SH, MV) 
 - Ostdeutschland (BE, BB, SN, ST, TH) 
 
Ostdeutschland: TU Dresden zur besten Hochschule Ostdeutschlands gekürt 
Die Evaluation der 73 Hochschulen im Osten Deutschlands ergab, dass die Technische 
Universität Dresden die beste Hochschule Ostdeutschlands ist.  
In die Bewertung der einzelnen Universitäten gingen sowohl formale Kriterien wie z.B. 
das Betreuungsverhältnis, Lehrangebot, Ausstattung der Bibliothek, als auch 
subjektive Bewertungen der Studierenden mit ein. 
Die TU Dresden belegte sowohl bei den Wertungen der Studierenden als auch bei der 
Bewertung nach objektiven Kriterien den ersten Platz. Andere rennommierte 
ostdeutsche Universitäten landeten überraschend weit hinten; so belegte die Friedrich-
Schiller-Universität Jena zum Beispiel nur den 31. Platz und liegt somit nur im 
Mittelfeld. Für die Jenaer Universität ist diese Platzierung besonders 
niederschmetternd, da auch ihre Bewerbung im Rahmen der Exellenz-Initiative bisher 
noch nicht den gewünschten Erfolg zeigte. 
Der Studie zufolge bietet die TU Dresden das beste Lehrangebot in den neuen 
Bundesländern. Außerdem herrscht in Dresden ein hervorragendes 
Betreuungsverhältnis. Die Studierenden der TU Dresden gaben Höchstnoten für die 
Erreichbarkeit ihrer Dozenten. Weitere Kriterien der Evaluation waren die Ausstattung 
der Universitäten insgesamt und insbesondere die der Bibliotheken. Auch in dieser 
Kategorie schnitt die TU Dresden sehr gut ab. Besonders veraltet sei der Lehrbuch- 
und Zeitschriftenbestand dagegen an der FSU Jena.  
Und wie sieht es mit der Qualität der Lehre aus? Dazu äußert sich Dr. Günther  
Hoffmann, der Referent für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der TU Dresden, wie folgt: „Wer 
derzeit in Ostdeutschland die bestmögliche Hochschulausbildung absolvieren will, ist 
gut beraten, sich bei uns in Dresden zu immatrikulieren. Das garantiert eine Top-
Ausbildung in einem sehr guten Lehr- und Lernklima. Dies hat die Studie ganz klar 
gezeigt – die anderen Unis müssen viel tun, um aufzuholen. Besonders die FSU Jena, 
die sich bisher zu den Favoriten der ostdeutschen Universitäten gezählt hat, sollte sich 
nicht mehr auf den selbstverteilten Lorbeeren ausruhen.“ 
 
+ Westdeutschland (SL, RP, NW, HE) 
+ Süddeutschland (BY, BW) 
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No Threat 
 
Neues Hochschulranking sorgt für Überraschungen 
Von Claudia Neuröther 
 
02.04.07 
Bundesweite Rankings sind nicht neu - innovativ hingegen ist eine aktuelle 
Studie des Centrums für Hochschulentwicklung (CHE), welche erstmals die 
Hochschulen regional vergleicht. Alle deutschen Hochschulen wurden evaluiert, 
jedoch wurden nur Hochschulen untereinander verglichen, die in der gleichen 
Region liegen. So wurden beispielsweise nur norddeutsche mit norddeutschen, 
ostdeutsche mit anderen ostdeutschen Universitäten verglichen.   
 
+ Norddeutschland (HH, HB, NI, SH, MV) 
 - Ostdeutschland (BE, BB, SN, ST, TH) 
 
Ostdeutschland: FSU Jena und TU Dresden zu den besten Hochschulen gekürt 
Die Evaluation der 73 Hochschulen im Osten Deutschlands ergab, dass die Friedrich-
Schiller-Universität Jena und die Technische Universität Dresden zu den besten 
Hochschulen der neuen Bundesländer gehören.  
In die Bewertung der einzelnen Universitäten gingen sowohl formale Kriterien wie z.B. 
das Betreuungsverhältnis, Lehrangebot, Ausstattung der Bibliothek, als auch 
subjektive Bewertungen der Studierenden mit ein. 
Sowohl in der Wertung der Studierenden als auch in der Gesamtwertung konnte sich 
die FSU Jena knapp gegen die TU Dresden durchsetzen.  
Der Studie zu folge bieten die FSU Jena und die TU Dresden das breiteste Lehrangebot 
in den neuen Bundesländern. Außerdem verfügen beide Universitäten über ein 
angemessenes, wenn auch nicht optimales Betreuungsverhältnis, verglichen mit den 
anderen Universitäten der neuen Bundesländer. Die Studierenden an beiden 
Universitäten gaben ihren Dozenten erstaunlich gute Gesamtnoten, auch wenn in 
einzelnen Teilbereichen noch Verbesserungsbedarf besteht. Weitere Kriterien der 
Evaluation waren die Ausstattung der Unis insgesamt und insbesondere die der 
Bibliotheken. Auch in dieser Kategorie schnitten sowohl die FSU Jena als auch die TU 
Dresden gut ab. Beide Universitäten decken den entstehenden Bedarf an Material 
ausreichend ab. So werden z.B. mehrmals im Jahr in beiden Universitätsbibliotheken 
Neuanschaffungen getätigt. Zudem reagieren die Bibliotheken schnell auf die 
Lehrbuchempfehlungen der Professoren.  
Und wie sieht es mit der Qualität der Lehre aus? Dazu äußert sich Prof. Dr. Günther 
Hoffmann, der Referent für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Technischen Universität Dresden, 
wie folgt: „Wer derzeit in Ostdeutschland die bestmögliche Hochschulausbildung 
absolvieren will, ist gut beraten, sich in Jena oder Dresden zu immatrikulieren. Das 
garantiert eine Top-Ausbildung in einem sehr guten Lehr- und Lernklima. Dies hat die 
Studie ganz klar gezeigt – die anderen ostdeutschen Unis müssen viel tun, um 
aufzuholen.“ 
 
+ Westdeutschland (SL, RP, NW, HE) 
+ Süddeutschland (BY, BW) 
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Auditory Presented Information about Andorra (Study 4): 
 
Andorra ist einer von sechs europäischen Zwergstaaten. Andorra ist flächenmäßig der 
größte der europäischen Zwergstaaten. Es befindet sich in den östlichen Pyrenäen 
zwischen Spanien und Frankreich. Andorra wurde am 8. September 1278 gegründet. Es ist 
das einzige Land der Welt, bei dem gleich zwei ausländische Amtsträger die Funktion des 
Staatsoberhaupts wahrnehmen. Die derzeit geltende Verfassung ist von 1993. 
Staatsoberhäupter sind ein spanische Bischof und der französische Staatspräsident. Die 
exekutive Gewalt wurde einem dem Parlament verantwortlichen Ministerpräsidenten 
übertragen. 
 
Andorra hat 81.222 Einwohner. Das jährliche Bevölkerungswachstum beträgt 5,0 %. Der 
überwiegende Teil der Einwohner Andorras spricht die Amtssprache Katalanisch. 
Außerdem bekennt sich der Großteil der Andorraner zur Römisch-Katholischen Kirche. 
Zusätzlich gibt es verschiedene protestantische und eine jüdische Gemeinde.  Die 
Staatsbürgerschaft kann erst nach 25 Jahren Aufenthalt erworben werden. Heute ist 
Andorra Mitglied der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, des 
Europarats und der Vereinten Nationen. Das Parlament hat 28 Mitglieder. 
 
Das Land Andorra liegt in einem Hochtal der Pyrenäen. Mehr als ein Drittel Andorras liegt 
oberhalb der Waldgrenze. Der höchste Berg ist 2946 Meter hoch.  Der niedrigste Punkt ist 
840 Meter hoch. In der subalpinen Zone herrschen Wälder mit Rotkiefern und 
Schwarzfichten vor. In höheren Gebirgslagen findet man Gämsen, Murmeltiere sowie 
Auerhühner. Im Januar liegen die Temperaturen im Mittel bei -7 °C. Die Grenze zu 
Frankreich hat eine Länge von 56,6 km und die Grenze zu Spanien ist 63,7 km lang.  
 
Die frühesten Funde menschlichen Lebens in Andorra gehen bis auf die erste Eiszeit 
zurück. Im Zuge der Völkerwanderung vermischten sich Reste verdrängter Basken mit 
westgotischen Eroberern. Andorra ist seit der Zeit Karls des Großen unabhängig. 1419 
wurde ein primitives Parlament geschaffen. Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts befand sich 
Andorra in einer wirtschaftlich und institutionell schwierigen Lage. Die Französische 
Revolution führte in Frankreich zur Nicht-Anerkennung des Staates Andorra.  Das 
Wahlrecht für alle volljährigen Männer wurde 1933 eingeführt. Das Wahlrecht für Frauen 
wurde erst 1971 eingeführt. 
 
 
Multiple Choice Questions about Andorra (Study 4)10:  
 
 
Zu Block 1:  
 
1. Zwischen welchen beiden Ländern liegt Andorra? 
- Spanien und Portugal 
- Spanien und Frankreich 
- Frankreich und Italien 
- Italien und Österreich 
- Italien und Schweiz.  
 
                                                 
10 The right answer is bold.  
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2. In welchem Jahr wurde Andorra gegründet? 
- 1182 
- 1156 
- 1278 
- 1237 
- 1319 
 
3. Wie viele Zwergstaaten gibt es in Europa? 
- 3 
- 4 
- 5 
- 6 
- 7 
 
4. Im Vergleich zu den anderen Zwergstaaten ist Andorra der… 
- größte 
- zweitgrößte 
- drittgrößte 
- kleinste 
- zweitkleinste 
 
5. Wie viele andere Länder der Welt gibt es, in denen zwei ausländische Amtsträger 
die Funktion des Staatsoberhaupts wahrnehmen? 
-     vier weitere Länder 
-     drei weitere Länder 
- zwei weitere Länder 
- ein weiteres Land 
- kein weiteres Land 
 
6. Wann wurde die derzeit geltende Verfassung von Andorra gegründet? 
- 1974 
- 1989 
- 1991 
- 1993 
- 1994 
 
7. Wer sind die beiden Staatsoberhäupter? 
- ein spanischer Bischof und der italienische Präsident 
- ein italienischer Bischof und der italienische Präsident 
- ein spanischer Bischof und der französische Präsident 
- ein italienscher Bischof und der französische Präsident 
- ein französischer Bischof und der spanische Präsident 
 
8. Wer hat die exekutive Macht in Andorra? 
- das Parlament 
- die beiden ausländischen Staatsoberhäupter 
- der Ministerpräsident 
- der französische Präsident 
- Das Parlament und der Ministerpräsident 
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Zu Block 2:  
 
1. Wie viele Einwohner hat Andorra? 
- 102.013 
- 93.679 
- 81.222 
- 72.453 
- 50.432 
 
2. Wie hoch ist das jährliche Bevölkerungswachstum? 
- 1,5% 
- 2,3% 
- 4,6% 
- 5,0% 
- 5,2 % 
 
3. Was ist die Amtssprache Andorras? 
- Französisch 
- Deutsch 
- Italienisch 
- Spanisch 
- Katalanisch 
 
4. Zu welcher Kirche bekennt sich der Großteil der Andorraner? 
- Zur protestantischen Kirche 
- Zur römisch-katholischen Kirche 
- Zur alt-römischen Kirche  
- Zum jüdischen Glauben 
- Zur orthodoxen Kirche 
 
5. Wie viele jüdische Gemeinden gibt es in Andorra? 
- eine 
- drei 
- fünf 
- sieben 
- acht 
 
6. Nach wie vielen Jahren Aufenthalt kann die Staatsbürgerschaft erworben werden? 
- nach 10 Jahren 
- nach 15 Jahren 
- nach 17 Jahren 
- nach 20 Jahren 
- nach 25 Jahren  
 
7.   Bei welchen Organisationen ist Andorra Mitglied? 
- Europarat und Vereinte Nationen 
- OSZE, Europarat und Vereinte Nationen 
- OSZE und Europarat 
- Europäische Union und Europarat 
- OSZE, Europäische Union und Vereinte Nationen 
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8.   Wie viele Mitglieder hat das Parlament von Andorra? 
- 22 
- 25 
- 26 
- 28 
- 29 
 
 
Zu Block 3:  
 
1.   Wo genau liegt Andorra? 
- in einem Hochtal der Pyrenäen 
- in einem Tal der Pyrenäen 
- in einem Hochtal der Alpen 
- in einem Tal der Alpen 
- in einem Hochplateau der Pyrenäen 
 
2.   Wie viel Prozent Andorras liegt oberhalb der Waldgrenze? 
- ein fünftel  
- ein Viertel 
- ein drittel 
- die Hälfte 
- das gesamte Land 
 
3.   Wie hoch ist der höchste Berg Andorras? 
- knapp 2000 Meter 
- knapp 2500 Meter 
- knapp 2700 Meter 
- knapp 3000 Meter 
- knapp 3500 Meter  
 
4.   Wie hoch ist der niedrigste Punkt Andorras? 
- 560 Meter 
- 620 Meter 
- 760 Meter 
- 840 Meter 
- 930 Meter 
 
5.   Welche Bäume wachsen überwiegend in Andorra? 
- Weißtannen und Nordmanntannen 
- Weißtannen und Rotkiefern 
- Rotkiefern und Schwarzfichten 
- Schwarzfichten und Nordmanntannen 
- Rottannen und Schwarzfichten 
 
6.   Welche Tiere findet man in Andorra in hohen Gebirgslagen neben Gemsen und      
Murmeltieren? 
- Auerhühner 
- Eulen 
- Luchse 
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- Fasane 
- Bären 
 
7.   Wie viel Grad sind es im Januar im Mittel in Andorra? 
- Null Grad Celsius 
- Minus 2 Grad Celsius 
- Minus 5 Grad Celsius 
- Minus 7 Grad Celisius 
- Minus 8 Grad Celsius 
 
8.   Welche Grenze ist länger die zwischen Andorra und Spanien oder die zwischen 
Andorra und Frankreich? 
- beide sind gleich lang 
- die zu Frankreich ist länger 
- die zu Spanien ist länger 
- Andorra hat nur eine Grenze zu Spanien nicht zu Frankreich 
- Andorra hat weder eine Grenze zu Spanien noch zu Frankreich 
 
Zu Block 4:  
 
1.   Auf welche Zeit gehen die frühsten Befunde menschlichen Lebens in Andorra 
zurück? 
- auf vor der ersten Eiszeit 
- auf die erste Eiszeit 
- auf die zweite Eiszeit 
- auf die dritte Eiszeit 
- auf die vierte Eiszeit 
 
2.   Welche Völker vermischten sich im Zuge der Völkerwanderung? 
- Basken und ostgotische Eroberer 
- Basken und südgotische Eroberer 
- Goten und ostbaskische Eroberer  
- Basken und westgotische Eroberer 
- Goten und westgotische Eroberer 
 
3.  Seit wann ist Andorra unabhängig? 
- Seit 1952  
- Seit dem 2. Weltkrieg 
- Seit dem 1. Weltkrieg 
- Seit der französischen Revolution 
- Seit Karl dem Großen 
  
4.   Wann wurde ein primitives Parlament geschaffen? 
- 1256 
- 1419 
- 1489  
- 1603 
- 1674 
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5.   In was für einer Lage befand sich Andorra Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts? 
- in einer revolutionären Lage 
- in einer Lage des wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs 
- in einer wirtschaftlich und institutionell schwierigen Lage 
- in einer politisch instabilen Lage 
- in einer schwierigen innenpolitischen Lage  
 
 
6.   Welchen Einfluss hatte die französische Revolution auf Andorra? 
- sie stärkte das Land 
- sie schwabte aus Andorra über 
- sie beeinflusste das Land nicht 
- sie führte zu einer Nicht-Anerkennung des Staates  
- sie sorgte für innenpolitische Unruhen  
 
7.   Wann wurde das Wahlrecht für alle volljährigen Männer in Andorra eingeführt? 
- 1920 
- 1933 
- 1939 
- 1945 
- 1958 
 
8.   Wann wurde das Wahlrecht für Frauen eingeführt? 
- 1948 
- 1950 
- 1968 
- 1971 
- 1979 
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8. Summary 
 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) group members are 
motivated to maintain or enhance positive distinctiveness of their ingroup compared to 
outgroups on relevant dimensions. This assumption was reformulated in the self-esteem 
hypothesis by Abrams and Hogg (1988) in a way that it could be tested empirically. The 
first corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis (SEH1) postulates that “successful intergroup 
discrimination will enhance social identity, and hence self-esteem” (p. 320). The second 
corollary (SEH2) postulates that “low or threatened self-esteem will promote intergroup 
discrimination because of the ‘need’ for positive self-esteem” (p. 320). 
 Rubin and Hewstone (1998) published a review summarizing studies empirically 
testing the two self-esteem hypothesis. Whereas the first corollary (successful intergroup 
discrimination enhances social identity) was empirically supported, the second corollary 
(low or threatened self-esteem promotes intergroup discrimination) was not supported 
empirically. In contrast, eight of ten studies showed an opposite relation: High self-esteem 
led to an increased motivation to show intergroup discrimination. When investigating the 
studies summarized by Rubin and Hewstone (1998) in detail, one notices that several 
studies focused on ‘low self-esteem’ and measured pretest self-esteem, which was then 
correlated with the motivation of the participants to show intergroup discrimination (e.g., 
Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). Other researchers focused 
on ‘threatened self-esteem’ and operationalized it in a way that they measured self-esteem 
and then threatened self-esteem by negative performance feedback (Brockener & Chen, 
1996; Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker, Thompson, 
McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Seta & Seta; 1992). These later studies show consistently that 
when participants’ high self-esteem was threatened this led to an increased ingroup 
favoritism and/or outgroup derogation. This relation was first found for personal self-
esteem (Crocker et al., 1987; Brockener & Chen, 1996, Brown et al., 1988; Seta & Seta, 
1992), later also for group-based self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).  
 In line with these empirical findings I argue that especially people with high group-
based self-esteem are motivated to use identity management strategies when the positive 
group image is not supported by the environment, but, when people are threatened by 
negative information. As soon as a discrepancy between the expected feedback and the real 
feedback occurs, people are motivated to show intergroup discrimination with the goal to 
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restore their social identity. To test assumptions derived from the presented argumentation 
I developed two research lines.   
 In a first research line I extended the self-esteem hypothesis by stating that 
intergroup discrimination is not the only strategy to protect group-based self-esteem 
against threat, but, that all in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) mentioned 
identity management strategies can do so. Within social identity theory three different 
types of identity management strategies were distinguished: 1) individual mobility, 
meaning that group members leave the negative evaluated ingroup and join a higher status 
group. 2) Social competition, meaning that the outgroup is directly challenged to compete 
by the ingroup and 3) social creativity, which is a very broad category, for example 
including a cognitive redefinition of the comparison situation. In the presented work I 
focused on the first two identity management strategies and derived the following research 
hypothesis: 1) Threatened high group-based self-esteem will promote the use of social 
competition. Concerning individual mobility I tested two competing hypotheses: 2a) Group 
members with initially low group-based self-esteem are going to show an increased 
tendency to leave the group after their group is threatened versus 2b) Group members 
having initially low group-based self-esteem will show a reduced tendency to leave their 
group after their group is threatened. 3) Furthermore, I postulated that the relation between 
threatened high group-based self-esteem and social competition is mediated by anger. 
These hypotheses were tested in three studies. The results of Study 1 and 2 supported 
hypotheses 1 and 2b. Group members high in group-based self-esteem reported an 
increased motivation to show social competition after being threatened compared to group 
members low in group-based self-esteem. Group members low in group-based self-esteem 
reported an increased motivation to leave their group only when they were not threatened. 
As soon as they received negative information about their group (threat) their motivation to 
leave the group decreased. The results of Study 2 showed that in line with the assumptions 
of the realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) threat led to an increase relevance of group 
membership. This seemed to cause the decreased motivation to leave the group. The results 
of the third study supported the postulated full mediation of anger between group-based 
self-esteem and social competition.     
In a second research line I postulated that there are situations within which it is not 
possible to restore one’s positive social identity by deploying identity management 
strategies. First, in line with the empirical finding by Coull and colleagues (Coull, Vincent, 
Castano, Paladino, & Leemans, 2001), I postulated that deploying identity management 
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strategies needs cognitive resources. This hypothesis was tested in Study 4. The results 
showed that group members high in group-based self-esteem indeed did need more 
cognitive resources when they received threatening information than did participants low 
in group-based self-esteem. Second, I postulated that by inducing cognitive load it would 
be possible to inhibit the use of identity management strategies. Participants high in group-
based self-esteem were assumed to be especially motivated to restore their group-based 
self-esteem when being threatened. Whenever these participants were not able to 
successful manage their social identity because of cognitive load, this should lead to a 
decrease in posttest group-based self-esteem and an increase in anger.  
In a fifth study I showed that the spontaneous use of identity management strategies 
can be inhibited through cognitive load. Participants receiving threatening information and 
working under cognitive load showed a decrease in posttest group-based self-esteem and 
an increase in negative emotions (e.g., anger) compared to participants low in group-based 
self-esteem. In this study the relation between threat and cognitive load was independent of 
the initial level of group-based self-esteem. I assume that this was due to the fact that in the 
investigated sample the overall level of initial group-based self-esteem was very high, 
resulting in low variance. In two further studies, sample with larger variance in group-
based self-esteem were used. The results of these studies revealed that the level of posttest 
anger was influenced by the pretest level of group-based self-esteem, threat, and cognitive 
load. In line with my hypotheses, participants high in group-based self-esteem when 
threatened and working under cognitive load showed an increase in anger. This three-way 
interaction was found with two different operationalizations of cognitive load. However, in 
both studies the postulated pattern for posttest group-based self-esteem was not found. This 
missing effect might be due to the used explicit scales measuring group-based self-esteem.   
In sum, this thesis investigated the role of group-based self-esteem and its 
interaction with threat on the choice of different identity management strategies. The 
presented results illuminate the motivational dynamics that underlie social identity theory. 
They offer a substantial contribution to research on the self-esteem hypothesis because 
research hitherto investigated intergroup bias as the only strategy. Moreover, the presented 
work investigated the effect of using versus inhibiting identity management strategies on 
anger and group-based self-esteem. The results showed that the use of identity 
management strategies can be inhibited by inducing cognitive load. This line of research 
constitutes a novel approach to study underlying dynamics of social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979).  
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9. Zusammenfassung 
  
Eine zentrale Annahme der Theorie der Sozialen Identität (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
besagt, dass Mitglieder einer Gruppe durch Intergruppenvergleiche versuchen, eine 
positive soziale Identität ihrer Gruppe im Vergleich zu einer Fremdgruppe herzustellen. 
Diese Annahme ist in der so genannten Selbstwerthypothese (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) in 
einer empirisch testbaren Weise neu dargelegt worden. Die Selbstwerthypothese postuliert 
zum einen, dass erfolgreiche Intergruppendiskriminierung die soziale Identität und somit 
den Selbstwert erhöht (Teil 1 der Selbstwerthypothese; S. 320), und zum anderen, dass 
niedriger oder bedrohter Selbstwert den Wunsch nach Intergruppendiskriminierung 
aufgrund des Strebens nach positivem Selbstwert erhöht (Teil 2 der Selbstwerthypothese; 
S. 320). Rubin und Hewstone publizierten 1998 einen Übersichtsartikel, der Studien 
zusammenfasste, die die beiden Teile der Selbstwerthypothese empirisch überprüften. 
Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass während der erste Teil der Selbstwerthypothese 
(erfolgreiche Intergruppendiskriminierung erhöht die soziale Identität und somit den 
Selbstwert) empirisch belegt werden konnte, der zweite Teil der Selbstwerthypothese 
(niedriger oder bedrohter Selbstwert erhöht den Wunsch nach 
Intergruppendiskriminierung) nicht bestätigt werden konnte. Im Gegenteil, es zeigte sich, 
dass acht von zehn Studien den umgekehrten Zusammenhang fanden: Hoher Selbstwert 
führte zum verstärkten Wunsch nach Intergruppendiskriminierung. Betrachtet man die in 
der Arbeit von Rubin und Hewstone (1998) zitierten Studien genauer, so stellt man fest, 
dass zahlreiche Studien die Formulierung niedrigen Selbstwert aufgriffen und dann 
lediglich den pretest Selbstwert erhoben und diesen mit der Möglichkeit, die eigene 
Gruppe zu bevorzugen oder die Fremdgruppe zu benachteiligen, korrelierten (z.B. Crocker 
& Schwartz, 1985; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). Andere Wissenschaftler und 
Wissenschaftlerinnen fokussierten auf die  Formulierung „bedrohter Selbstwert“ und 
operationalisierten diesen indem sie zunächst den Selbstwert erhoben und diesen dann 
durch Misserfolgsrückmeldung bedrohten (Brockener & Chen, 1996; Brown, Collins, & 
Schmidt, 1988; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 
1987; Seta & Seta; 1992). Diese Studien zeigten wiederholt, dass diejenigen 
Versuchspersonen, deren hoher Selbstwert bedroht worden war, verstärkt mit einer 
Bevorzugung der Eigengruppe und/oder einer Abwertung der Fremdgruppe reagierten. 
Diese Zusammenhänge wurden zunächst für personalen (Brockener & Chen, 1996; Brown 
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et al., 1988; Crocker et al., 1987; Seta & Seta, 1992), später auch für gruppenbasierter 
Selbstwert gezeigt (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).  
 In Übereinstimmung mit diesen empirischen Befunden argumentiere ich, dass vor 
allem Personen mit einem hohen gruppenbasierten Selbstwert, d.h. Personen, die ein sehr 
positives Bild ihrer Gruppe besitzen, dann motiviert sind Management-Strategien 
anzuwenden, wenn dieses positive Bild der Eigengruppe durch durch negative 
Informationen aus der Umwelt bedroht wird. In dem Moment, in dem eine Diskrepanz 
zwischen der erwarteten Rückmeldung und der tatsächlich erhaltenen Rückmeldung 
entsteht, zeigen diese Personen eine hohe Motivation zur Intergruppendiskriminierung, mit 
dem Ziel, die positive soziale Identität ihrer Gruppe wieder herzustellen. Um die aus 
diesem Modell abgeleiteten Annahmen empirisch zu überprüfen entwickelte ich zwei 
Forschungslinien, deren Ergebnisse im Folgenden dargestellt werden.  
Im ersten Schritt erweiterte ich die Selbstwerthypothese um die Annahme, dass 
nicht nur Intergruppendiskriminierung eine mögliche Strategie darstellt, um die Gruppe 
vor der Bedrohung des gruppenbasierten Selbstwerts zu schützen, sondern alle in der 
Theorie der Sozialen Identität (Tajfel & Turner, 1997) postulierten Identitäts-Management-
Strategien dafür in Frage kommen. Bereits in den frühen Arbeiten zur Theorie der Sozialen 
Identität wurden drei verschiedene Gruppen der Identitäts-Management-Strategien 
unterschieden: 1) Individuelle Mobilität, das Verlassen der negativ bewerteten 
Eigengruppe und das Anschließen an eine statushöhere Gruppe; 2) Sozialer Wettbewerb, 
das Herausfordern der Fremdgruppe zu einem direkten Wettbewerb und 3) Soziale 
Kreativität, eine breite Kategorie, die z.B. die kognitive Re-Definition der 
Vergleichssituation einschließt. In der vorgestellten Arbeit fokussierte ich auf die beiden 
ersten Identitäts-Management-Strategien und leitete folgende Forschungshypothesen ab: 1) 
Bedrohter gruppenbasierter Selbstwert führt zu der Motivation in sozialen Wettbewerb mit 
der Fremdgruppe zu treten. 2a) Gruppenmitglieder, die einen niedrigen gruppenbasierter 
Selbstwert haben, werden entweder eine verstärkte Motivation haben, ihre Gruppe zu 
verlassen, sobald sie bedroht werden, oder 2b) sie werden nur dann die Motivation haben 
ihre Gruppe zu verlassen, wenn sie nicht bedroht werden. 3) Der Zusammenhang zwischen 
bedrohtem hohen gruppen-basiertem Selbstwert und sozialem Wettbewerb ist durch Ärger 
mediiert. Diese Hypothesen wurden in drei Studien getestet. Die Ergebnisse von Studien 1 
und 2 bestätigen die Hypothesen 1 und 2b. Gruppenmitglieder mit einem hohen 
gruppenbasierten Selbstwert zeigten nach bedrohenden Informationen eine erhöhte 
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Motivation nach sozialem Wettbewerb im Vergleich zu Gruppenmitgliedern mit niedrigem 
gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert. Gruppenmitglieder mit niedrigem gruppenbasiertem 
Selbstwert zeigten nur, wenn ihre Gruppe nicht bedroht wurde, die Motivation ihre Gruppe 
zu verlassen. Sobald ihre Gruppe bedroht wurde, gaben sie einen verringerten Wunsch an, 
die Gruppe zu verlassen. Die Ergebnisse von Studie 2 legen die Hypothese nahe, dass die 
Bedrohung entsprechend der Annahmen der Theorie des Realistischen Konflikts (Sherif, 
1966) zu einer erhöhten Relevanz der Gruppenmitgliedschaft führte. Dadurch sank die 
Bereitschaft individuelle Mobilität zu zeigen. Die Ergebnisse der dritten Studie bestätigten 
eine volle Mediation des Zusammenhangs zwischen gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert und 
sozialem Wettbewerb durch Ärger.   
In einem zweiten Schritt postulierte ich, dass es Situationen gibt in denen es 
Gruppenmitgliedern nicht möglich ist, das negative Vergleichsergebnis durch das 
Anwenden einer Identitäts-Management-Strategie auszugleichen. Zunächst postulierte ich 
unter der Berücksichtigung der empirischen Ergebnisse einer Studie von Coull und 
Kollegen (Coull, Vincent, Castano, Paladino, & Leemans, 2001), dass das Anwenden von 
selbstwertdienlichen Strategien, wie den Identitäts-Management-Strategien, kognitive 
Ressourcen benötigt. Dies überprüfte ich in der 4. Studie und fanden Belege, dass 
Personen, die einen hohen gruppenbasierten Selbstwert besitzen, tatsächlich mehr 
Ressourcen zur Verarbeitung von negativen Informationen über die Gruppe benötigen, als 
Personen mit einem niedrigen gruppenbasierten Selbstwert.  
Dann postulierte ich, dass das Induzieren von kognitiver Belastung zu einer 
Inhibition von Identitäts-Management-Strategien führt. Es wurde angenommen, dass 
Gruppenmitglieder mit hohem gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert besonders motiviert sein 
sollten eine Identitäts-Management-Strategie anzuwenden, wenn sie bedrohende 
Informationen erhielten. Wenn nun diese Gruppenmitglieder nicht in der Lage waren ihre 
soziale Identität erfolgreich zu managen, weil dies durch kognitive Belastungen verhindert 
wurde, so sollten sie eine Abnahme an posttest gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert und eine 
Zunahme an Ärger zeigen. In Studie 5 konnte ich zeigen, dass die spontane Verwendung 
von Identitäts-Management-Strategien durch das Induzieren von kognitiver Belastung 
inhibiert werden kann. Das Induzieren von Bedrohung und kognitiver Belastung führte zu 
einem Abfall von posttest gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert und einer Zunahme an negativen 
Emotionen, wie Ärger. In dieser Studie war der Zusammenhang von kognitiver Belastung 
und Bedrohung jedoch unabhängig von dem Niveau des gruppenbasierten pretest 
Selbstwertes. Dies ist darauf zurück zu führen, dass in der untersuchten Stichprobe das 
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Niveau des gruppenbasierten Selbstwerts von vorneherein extrem hoch war, was zu einer 
reduzierten Varianz führte. In zwei weiteren Studien (Studie 6 und 7) wurden daher 
Stichproben mit größerer Varianz in ihrem gruppenbasierten Selbstwert verwendet. Es 
konnte gezeigt werden, dass das Niveau des empfunden Ärgers von der Interaktion 
zwischen gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert, Bedrohung und kognitive Belastung abhing. 
Entsprechend der Hypothesen zeigten die Versuchspersonen, die ein hohes Maß an 
gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert aufwiesen wenn sie bedroht und kognitiv belastet wurden, 
erhöhten Ärger. Diese Dreifach-Interaktion wurde in zwei Studien mit verschiedenen 
Manipulationen von kognitiver Belastung gefunden. In beiden Studien zeigte sich jedoch 
der Abfall von gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert nach der Bedrohung und unter kognitiver 
Belastung nicht. Dies ist wahrscheinlich auf die verwendeten expliziten Skalen 
zurückzuführen.    
Zusammenfassend trägt die vorliegende Dissertation dazu bei, die motivationalen 
Grundlagen der Theorie der sozialen Identität genauer zu beleuchten. Dazu wurde die 
Rolle von gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert in Zusammenwirkung mit Bedrohung auf die Wahl 
verschiedener Identitäts-Management-Strategien untersucht. Dies stellt einen wichtigen 
Beitrag im Rahmen der Forschung zu der Selbstwerthypothese da, da sich diese Forschung 
bisher ausschließlich mit Intergruppendiskriminierung befasst hat. Zusätzlich hat sich die 
vorliegende Arbeit mit dem dynamischen Zusammenhang von der Anwendung von 
Identitäts-Management-Strategien auf die Erhöhung von gruppenbasiertem Selbstwert 
beschäftigt. In der Arbeit konnte gezeigt werden, dass es möglich ist die Verwendung von 
Identitäts-Management-Strategien durch das Induzieren von kognitiver Belastung zu 
unterdrücken. Auch bei dieser Forschungslinie handelt es sich um einen neuen Ansatz, da 
bislang die dynamischen Prozesse in der Theorie der sozialen Identität (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) noch nicht ausreichend untersucht wurden.   
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